The present article attempts to clarify the outlines of these fragments, by giving possible solutions to two main questions :(1), what were the votive offerings that the satyrs brought to the temple of Poseidon, and(2), what was the myth that provided the background of our satyr-play. (1) Many scholars take these votive offerings as satyr-masks following E. Fraenkel. By closer examination, however, we suggest that it is more appropriate for satyr-plays to suppose that they are the phalluses which the satyrs have taken off(as if they undressed). a13-17 probably mean that the satyrs' mother would mistake the phalluses hanged on pegs for her bald sons. The point of this joke seems to be that she is a woman. The purpose of their dedicating them may be therefore nothing but to keep off not only other contestants who perhaps have tapered and short (perhaps infibulated) genitals as the satyrs do, but also especially, the effeminate god, their master Dionysus. τω θεω(all)might imply 'to Dionysus'. (2) The second question depends on who is the speaker in c49-52 who has brought a newly-made toy(s)for the satyrs. Having shown that there is no good reason to suppose this speaker to be an ironworker, craftsman, or smith, and that it is possible that the toy(s) is a weapon, that is, war-chariot, we suggest that this speaker is Theseus who invented it according to Schol. Aid Ar. Nu 28(I 3. 1. 15, 7-9 Holwerda), and that thebackground of our play was therefore the legend of his foundation of the Isthmian Games. The speaker of al-2also seems to have been Theseus, son of Poseidon. If ξυνισθμιαζειν(c58)means that Theseus will participate in a chariot-race with one of the satyrs(probably as a passive partner)in a war-chariot which has room for two to stand, like the Actorione in II. 23. 638-642 who may be taken as Siamese twins by the audience, ισθμιαζειν must be taken in this meaning, that is, 'to participate in the Isthmian Games'. Thus, we conclude as follows. When it has been announced that the games will be held in Isthmus after Sinis was killed by Theseus, the satyrs who have run away from their master Dionysus in order to compete in the games, come to the temple of Poseidon and are about to hang the phalluses on the wall, intended as another Sinis. Just then Dionysus appears suddenly and their plan comes to nothing. In fr. c when the satyrs who have been reproached again by Dionysus for neglecting the dance, refuse to leave the temple, Theseus enters bearing a war-chariot and offers it to the satyrs who are alarmed at the sight of it, promising to participate in the games with them in return for providing him with a voyage home. It is not unlikely that the satyrs are driving here not chariots but mule-cars(cf. c49 Kcava)for which a race was introduced into the Olympian Games in 500 B.C. If πλουν(c57) indicates the return home of Theseus, finally he might leave for Athens with the satyrs in their ship. Therefore, it seems likely that the origin(aition) of προεδρια(cf. Plu. Thes. 25. 7)was described in our play. The favorite motif in satyr-plays of the satyrs' liberation from slavery may have been used. The title may be interpreted as 'spectators'.

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Who plays the role of keryx(Thesm. 295-311, 331-351, 372-380, 381a)? This question has been discussed with reference to the number of actors necessary for the production of Aristophanic comedy. Yet the question should be approached through a re-examination of the manner in which the chorus of festive women enters the orchestra, and of the exact location where Kedestes is sitting during the scenes of prayers and orations until he stands up to defend Euripides. The solution of F. V. Fritzsche adopted by most editors, that the two 4ia lines(381-2)should be given to the koryphaios, the other lines(295-311, 331 -351, 372-380)to one of actors, is still unacceptable for two difficulties. (A) As Ed. Fraenkel rightly pointed out, "σιγα σιωπα προσεχε τον νουν(381a) " cannot be separated from the remaining parts of keryx(295-311, 331-351, 372-380). (B)If the actor who has played the role of keryx exits just after his last word(380) , he must go out without any motivation or pretext before his proper duty is finished, and if he does not exit, he must remain silent on stage until the end of the play. Two attempts to solve these difficulties, one by C. Beer and another by W. Lange, are no less objectionable : (A)Beer's hiereia-theory is blamed for introducing the fifth actor and a new character, "Priestess of the Thesmophorion" curiously ignorant of the happenings in her sanctuary(cf. 759-61) , (B) Lange's koryphaios-theory for attributing to the keryx=korpyhaios a passive role of spectator which cannot be consistent with his role of procedural control : 381b χρεμπτεται γαρ ηδη 382 οπερ ποιουσ οι ρητορεσ. Μακραν εοικε λεξειν. I propose to give this one and half