パルテノンが正面8柱式神殿であるのは何故か-このような問いかけは,古代ギリシア精神の具現として,幾多の崩壊の危機をくぐり抜け2400年の長きに渡り,アテネのアクロポリスに存在しつづける歴史的建造物に対しては,余りにも突飛に思われるかも知れない.しかし,現存するパルテノンがエーゲ海の強烈な太陽の下に,自重の姿で我々の目を欺くように,その成立にも未だ解決を見ない幾つかの疑問が残っている.本論では,パノレテノン神殿の特徴とその原因を探り,ギリシア美の一典型を示す.

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Was Pindar "honest" or not in his praises of victors? To answer this question we should deal with each ode separately, for his odes were written for different men, on different occasions. I discuss three cases in this paper(the text used is that of Bowra). First, Isthmian 2. I interpret its proem in line with Farnell and Bowra. The poet is asking Thrasybulos in indirect words for the payment promised, seemingly, by the late Xenocrates in exchange for this ode or the odes including this. Now, the poet's veiled requestruns through the ode. In vv. 23-27, "ανεγνον" and "ασπαζοντο" point, as a preliminary suggestion, to vv. 43-45, where Thrasybulos is required not to reject "these hymns". In vv. 35-42, the long praise of the late father hints, "You, the son, should be equaly hospitable". The poet tries to bring home this hint by quoting his own Pyth.6 (vv. 50 ff.) , an ode which was written to praise the son's filial devotion to the father. Thrasybulos is asked to perform as a dutiful son this Isthm. 2 which celebrates his father's memory. Now, in conclusion in this ode, Pindar's praises of his Standesgenossen are never wholly false on any occasion. In this case, however, we cannot but feel that the words to Thrasybulos(v. 12, 48) are somewhat "cajoling", and that the praise of the father is intended in part as a"tool". Secondly, Ol. 13 and fr. 107. It is argued by Norwood and Meautis that the poet dislikes Xenophon, the receiver of these odes. One of Norwood's points is that Xenophon receives not a word of praise in Ol. 13 except the mere naming of his victories. But, the words of v. 1 or vv. 30-1 serve fully as praise. Moreover, the long praise of Corinth or the Corinthian virtues in vv. 4-23b is not irrelevant, but intensifies as a foil the value of the rare achievement of Xenophon praised in vv. 30-1. In the section after the myths no mention of Xenophon is made(Hamilton, Epinikion 108 n. 5). It is not a mark of Pindar's coldness to Xenophon. Fr. 107 for the hieroduloi is also called to witness by the two scholars. The poet is playful in this fragment through and through. Vv. 1-9 recall to us the Greek "prejudice" about women's lewdness shown mythologically in Teiresias' story. Pindar is jokingly indignant of the license given to the hieroduloi. Vv. 13-15 are also playful. Pindar was doubtlessly embarassed at first by the order of a song for the hieroduloi, but he performed this difficult task with professional sincerity and tact. This is the point of v. 16. To sum up, we probably cannot say Pindar "loved" Xenophon, to be sure, but the argument that Pindar disliked him is out of the question. The fragment shows the smiling attitude of the poet to Xenophon. Finally, Pythian 10. This is one of the most fervent odes of the poet. The twentyyear-old poet, who feels great gratitude(cf. vv. 64-68)to Thorax for receiving an order for a Pythian victory for the first time in his poetic career, and who is filled with hopes of his own future glory, idealizes the aristocratic Thessaly as an aristocrat himself, and compares admiringly its happiness which has now been brought about by Hippocleas' victory with the blessedness of the Hyperboreans. His praise of the Thessalian aristocrats is whole-hearted.

