科学哲学

Self-Reflectivity and the Ability to Respond

Takeshi Ohba

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 1-16
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.1

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According to a prevailing view, a self is reflective solely by virtue of the self-referential nature of a human mind. Relationship with fellow beings, according to this view, concerns merely a contingent matter of psychological developments, and has conceptually nothing to do with the self-reflectivity. This view, however, seems to me totally wrong. To be sure, both 'self-locating' information processing and 'other-oriented' information processing may be necessary and sufficient for purposeful movements and social transactions. But selfhood requires an ability to entertain an "I"-thought. To have this ability is manifested by being able to identify an image in a mirror as one's own image though no one can see one's own face. This sort of self-identification requires in turn the mastery of the concept of 'being seen by' fellow beings.

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ネオ・ベイジアニズムによる帰納の正当化は未完である

出口康夫

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 17-30
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.17

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Neo-Bayesianism, the statistical methodology based on the idea of probability interpreted as degree of belief, formulates inductive inferences in terms of probability theory, and justifies them under assumptions of rationality. Conditional probability with condition of zero probability is among those inductive inferences formulated within the Neo-Bayesian terminology. This paper aims to call attention to the need for the justification of the zero conditional probability by pointing out that so far no theorem has justified it successfully.

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カルナップの規約主義

『言語の論理的構文論』を中心に

中村正利

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 31-42
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.31

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This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.

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プレ『論考』期におけるウィトゲンシュタイン意味論の変遷

野村恭史

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 43-53
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.43

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The metaphysics of "simple" objects and the syntactic theory of "expressions (Ausdrücke)" can be seen as theoretical foundations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logicophilosophicus. I shall show in this paper how these two doctrines result from his struggling with Russell's theory of types, and establish the early Wittgenstein's basic idea that structural (formal) features of language mirror structural (formal) features of the world. In order to do so, I will trace the basic line of Wittgenstein's thought back to the pre-Tractatus period.

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ウィトゲンシュタイン初期思想における座標的言語

渡辺大地

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 55-68
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.55

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In this paper, I will consider the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates fixing a point in space in early Wittgenstein's thought. Pears pointed out that there is a tension between this comparison (which leads to holism) and separatist element in the relation between reality and sense. But I think this tension is illusion and a right interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of language will vanish this illusion. For this purpose, I will illuminate the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates and the motivation of this comparison.

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Philosophy of Mathematics and Ontological Commitment

On Quine's and Vuillemin's Classifications

Joseph Vidal-Rosset

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 69-80
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.69

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This paper concerns Quine's classification of philosophies of mathematics as sketched in "On what there is" and offers a new reading of Quine's view. In his famous paper Quine defines three positions: Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. Each of them, he says, has its modern expression, respectively, in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. According to Quine these foundational positions can be accepted or rejected on a clear and objective basis, according to their distinctive ontological commitments. Consistent with his own criterion for ontological commitment (buttressed by his view on impredicative definitions), Quine adopts the Realist (or the Platonist) position in mathematics. Later, it is shown that genuine Intuitionism is not definable by Quine but is easily defined in Vuillemin's classification scheme (in What Are Philosophical Systems? C. U. P., 1986).

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討論

黒崎宏他

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 85-90
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.85

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書評

野家啓一

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 91-94
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.91

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付記

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 94
発行日: 2000年
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.1_94

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第32回大会(1999年)ワークショップ記録

岩沢宏和

2000 年 33 巻 1 号 p. 97-109
発行日: 2000/05/15
公開日: 2009/05/29

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.97

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