line(381b-382)to Kedestes, as an aside (cf. 45, 48, 50, 51, 57, Ach. 59, 64), and all the remaining parts(295-311, 331351, 373-380, 381a)to the keryx=koryphaios. The following observations support this distribution : (A) The role of adding an affirmative reason of silence is proper to Kedestes, as he has been sent as a spy in the orations(588 των λογων κατασκοποσ cf. 292-4). (B) Kedestes is sitting not among but apart from the women, and looking into their ritual activity represented as a drama within a drama(cf. Ran. 311-412). (C) The chorus of women has entered not before πρωτη λεξι&b.sigmav; but accompanied by the biddings of koryphaios like other parodoi. This interpretation conforms to the dramatic conventions as shown by the following comparisons. I. [A] A hero notices the chorus drawing near(A. Cho. 10-2, S. OC 111 -2, E. El. 107-9, Ar. Ach.238, Ran.312-5 cf. Thesm.280-1). [B] He prays to gods for his success(A. Cho. 18-9, S. OC 84-110 cf. Thesm. 282 -3, 286-8). [C] He conceals himself(A. Cho.20-1, S. OC 113-5, E. El. 111-219, Ar. Ran. 315-22 cf. Thesm. 294), [D] with a word εκποδων(A. Cho.20, S. OC 113, Ar. Ach.240 cf. Thesm. 293)and [E] a proverbial expression(S. OC 115-6 cf. Thesm. 294). [F] He sits down(Ar. Ran. 315, S. El. 109 cf. Thesm. 292). II. The chorus enters singing and dancing(A. Cho. 22-105, S. OC 117-37, Ar. Ach. 241-79, Ran. 324-413). III. The hero appears before the chorus(A. Cho. 212, S. OC 138, Ar. Ach. 280-3, Ran. 413 cf. Thesm. 466). IV. An amoibaion, stichomythia or battle-scene follows(A. Cho. 212-224, S. OC 138-227, Ar. Ach. 284-357, Ran. 413-439 cf. Thesm. 533-70). Here exists a strong parallelism between Thesm. 280-570 and the other "eavesdropping" scenes. Fraenkel finds difficulty in the meter at 381 : "... bleibt bei dieser Anordnung ganz unverstandlich, warum die Heroldin nach alien ihren bisherigen Trimetern plotzlich in Tetrameter ubergeht, von denen sie jedoch nicht einmal den ersten zu Ende fuhrt." But the first(381) of 4ia lines following 3ia ones cannot be called 4ia so long as it is not finished. According to my distribution Kedestes influences the nature of meter with the abrupt change of style and point of view, while the speech of

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There were many kinds of state officials involved in the administration of the democracy in classical Athens. We can confirm some of them in Athenaion Politeia by Aristotle. Athens also had many religious state officials, priests, religious assistants and consultants for deliberation and supervision of religious matters or performing festivals, rituals and rites. Exegetes (pl. exegetai) is one of these religious professions. The characteristics, features and roles of the exegetai in classical Athens are discussed. Exegetai make an appearance in Laws by Plato. They are not priests, but high state officials who engage in legislation, consultation and expounding the laws or religious conventions. It seems that nine persons were elected by the people and then three appointed by Delphi. Not of all the description by Plato is a reflection of exegetai in classical Athens, but with due regard for the account of exegetes in Euthyphro, which seems to describe a real event of consulting exegetes, the author thinks that the reference to exegetai in Plato's Laws reflects the facts to some extent. Previous studies about types, roles and distribution of office duties of exegetai have chiefly depended upon inscriptions after the 2nd century B.C. and an explanation about exegetai by Timaios and other lexicographers. However, the Timaios' definition of exegetai is only a summary of descriptions of exegetai in Plato's Laws. Therefore, we should not apply the pictures of exegetai after the 2nd century B.C. to that of exegetai in classical Athens. As the result of studying historical materials on the exegetai, there were two types of exegetes in classical Athens. One was an exegetes of the Athenian state and the other was exegetai of the Eumolpidae. According to the relations of exegetes with gods and temples, they were not priests, but state officials for life. They had some relation to Delphi. There was one exegetes of Athens and was engaged in expounding and instructing with regard to sacred and ancestral laws (patria) or customs about purifications, festivals, rituals, funerals, weddings and so on. There were several exegetai of the Eumolpidae and they chiefly took part in the Eleusinian Mysteries. Finally, the author regards Lampon as an exegetes in classical Athens. Lampon was a friend of Perikles and a famous diviner. He had greater competence and authority than a diviner and played an important role as an exegetes in an inscription in late 5th century B.C.(IG, I^3, 78). The results of my study will provide some clues to the answer questions about the origin and transition of exegetai. This will be my next subject.