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In this paper we examine the opposing relationship between the Greek world and the barbarian world in Cyc, Or. and Bac. with the aid of the antithesis; "το ελληνικον" and "το βαρβαρικον". Euripides, in writing Cyc, has taken his plot from Homer(Od. IX.), but he is not entirely indebted to Homer. In the characterization of Cyclops there is a great difference between them. Cyclops of Homer is a monster(πελωριον) , while that of Euripides is described as a more humanized and civilized character. In addition, the latter, unlike the former, is strongly opposed to "law(νομο&b.sigmav;)", one of the mental elements which constitute the Greek world(338 ff.), and criticizes the expedition to Troy, which was a great achievement of the Greeks, as an act of folly (280 ff.). Polyphemus is by no means the anti-social monster, but a man of reason, though a barbarian. His denial of law and his criticism of the Trojan War are nothing but an expression of an antipathy of the barbarian world against the Greek world and at the same time are also an expression of the poet's doubts about the traditional values of Greece. In this play we can also understand that "wisdom(σοφια)"(this is also one of the mental elements which constitute the Greek world)becomes a laughing-stock. At first sight Odysseus of Euripides, like that of Homer, seems to use every artifice in order to escape from the cave of Cyclops, but once in the middle of the play he comes out of the cave without trouble(375) , and moreover, at the end of the play (707), it is shown to us that the cave has a second opening. He can escape from the cave at a moment's notice without the aid of artifices, whenever he wishes to. His artifices are, so to speak, of no practical use. This shows that "wisdom", i. e. Greek intelligence represented by Odysseus is thoroughly ridiculed. Now, Mr. Matthiessen pointed out the similarity of the dramatic construction between Cyc, Hel., and IT. and set the date of Cyc. in the years 415-410 B. C. Setting aside the problem of the date there is something in common between these three plays, e. g. motif of escape and criticism of the Trojan War. However, we must indicate that there is something in common between Cyc. and Or. rather than between those three plays; motif of escape, criticism of the Trojan War and disregard of "law". Orestes, who was guilty of matricide and sentenced to death, is going to break the "law" in order to escape from death and comes into conflict with Tyndareus and Menelaus. Orestes, of course, is a Greek, but his behaviour may be said unsuitable for a Greek. In short, he is going to destroy the Greek world by his barbarian behaviour. It can be said that this behaviour of Orestes is a surfacing of barbarian elements ( (i. e. 美雪το βαρβαρικον) which have been contained by the civilized community of Greece. In Or. the Greek world is menaced with a fall from the inside. The Trojan War, in this play, is relentlessly criticized by a Greek Tyndareus (521, 2) , which shows that Greeks themselves are sceptical about their own traditional values. We must recognize that the criticism of the Trojan War shown in some plays of Euripides is not only a manifestation of the anti-war sentiment of the poet, but also that of his criticism of traditional values of Greece. Now, in Bac. the Greek world and the barbarian world are sharply set in opposition. A mission of a new heretical religion enters into Thebes from Asia. Pentheus, a king of Thebes, i. e. a representative of the Greek world, persecutes this barbarian religion in order to keep social order in his kingdom. On the other hand, Dionysus, the leader of the mission, and his devotees also keep their own law and act on it, though they are both barbarians. Here we see two laws of different nature: the law of Greeks and that of barbarians. The former is state law and the

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The main purpose of this paper is to reconsider the true standpoint of Socrates in the Crito, one of the earlier dialogues of Plato, in order to remove misunderstandings about the Socratic attitude towards the city-state and the law. This attempt will at the same time clarify the substantial principle which is constantly held by Socrates throughout his life and death. From ancient times, it has been frequently considered that Socrates in the Crito puts the law of the city-state into the position of the absolute standard of ethical judgment. A series of discussions on this problem has recently again arisen from the papers of R. Martin("Socr. on Disob. to the Law", Rev. of Metaph., 24/1970, 21-38)and of A. D. Woozley("Socr. on Disob. the Law", G. Vlastos ed., Philos. of Socr., 1971, 299-318). Many of the writers debate it on the assumption that the central point of the assertion here stated by Socrates lies in the 'Destruction of the City' argument(so named by G. Young, whose paper in Phronesis 19/1974 is also referred to particularly in my paper) , whether they agree with or reject it. But, the author thinks, when we read the Crito following carefully the essential structure of the argument which is, as is explicitly stated at 48E-49E, already systematically methodised, and that in the same way as is formalised in the Phaedo, then it will become obvious that the 'Destruction of the City' argument is only a showy but untrue one, while Socrates' substantial assertion is stated duly with the 'hypothetical' procedure based exactly on the αρχαι(49D-E). The true reason for his refusal to escape is, accordingly, not because his escape might bring destruction of the law and then of the city-state, but just because it is not compatible with the αρχαι accepted by himself or, in other words, not compatible with "the logos which upon reflection appears to me to be the best"(46B). In short: when said in response to the subtitle to this dialogue, περι πρακτεου, it is asserted here by Socrates that we should make our conduct conform to the judgment of the logos, and not in obedience to the law.

