In this book, Kawase indicates the parallelism between the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Henry and those of the Japanese psychiatrist-philosopher Bin Kimura around the “phenomenology of life”. The “phenomenology of life” is elaborated by the French philosopher to innovate “proto-phenomenology”, which derives mainly from Husserlian phenomenology. Although Kimura never mentioned Henry’s “phenomenology of life”, Kawase dares to link his thoughts by means of Kimura’s philosophy on life. For Kimura, life had two dimensions: “bios” as the individual life of living beings and “zōē” as life in general.
  In this review, we support Kawase’s philosophy for presenting new thoughts on life. Concurrently, we have some questions regarding this philosophy. First, how can we think of life as “zōē” through life as “bios”? According to Kawase, it is fine art that connects these two forms of life. We would like to push this concept forward. Second, we wonder about Kawase’s opinion on the link between the two forms of life. According to his assertion, the sense of the link between these two forms of life seems to be lost in our modern daily life; however, if this link really exists, this sense would be received with too much enthusiasm. We hypothesize that there are those who have yet this sense; for example, some autists find the connection with the whole world, or life as “zōē, ” in their daily lives. We conclude that this book has the potential to let us realize that we, as well as this type of person, can find this sense calmly in our life as “bios”.

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  Dans la conclusion de Généalogie de la psychanalyse. Le commencement perdu (1985), ouvrage constitué des textes des séminaires tenus à l’université d’Osaka, Michel Henry a fait mention de « mille et une statues de Kannon Bosatsu » qui se place au Sajūsangen dō de Kyoto. Il affirmait avec raison que Kannon, la déesse de la compassion, est la puissance, c’est-à-dire « la possibilité infinie et indéfinie de donner et de sauver ». Malgré cette remarque, Henry n’a jamais abordé la question de la compassion, de l’aumône, dont la puissance est censé appartenir à Kannon, dans le texte de cet ouvrage où le vouloir-vivre chez Schopenhauer et la volonté de puissance chez Nietzsche ont été cependant soumis à l’analyse minutieuse. C’est d’autant plus curieux et incompréhensible que Schopenhauer avait mis l’idée de compassion (Mitleid) au centre de sa philosophie, vouée à provoquer la critique sévère de Nietzsche. Voici donc la question fondamentale qui doit se poser dans cet article: pourquoi Henry n’y a-t-il pas du tout examiné la compassion de près, bien qu’il ait tenté de trouver diverses idées significatives de la primauté de l’affectivité dans les textes de Schopenhauer et de Nietzsche? Ayant pour objet de résoudre cette question, l’analyse se compose de trois étapes: 1) prenant toute la perspective phénoménologique de son principal ouvrage L’essence de la manifestation (1963) en considération, nous expliquons comment Henry estime la compréhension schopenhauerienne de la vie ou de la souffrance; 2) nous constatons dans quel point la pensée de Nietzsche pour Henry arrive à surmonter des difficultés auxquelles Schopenhauer s’est heurté; 3) nous montrons quelles modifications la problématique de la compassion peut exercer sur ces interprétations de Schopenhauer et de Nietzsche dans Généalogie de la psychanalyse, et la rapportons au développement philosophique du dernier Henry.

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  This paper attempts to reconsider Michel Henry’s interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy in order to respond to Henry’s critique of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
  Henry’s interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Généalogie de la Psychanalyse shows an original view of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Simultaneously, it is also remarkable that, regarding key concepts of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, there are many differences between Schopenhauer’s own definitions and Henry’s interpretation of them. While these differences can be regarded as resulting from Henry’s arbitrary interpretation, this paper rather focusses on a methodological distinction between them as an important reason for their differences and reconsiders them from this viewpoint. While in L’Essence de la Manifestation Henry finds “affectivity” as a principle of Henry’s own thought on the one hand, in Généalogie de la Psychanalyse on the other hand Henry reinterprets the modern history of philosophy being based on the concept of “affectivity ” as a principle so that he also reconstructs Schopenhauer’s metaphysical thought explained in Die Welt als Wile und Vorstellung from this standpoint. Conversely, Schopenhauer’s description of metaphysics is principally based on the opposite methodology, i.e. the analytic method which starts from the given experience and attempts to reveal the higher philosophical principle. Based on this methodological distinction, this paper reconsiders Henry’s interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and attempts to respond to Henry’s critique from Schopenhauer’s standpoint, especially focussing on Henry’s critique of the concept of “will” in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Henry claims that Schopenhauer “glimpsed but not conceptualized” the “affectivity” so that he resulted in attributing a wider meaning to the concept of “will” as a metaphysical principle. From this viewpoint, Henry claims that Schopenhauer’s identification of “will” with the metaphysical principle should be regarded as resulting from a “falsification” of the “affectivity”. However, Schopenhauer is also engaged in this problem by dealing with the “denomination” of the reality of the world and therefore answers to this problem by conceding to the concept of “analogy” as playing a central role in his metaphysics.

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   Philosophy can be understood as caring for the soul. In certain Greco–Roman traditions, the methods and doctrines of some schools of philosophy were considered to be therapeutic. For instance, this is acknowledged in texts on ancient medicine, especially those under the name of Hippocrates and also in the teachings of Epicurus. The understanding of philosophy as such was discussed by Nussbaum (1994) and Hadot (1995, 2002), and today the understanding of philosophy as therapeutic or as part of exercices spirituels is considered to shed light on the important role of philosophy. Although philosophy is commonly understood as a purely theoretical activity aimed at discovering truth, it is also widely understood as a part of care that helps us live a healthy and rational life.
   Hutter and Friedland (2013) and Faustino (2017) situate Nietzsche’s work in this tradition. Nietzsche referred to himself as a “psychologist” and repeatedly referred to his diagnoses of decadence and asceticism. However, as Werkhoven (2017) noted, the issues that Nietzsche diagnosed may be peculiar to modern people. Hutter (2013) does not explicitly treat of this gap; nevertheless, a certain distinction is needed between Nietzsche and the ancient exemplars of this tradition. Nietzsche’s own description of his therapy focuses on the affirmation of life. This approach assumes the modern understanding of life after the death of God. Here, what is life? What kind of therapy did Nietzsche suggest his suffering contemporaries? To pursue these themes, in this article, I revisit Michel Henry's interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy in relation to the phenomenology of life. In this context, I draw attention to the phenomenological dimension of Nietzsche’s therapy. I situate both in the tradition of philosophy as the therapy of life, which is an extension of the tradition of philosophical care, which has its origins in ancient times.

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