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At the end of the sixth century B.C., the Athenians began to establish colonies. This fact may indicate that the Athenian colonization is the starting point of a new era of Greek colonization. For approximately 200 years thereafter, the Athenians continued at intervals to establish colonies broadly along the northern shore from the Black Sea to Thracia, on the islands of the Aegean Sea, and on the southern tip of the Italian peninsula by the Adrian Sea. This Athenian colonization had, indeed, characteristics basically common to the other Greek colonies, but they had a unique character as well. This unique has been said to lie in the fact that although the typical Greek colonies "apoikia" forfeit their citizenship in the mother city, the Athenian colonies kept it. These Athenian colonies and the relation to the mother city, which was strengthened by maintaining citizenship in the mother city, have been called "cleruchia" by scholars, and recognized as one method of building an empire, i.e. "military colonies". There is no doubt that the Athenian colonies were used to establish an empire, but a question arises whether citizenship of the Athenian colonists was alternatively either forfeited or kept. This paper recognizes the citizenship of the Athenian colonists, not as a programmed alternative but as that having dual aspects ; both cutting off from the mother city and binding to the mother city, depending on the circumstances. Firstly, materials on the citizenship of the Athenian colonists will be examined and the lack of an alternative will be pointed out. Secondly, how the lack of an alternative has been understood by scholars will be shown and the unsolved contradictions will be pointed out. There are three points ; 1. Some colonists were not called Athenians, the Lemnians for example. This could mean that they were the citizens of the colony. 2. The colonists belonged to their original tribes and demes in Athens. This may indicate that they were Athenians. 3. In fact, they were able to return to their mother city and function as Athenian citizens. Finally, the contradiction will be solved by examining the inscription of Naupactian colonists from the East Lokris in about 460 B.C. (ML20) indicating the relation between these three contradictory factors. In conclusion, citizenship of the Athenian colonists in the fifth century B. C. must be separated into two groups ; one is that of colonists establishing a new polis and the other is that of colonist not establishing a new polis. The colonists of the latter were called "Athenians" and recognized as Athenians living abroad. However, those in the former category were called "Lemnians" for example. This means that they became citizens of their own colony in order to engage in the practical needs for their new polis. In this aspect, they were separated from their mother city. At the same time, they belonged to their original tribes and demes in Athen. This was not nominal, but a proof that they would be Athenian citizens again in future after returning to their mother city. In this aspect, they were connected to their mother city. The main purpose of their connection might be maintenance of an interchangeable land tenure between the colony and mother city. Actually, they returned to their mother city and were able to become Athenians again by declaring at the assembly of the demes to which they belonged in Athen, and being recognized by other members of the demes. The factor which made possible this manner of recognition was its small size.