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(I) In Phaedo 99e 4-100a3(shown in the letter E hereafter)Socrates adopts the method of "studying things in words(logos)" instead of that of "studying things in facts(ergon)" in the inquiry for causes. Socrates puts it in this way: "I hypothesize in every case the logos that I judge to be most powerful." It should be noted that this beginning part of the famous passage on the hypothetical method (100a3-9, shown in the letter A hereafter) is intended as the explanation of that method of "studying things in words." According to one influential intepretation (R. Robinson, R. Hack forth, N. Gulley) , the logos in A means a proposition and the logos in E is loaded with the same meaning as in A. And owing to their common assumption that the virtue of the hypothetical method lies in the mere formal analysis of propositions, their interpretation is fated to have its difficulty. The fact is that Socrates says A to explain E, so I have come to the conclusion that the logos in A is just synonymous with the logos in E in the light cast from the logos in E. Hence the first point of this paper is to point out the difficulty of defining the logos in A in terms of the logos in E, following what Socrates says. To refute their interpretation in this way, we must understand correctly the implication of the comparison of the two methods of "studying things" in E, one of which is by observations based on sense-experience and the other is by reasoning about logical relations of concepts or propositions. The crucial point is why Socrates thought a world of words to be more reliable than that of facts as to where Forms should be inquired for. The reason I put up for it is this. When a thing appears F(e. g. large, beautiful, good) , we cannot think that there lies in a world of facts some quality or relation that strictly corresponds to the word 'F'. We must trace the cause of this appearance to the very utterance of the word 'F', which never copies a fact, but operates ante rem. So the point of the comparison is not just a simple juxtaposition of the two methods, but rather the contention that the method of "studying things in words" is logically prior to that of "studying thing in facts", since the existence of so-called facts depends on certain kind of words. Due to the lack of this point, it follows from their intepretation that the logos hypothesized in A is compatible with the hypotheses derived from the "studying things in facts", such as "soul is an attunement" or "justice is repaying one's debt". Thus I conclude that the logos in A is nothing but that in E in significance and translate both logoi by 'word'. (II) These considerations lead us to the following conclusions about the Theory of Forms as Paradeigma. (i) To interpret the hypothesis "There is something beautiful itself by itself" (100b5-6, shown in the letter B herafter)as referring to an objective reality ante verbum is to stand at the antipodes of the Socratic method of "studying things in words." For the Socratic method assumes there is no objective, identifiable reality ante verbum. (ii)To assume that Form F is the criterion of the meaning of the word 'F' is also to miss the point of the Socratic method. For the rejected method of "studying things in facts" assumes that in the realm of facts is there some quality or relation that functions as the criterion, and Socrates showed this assumption leads to perplexities. So the hypothesis in B does not state that there is a Form ante verbum which functions as that criterion. In Phaedo Forms are introduced primarily not as criterions but as causes (aitia) how we allow facts to come into existence by uttering certain kind of words. Therefore the hypothesis in B should be understood as the basic postulation in

