科学哲学
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
45 巻, 2 号
選択された号の論文の11件中1~11を表示しています
特集
  • 竹内 泉
    2012 年 45 巻 2 号 p. 1-13
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper discusses a method to apply the science of logic to prtobability. First this paper discusses the relations between probability and sciences. Next, this paper forcuses mathematics which is similar to the science of logic, and compares the methods to apply them to sciences. Lastly, this paper shows the formalisation and the analisys of probability in a problem of cryptography by the science of logic.
  • 久保田 貴大
    2012 年 45 巻 2 号 p. 15-27
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Cryptographic schemes must be presented with a security proof based on complexity theory. However, security proofs tend to be complex and difficult to verify, because an adversary can access various kinds of oracles. The use of formal methods is a way to tame such complexity. Hoare logic has been used to verify properties of programs and its probabilistic extension has also been provided. In this paper,we introduce a probabilistic Hoare logic and its application to verification of security proofs of public key encryption schemes. Adversarial attacks are formalized as programs with probabilistic execution and security properties are formalized as first-order logic formulae.
  • -自認・合理的行為者性・一人称特権-
    島村 修平
    2012 年 45 巻 2 号 p. 29-46
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.
  • 金杉 武司
    2012 年 45 巻 2 号 p. 47-63
    発行日: 2012年
    公開日: 2016/01/15
    ジャーナル フリー
    Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called “self-deception” should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.
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