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Despite his well-known confession of ignorance Socrates does claim somehow to have knowledge in several passages of Plato's early dialogues. The aim of this paper is to focus on one of such passages, 29b of the Apology, and investigate the nature of this claim and the way it relates to his ignorance. In Apology 29b Socrates is making knowledge claim at two stages. Firstly, he claims to know(1)that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey the one who is better than him. Secondly, using this knowledge(1) as a premise and also adopting a further premise(2)that disobeying God and quitting philosophy is the very act of doing wrong and disobeying the one who is better than him, he reaches a conclusion(3)that disobeying God and quitting philosophy is bad, and concerning this conclusion he seems to be claiming to have knowledge. It is my contention that the grounds on which Socrates claims to know(1) and(3) are distinct and both of them are such as to be compatible with, and explain, his constant confession of ignorance, and further that not only in the Apology but also in early dialogues in general, when Socrates announces his knowledge in the process of drawing a conclusion(often in his elenchus) , his knowledge is classified either in type (1)or type(3). I suppose that the best way to make Socrates' claim of knowledge concerning(1) compatible with his confession of ignorance is to limit his knowledge to the area of logical properties of certain moral expressions. That is to say, when Socrates says he knows(1)that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey the one who is better than him, what he means is that he knows that if something is described as an act of doing wrong or disobeying someone who is better than oneself, it necessarily follows that it is also described as an act that is evil and disgraceful. Thus I take it that type (1) knowledge concerns entailment relationship, or meta-ethical facts, concerning certain moral expressions, and Socrates declines to do what he takes to be an act of doing wrong, partly backed up by this kind of formal knowledge. As to type(3) knowledge, it seems at first sight that Socrates' knowledge concerns conclusion(3)itself, but this interpretation meets a difficulty : although he announces his knowledge of premise(1), premise(2)is mentioned only as what he believes(28e), and it is unlikely that Socrates takes the conclusion to constitute knowledge when one of its premises is only a belief. One possible way of avoiding this difficulty is to introduce the distinction between two levels of knowledge. For example, Vlastos distinguished between the stronger kind of knowledge whose hallmark is infallible certainty and the weaker kind which, although falling short of certainty, can be and has been acquired by Socrates through his habitual activities of elenchus. Thus, whereas(2) is strictly speaking only a belief, Socrates can say he knows(2)in this weaker sense and accordingly, can claim also to have knowledge of conclusion(3), which is drawn from(1) and(2). However this interpretation is rather complicated, and the solution I would like to propose is simpler and more straightforward. In my view, Socrates' knowledge does not concern conclusion(3) itself but the logical necessity of(3)following the acceptance of(1)and (2). What Socrates claims to know at 29b is that(3)necessarily follows if (1) and(2) are accepted, or that(3)is true provided that(1)and(2)are both true. Because "if" clause or "provided that" clause is omitted here, his statement gives a false impression that he is saying he knows(3)itself. Thus, according to my interpretation both types of knowledge are rather formal in that type(1)concerns the logical-semantic necessity of certain moral expressions and type(3)concerns the logical necessity of inference. Type(1)knowledge is not so useful if it is possessed without any

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The aim of this article is to show a part of Plato's view of knowledge lying in the first part of the Theaetetus. How to interpret ousia in the final refutation(184-186)is crucial to that aim. Many commentators, including Corn ford, have construed basically that Plato argued here the judgement of psyche (soul) about percepts or a matter of proposition, on the grounds that sentences in<S is P>form that have percept-Subjects are found at 185A9, 11-12, B2, 4-5. Such a tendency of studying Plato's text is increasing in power nowadays. [Interpretation I]. But I doubt whether 'judgement' or<S is P>proposition is the question at issue or a primary matter here. I think ousia is 'nature'(physis)in the meaning of 'that which is F' answering to a question 'What is F?', and offer an interpretation of the text. [Interpretation II]. Our text is as follows : A(1) 185A8-B6 : <S is P>propositions are found as contents(objects)of thinking (considering, judging). A(2) 185B7-E2 : soul's own thinking of ta koina about<S>. [185E3-186A1]: division of soul's thinking and objects into two types. B186A2-B10 : soul's own thinking of ousia of〜(P) [about<S>?]