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Greek has no original form of the passive voice. It uses for passive voice, partly the active endings and partly the middle endings. The passive function of middle voice is mainly based on its reflexive usage. So there may occur the wavering of meaning between middle voice and passive voice: e. g. το δ' εφελκετο μειλινον εγχο&b.sigmav;(N 597) ("He trailed the ashen spear." or "The ashen spear was trailed."). This kind of wavering can sometimes cause very different explanations of a sentence or acontext. ησκητο(A.R.I. 742)is one of such examples. Here the sentence is in general translated as follows : "Cytherea had been wrought with drooping tresses, wielding the swift shield of Ares." This usage of ασκειν is that of the old epic. There occurs, however, a question if this ησκητο can be taken as the middle voice. The middle voice of ασκειν is sometimes used for expressing the personal adornment(e. g., E. Hel. 1379, Ale. 161, etc.). If this is the case with ησκητο, its meaning may better fit to the context. For "She seemed to see her own image in the shield of bronze" (745 f.) suggests the scene of Aphrodite's dressing-up. This view may be possible in meaning. Does Apollonius, however, extend the meaning of Homeric dictions through the usage of tragic poets? Although he mainly uses Homeric dictions, Apollonius is not always faithful to Homeric usages. He practises different combination, different arrangement of words and phrases. For he tries to aim at perfection, complement and building-up of epic dictions. He is, however, not so revolutionary as Callimachus or Theocritus. How does Apollonius deal with the voices of Homeric verbs, when he changes them? For example, μακρου&b.sigmav;/πλεζασθαιπλοκαμου&b.sigmav;(A. R. III, 46 f.). This is a scene of Aphrodite's dressing-up. This scene is evidently based on that of Hera in Iliad XIV, 170f. : χερσι πλοκαμου&b.sigmav; επλεζε φαεινου&b.sigmav;(176 f.). Here is an alternation of επλεζε to πλεζασθαι, which is no doubt the correction of Homeric usage. Middle form must used. There are not a few examples of this sort. For Apollonius, one of the most concerning things in composing Argonautica was criticize and correct readings in the Homeric text, to which he could not agree. On the whole, Apollonius makes use of Homeric usages in precise manner, except for practising different combination and arrangement of words. As far as mid.-pass. forms are concerned, he tries to correct some Homeric usages of verbs into the proper ones. In this course, he is rarely influenced by tragic or lyric poets. In the case of ασκειν, the meaning of personal adornment usually accompanies word or phrase which may let us understand such meaning(e. g. δεμα&b.sigmav;, σωνα). It would be difficult to find the meaning of personal adornment in the ησκητο.

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Antiochus IV of the Seleucids was the first Hellenistic king to express the epithets of Theos Epiphanes on the reverse of his coins and represented the portraits of Zeus Olympius at the same time. Since E. R. Bevan hypothesized that Antiochus IV identified himself with Zeus Olympius, the interpretation has found general acceptance. However, there is a different tendency in recent studies, so I refer to several points. Antiochus IV epithets as such cannot deny the influence of Ptolemy V Epiphanes. But besides that there must have been other rational reasons. When Antiochus IV returned to Syria, the royal family of the Seleucids had been in utter confusion and the realm was in unrest, particularly in Coele-Syria and Phoenicia. The partisans of Ptolemy in these regions seem to have defied his kingship because they had been under the rule of the Ptolemies more than several decades until 200 B. C. In addition to that, the plan for recapturing Coele-Syria and Phoenicia was being manoeuvred at the court of the Ptolemies. In such situations, from early on Antiochus IV aimed to strengthen his kingship and to counter the plot of the Ptolemies. Accordingly, it may be considered that he expressed himself by Theos Epiphanes as the saviour of the Seleucid Kingdom.Antiochus IV ignored the tradition that Apollo was portraied on the Seleucid coins after Antiochus I, and instead of Apollo he represented Zeus Olympius on his coins. The Seleucids, however, were not always regardless of Zeus Olympius, since the god was the highest guardian deity of the dynasty. Antiochus IV seems to have needed, first of all, the protection of the god when he aimed at strengthening his kingship, and he may have followed the first king Seleucus I with his intention of being the refounder of the Seleucid Kingdom. On the other hand, we must take into consideration that royal coins in antiquity had an exceedingly important propaganda effect. From this point of view, we cannot assert that Antiochus IV did not identify himself with Zeus Olympius, but it would not seem that he demanded the standardized worship for him as Zeus Olympius from his people. It is plausible that he left the cult for him to their estimation. According to I Maccabees, Antiochus IV ordered the dedication of the temple at Jerusalem to Zeus Olympius, and the festival is supposed to have been in the cult form of Baalshsmin whose deity was worshiped as Zeus Olympius in Syria. It is, however, improbable that Antiochus IV enforced upon every tribe in his realm such a syncretic cult as it was worshiped by gentile and Jewish apostates at Jerusalem.According to literary sources, Antiochus IV was undoubtedly interested in Zeus Olympius, and he made a display of his kingship inside and outside the realm.However, the epithets of his Theos Epiphanes were limited inside, and he was always Epiphanes during his lifetime outside. The Seleucids after him had also connections with Zeus Olympius, but he did not name himself Zeus Antiochus as did Seleucus I Zeus Seleucus, granting this dynasty to be on the rapid decline after him. Even though he considered himself cherished by Zeus Olympius, he would not have organized his realm under a unified policy with the god. He hellenized many cities with the purpose of developing civic consciousness, and with it he intended to form a stabile government. On the other hand, he intended to rule as an absolute monarch. Such political ideology was not yet accepted in his realm and was contradictory because the consciousness as a unified government was unripe in the Hellenistic Oriental society. Therefore, we may say that from Antiochus IV conduct it is hard to resolve clearly the relationship of Zeus Olympius to him.

