In this essay, I would like to show a demarcation between science and pseudo-science, from two approaches: theoretical and experimental/observational. Theoretical approach pays attention to revision pattern in theoretical explanation. Especially, when the elucidator introduces new unknown elements for explanation, pseudo-scientific explanation fails to satisfy some conditions. On the other hand, experimental/observational criterion says, pseudo-science claims doubtful phenomenological laws.
The central thesis to presentism is that only the present exists; what is past no longer exists and future does not exist yet. One problem with this position is how to explicate the asymmetry of time. In ordinary talk, we say that the past is fixed whereas the future is still open. How can we cash out such metaphors? The answer, however, will not automatically follow from presentism itself because past and future are said to be ontologically on par, both being nonexistent. In this essay, I first introduce a theory of presentism, which I call Tensed-Property Presentism, and show how it can explicate the asymmetry of time.
Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.
This paper aims to overcome the problem “fragility of knowledge” with which conversational contextualism is confronted by presenting Wittgensteinian contextualism model which replaces “conversational context” dependency of knowledge with “language game” dependency of knowledge. Wittgensteinian contextualism can be distinguished into two standpoints. One is “contextualism of justification” which insists on the variability of justification rules with language games, the other is “contextualism of hinge” that insists on variability of error possibilities to be excluded with language games. Wittgensteinian contextualism which combine these two contextualism can make knowledge stable by fixing and structurizing the context.
In this paper, I try to characterize reference and introduction as two distinct modes of making de re statements. Roughly speaking, introduction differs from reference in that an introducing utterance makes its hearer to get to know some new particular. In cases of discourse anaphora whose antecedents are indefinite descriptions, pronouns seem to have a characteristic feature, which I shall call “inheritance requirement,” that they must be interpreted as bearing, if any, the same particulars introduced by their antecedents. And I give a brief remark on how this feature relates to two semantics purposed to handle discourse anaphora, namely Discourse Representation Theory and E-type Pronoun Theory.
Probability concepts are an integral part of modern evolutionary theory. This raises a philosophical question. Which interpretation of probability is appropriate for evolutionary theory? Alex Rosenberg argues from the Laplacian worldview that the probabilities used in evolutionary theory shouldn't be interpreted realistically because they only reflect our ignorance of details. This paper gives a critical appraisal of his arguments. I show that the probabilities reflect not merely our ignorance but some aspects of reality. I also show that in evolutionary theory we may update the probabilities rationally depending on what we know. Then I suggest an alternative interpretation, which is the Bayesian interpretation.
Yuji Yonemori published a book titled Abduction in 2007. In this book, he argues mainly in support of C. S. Peirce's theory of abductive reasoning. Peirce said that abductive reasoning is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis, that the reasoning is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea, and that the reasoning differs from either deduction or induction. Yonemori agrees with Peirce on all of these points in his book. In this review, I shall critically comment on the book.