. [Interpretation I] The grounds of reading 'judgement' or<S is P>proposition in our text throughout are that Text A(1), A(2)and B are equivalent to one another, i. e. A(2)is a mere paraphrase of A(1), so : A(1)thinking of<S is P> =B thinking of ousia of〜(P)about<S> [Interpretation II] About Text A : α) The aim of introducing the 'about'(peri)-phrase into Text A is originally to affirm that ta koina are imperceptible in any way. cf. 184E8-185A7. In fact, after A(1) =exemplification of ta koina, Socrates' question is whether we have such an organ as grasps ta koina as well as in the case of sense-perception. The 'about'-phrase strengthens, formally, Socrates' rhetrical question, and still has the original form and role. And here the stress is on 'what is it that thinks ta koina about<S>?', not on 'thinking of ta koina about <S>'. β) Plato seems to be indifferent to (S) in the 'about'-phrase. Except their first introduction, names of Sound/Colour are never indicated afterwards, and Sound/Colour are dissolved into 'everything' soon after. Besides, a (somewhat strange)question of 185B9-10 suggests the formality of, and Plato's indifference to, <S>. Addition of such a formal phrase is also based on the fact that ta koina means, literally, 'they are thought of as common to a pair of things, and many or all things'. So, it doesn't matter if <S> is indefinite. Thus, it is reasonable from α)β) above that no 'about'-phrase is found at [185E3-186A1]. It was dismissed its post. For these the same reasons, no thinking or judgement of a specified<S>is told in A(2), and A(2)is not a mere paraphrase of A(1). About Text B : 'To everything' (epi panton 186A3)doesn't mean the same thing as 'about'-phrase in Text A in the meaning of<S> in the formula <S is P> , but rather, 'every F' we experience as 'appearance' (phantasia 152C1). It is said at 186B6-9 that soul tries to judge by for itself(1)ousia of the hard and the soft, (2)the oppositeness of the both to each other, and again(3) ousia of the oppositeness, returning to them and comparing them one another. We should notice that a pair of opposite things, not a single one, is told at 186B2-4. When we perceive a pair of opposite things at the same time, we pay attention to the opposite characters themselves, not the things that have them. Of course, we may also see, touch... and judge the pair things that have the characters in each case, but this way of judging(thinking)is excluded from Text B. Besides, other

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In De Anima II 1 Aristotle applies the form/matter distinction to the soul-body relation and introduces what J. Ackrill calls the "homonymy principle", according to which a dead body is not a body, except homonymously, that is in name. Ackrill argues that this account is infelicitous, because the homonymy principle suggests that a body cannot exist without soul, though Aristotle's hylomorphism requires that matter could be regarded as existing without form. In this paper I will attempt to show that this difficulty stems from understanding Aristotle's hylomorphism exclusively on the basis of the model of artifacts, and that it is not necessary in hylomorphism that "the matter can be picked out in such a way that it could be conceived as existing without the form," as Ackrill says. Aristotle introduces the homonymy principle to clarify the sense in which soul is essence. He explains it by an example of an instrument, i. e., an axe, and says that the essence of an axe is its function, without which it would not be an axe except homonymously. But he implies that the example of an axe is not appropriate because an axe is not a natural thing, and says soul is "logos of a certain kind of natural body having within itself a source of movement and rest." Aristotle thinks the distinction between natural things (esp. living things) and artifacts is relevant to the form/matter relation. In the case of living things the matter, which is said to have within itself a source of movement and rest, cannot be independent of the form, and must be conceived only as already having potentiality to realize a particular activity. Such matter is a kind of proximate matter, as different from that which is required in the analysis of change. Aristotle says the body as matter is "potentially such as to live," and on the other hand regards it as that which[actually]possesses soul. Why does he say so? In Metaphysics 8 he distinguishes two kinds of δυναμι&b.sigmav;(potentiality), i. e., dunamis related to movement, and dunamis related to energeia. The former has its end outside itself, and in its completion what has the dunamis acquires a new property. The latter has its end in its actuality itself, and in its completion what has the dunamis continues to be the same. This dunamis and its actuality is the same being. The body as matter is potentiality in the latter sense, and therefore it can be said to live potentially, even if it lives actually. This makes it possible that the soul itself is said to be not only a formal cause but a final cause, whereas the final cause of an artifact is outside itself(e. g., a user of an instrument). The body as matter is the heterogeneous parts of living things. Each part can be called so only in relation to the whole, which is specified by form. The matter is not in itself a definite thing, and we must refer to its form to identify it. Therefore the body is said to exist potentially, even if it manifests its own dunamis as a part of the living thing as a whole. Aristotle often explains the concept of matter by examples of artifacts, which are useful to clarify the distinction between form and matter. But it does not follow that in Aristotle's hylomorphism matter is always contingently enformed. In the case of a living thing, its matter must be a particular kind of matter, which is already directed toward a particular activity. In general matter must not be conceived as a thing which is identified in itself, and it is that aspect of a thing which can be understandable only in connection with its form, which clarifies an organized unity of the thing.