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Les mesures d'amnistie des rois lagides datent des II^<eme> et pr siecie av. J.-C. Elles se situent au moment du declin general de cette dynastie. Les copies actuellement connues sont celles d'Epiphane(Rosettana pour l'an 196 av. J.-C. ; PDem Berlin 13621 [demotique] pour l'an 186 av. J.-C) , de Philometor(PKroll et UPZ 111 pour l'an 163 av. J.-C.), d'Evergete II(SEG xii548 et PTebt699 pour l'an 145/4 av. J.-C; SEG ix 5 pour l'an 144-141/0 av. J.-C; PTebt 6 pour l'an 140/39av. J.C; PTebt 124, PTebt 5 et PSI 1401 pour les ans 121/0-118 av. J.-C)et d'Aulete (BGU 1185 pour l'an 63/2 av. J.-C). Elles sont corroborees par des allusions ou des citations, en tant que les<<philanthropa>>(bienfaits) , dans des documents de petition ou dans des proces comme SB 9508, PTebt 739, UPZ 111-112 et PRein 18-19. (Ajoutons que BGU 1311 et 1053 du premier regne romain.) Notre travail etudie le contenu de ces amnisties en cherchant a en degager les caracteres fondamentaux. Nous analysons en particulier PTebt 5, qui est la copie la plus typique et la plus developpee, en utilisant l'edition recente de M^<IIE> M.-TH. Lenger, le COP 53. Bien que les textes connus ne soient pas originaux, mais seulement des copies d'extraits selectionnees ou rassemblees pour la facilite, nous pouvons toutefois conclure que l'amnistie ptolemaique, contrairement a son nom, n'avait pas en vue le bien de petit peuple, et qu'en tant qu'amnistie elle n'a guere eu de resultat dans la societe. Elle ne beneficiait qu'au clerge et a la classe des petits proprietaires. Les edits d'amnistie visaient principalement a. conserver le monopole royal et a. maintenir un systeme de contrainte. Les diverses remissions et les protections personnelles(habeas corpus)proclamees dans les decrets en faveur des paysans royaux, des ouvriers du monopole (υποτελει&b.sigmav;) et des petits producteurs obliges (de λειτουργια) ont pour but, tout comme l'appel a, retourner a, l'ιδια, d'assurer la main d'ceuvre necessaire(BGU 1812 en est un exemple frappant). La protection visait en priorite l'outillage et non la personne humaine. D'autre part, ces amnisties decidees sur l'impulsion du moment creaient une contradiction entre le recouvrement des biens perdus et le statu quo, tous les deux voulus dans une meme promulgation, amenant ainsi la confusion dans le droit et l'economic (Voir les exemples ou tant fonctionnaires que personnes privees excluent la clause d'amnistie dans leurs contrats: BGU 1156, 1311 et 1053). Ce qui aggravait encore le climat de desobeissance et de negligence envers la loi(voir: BGU 1185).

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ヘブライおよびギリシア文学史には,死を目前にした人物の「訣別の辞」が数多く見出される.このような場合には,両者を文学様式と機能の視点から此較してヘブライ文学史の側でのその特性を解明することが聖書の様式史的研究方法にとって避け難い課題となる.しかし私の見るところでは,この研究方法が今世紀前半にドイツで提唱され,以後の聖書学の方法的基礎となったのち今日まで,「訣別の辞」の素材の辞典的な収集はなされたが,上のような視点からの立ち入った研究が行なわれたことはない.本稿は聖書の様式史的研究が残しているこの領域的な不備を,『ヨハネ福音書』13-17章のイエスの「告別説教」とプラトンの『パイドン』を各々の文学史的前提も顧慮しつつ此較することによって多少でも補おうとする試みである.

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