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Many heroes die fighting in the Aeneid, and their deaths have no small part in this epic which sings, unlike the Homeric poems, of a new human community destined to be born by divine will. What, then, is the significance of their deaths? In this paper, I discuss the question chiefly by comparing these deaths with the (heroic) deaths in the Iliad. 1. In the 12th book of the Iliad, Sarpedon says to Glaucus that one must go to fight because 'a thousand shapes of death surround him and no man can escape them'[326-7]. The speech expresses a heroic code and shows a view that the pursuit of undying fame means nothing but a resolute defiance to the death so inevitable to human beings. But this view, however common to many Homeric heroes, is not always in accord with the descriptions of their actual deaths in the poem : Sarpedon dies a heroic death indeed in the 16th book, but Patroclus in the same book tries to withdraw 'to escape the doom(ker) '[817]. Above all, Hector's running away from Achilles around the wall of Troy in the 22nd book is very impressive. Homer does not hesitate to describe other great heroes' fear of death : Ajax, Menelaus and even Achilles are terrified of facing their death in fight. 2. Now let us look to the battle scenes is the Aeneid. Although a similar ideal of heroic death remains alive and 'mors pulchra' is mentioned three times as that to which warriors aspire, Virgil does not always follow the Homeric example of showing the paradoxical fact that even a hero wants to save himself from dying. For instance, in the second book, Priam, when he sees his son murdered by Pyrrhus, tries to attack him defiantly and is killed at once. In this scene the old king is said to be 'trembling'[trementem : 550]in front of the enemy, but his quavering, as the poet suggests, is not from fear but from age. Nisus in the 9th book also has to see his dearest one killed before his eyes. Although he is frightened[exterritus : 424] at this moment, the terror, which is caused by the danger imminent to Euryalus, not to himself, does not prevent him from dashing to die immediately after the death of his friend. The death of Pallas in the 10th book is very like Sarpedon's. There is no inconsistency between the speech and the action of this young hero, and he is described as feeling no more fear at the moment of being killed by Turnus than when he accepts the challenge of this stronger enemy. Lausus in the same book, as well as Camilla in the next are also exempt from the experience of terror. Although a suspicion may be aroused that Mezentius, when wounded by Aeneas, falls into a panic[cf. trepidanti : 10. 788], it is noted that his actions are explained by the poet in physical rather than mental terms[inutilis, in...ligatus : 794]. In fact, Mezentius feels a violent pain only after his son is killed[850]and he still defies the enemy by saying that he is not afraid of his own death[880]. Unlike these heroes, Turnus and Aeneas are struck with the horror of death. In the last scene of the poem[12. 646, 894-5], Turnus fears because he begins to be aware not only of his mortality, but also of some mysterious power which forces him to die. It is the sight of Priam's terrible death in the second book that makes Aeneas look mortality in the face and begin to think of survival. 3. Thus, in the Aeneid, all the heroes except Aeneas and Turnus die in battle without fearing death, but why? To determine the reason, let us return to the Iliad and consider the motif of fear in the death scenes of the three heroes in relation to the whole story. The deaths of Sarpedon and Patroclus can be contrasted, since the former does not fear death, while the latter does. This contrast, which can be seen in the 16th book in the separate men, is also transferred in the 22th book to one character : Hector, who defies and then fears death, is re-acting

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Seneca's Hercules Furens has almost the same plot as its model, Euripides' Herakles, but examining the two tragedies in detail we also find many differences between them. The word, uirtus, is frequently used in Hercules Furens and it is emphas ized that Hercules is a man of uirtus in the first half. After he returned from the lower world and killed Lycus, the glory of his uirtus seemed to be proven, but he was suddenly driven mad by Juno and killed his own wife and children. When he came to his senses and realized what he had done, he was shocked and tried to commit suicide. Besides his sadness and sense of guilt, the reason for trying to commit suicide was that he had thought the fame of his uirtus had been disgraced. He tried to commit suicide, so to speak, because of uirtus. Then he was persuaded to give up suicide by his father, Amphitryon, who appealed to Hercules' filial piety, pietas. In Euripides' Herakles, the fear of losing his reputation made the hero give up suicide and decide to live bearing his fate and hardships. It seems that Hercules, a man of uirtus, changed his mind because of pietas in the version by Seneca, but Herakles adhered to being a man of uirtus to the end in Euripides' version. This difference is very important. In the prologos of Hercules Furens, Juno said that Hercules was too proud of his uirtus and foretold that the uirtus of Hercules would be the cause of his harm. A negative view regarding exessive uirtus is stated in the first choral ode and the chorus seems to think Hercules' katabasis (going to the lower world)was a deed caused by his excessive uirtus. Lycus, who was not a man of pietas, also thought himself to be as much a man of uirtus as Hercules and many correspondences between Lycus and Hercules are seen in Hercules Furens. Lycus was killed and Hercules became unhappy by the harm caused by the caprice of Fortuna which was also the theme of the chorus, but Hercules had a chance to recover from his harm with the help of pietas, because, as I said, Hercules, a man of uirtus, changed his mind when his father appealed to his pietas, unlike Euripides' hero, and decided to live bearing hardships, as his model. The persuasion scene seems to show us the transformation of Hercules from a man of uirtus to a man of uirtus with pietas. On these grounds, I conclude that Seneca created a new type of Hercules as a hero bearing hardshps who had become unhappy despite his uirtus because of the harm caused by the caprice of Fortuna, but decided to continue living as a man of uirtus improved by pietas.

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Many scholars have asserted that imperial authorities of the Later Roman Empire compelled curiales, the well-known prosperous civic aristocracy, to pay up "any" arrears of taxpayers under their control out of their own pockets, which led eventually to their ruin. In this paper, which focuses on Late Antique Egypt, I try to refute these assertions mainly through the re-examination of some papyri which these scholars have called "obvious" proof of this compulsory taxation(1)and to re-consider the curiales' local power in later Roman society as more positive than previously thought in the light of new evidence concerning their own compulsory measures on taxpayers(2). The following are my conclusions. (1) Legal texts(Codices Theodosianus et Iustinianus)tell us that the curiales in charge of tax collection were not compelled to pay up "any" arrears out of their own pockets(unusquisque decurio ne pro alio conveniatur cf. CI.4.46.1; 10.6.3; CT.11.7.2; 1,7; CI.11.57.1), but to compensate for losses resulting from their own neglect of duties(CT. 12. 6. 1 et al.). In accordance with these regulations, the papyri, which have wrongly been regarded as the proof of the compulsion to make them pay up any arrears(WChr.281; 424), show us that what they were actually compelled to make up were not any arrears but just losses from their own neglect. In fact, these and other documents(PLips. 62 ; PFlor. 95 ; CT. 11. 29 et al.)make it clear that, both because of their lack of compulsory measures and indifference to arrears, the imperial authorities could not be so harsh to the curiales as to press them to pay off all arrears. The imperial authorities even remitted arrears repeatedly, except when they faced cases of want which were rare in practice. (2) On the other hand, many papyri prove that the curiales, by exclusively assuming the posts of praepositi pagi, which were free from close imperial control, could and did dispose of effective powers and measures to compel village-officials (komarches, sitologos, apaitetes) to pay off all taxes. Firstly, they had close control over the entire process of tax-collection from the initial stage of the nominations of village-officials to the final stage of the settlement of accounts(cf. WChr. 406 ; P. Cair. hid. 9 et al.). Secondly, they could claim the payment of any arrears from village-officials on their own authority(cf. WChr. 406 ; P. Cair. Isid. 68 et al.). Finally, they employed their own compulsory measures, i. e. their own deputies (foethoi) , policemen (symmachoi), soldiers(stratiotai)and prisons not only to compel village-officials and taxpayers to pay off all taxes but also to keep them obedient to public order in rural areas(POxy. 3384-3429 et al.). These powers and measures all made curiales far from ruined, but rather more powerful locally. Later, some well-prepared curiales were able to establish their own oikoi-powers and to become imperial aristocracy(honorati)as were the Apions in the 6th century.

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