科学哲学

知覚の命題的構造

─概念主義の経験的基盤の探究─

小口峰樹

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_1-1_16
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_1

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John McDowell proposes conceptualism of perceptual content to warrant the idea that perceptual experience rationally constrains belief. To support this idea, McDowell claims that not only belief and perception, but also the world itself has a propositional structure. This view of the “unboundedness of the conceptual” is, however, doubtful. In this paper, I shall explore how we can defend conceptualism without accepting the above view. To do this, I shall propose a mechanism that gives a propositional structure to perception before it is established as a conscious experience. In so doing, I shall employ two empirical theories: the visual index theory and the sensory classification theory. This inquiry aims at revising conceptualism and giving it an empirical basis.

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「経験の透明性」は経験の現象性と志向性の関係について何を示しているのか

小草泰

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_17-1_33
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_17

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A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

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帰属者の文脈主義モデルを用いた認識的規範の多元性の解明

─正当化の内在主義と外在主義の調停を目指して─

山田圭一

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_35-1_47
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_35

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Until now, Many philosophers have tried to elucidate plurality of epistemic norms in terms of plurality of aims with which we acquire knowledge. In this paper, I try to elucidate them in terms of plurality of aims with which we evaluate knowledge. For this purpose, I construct the new knowledge model which is composed of the idea of Attributor Contextualism and the conception of language games by Wittgenstein. With this model, I want to suggest a new research program of epistemology which can contain both Internalism and Externalism that have caused a lot of controversy in contemporary epistemology.

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書評論文

ウィトゲンシュタイン最後の思考―確実性と偶然性の邂逅

─山田圭一著（勁草書房，2009年刊）─

野村恭史

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_49-1_57
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_49

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Keiichi Yamada’s first and recent book, The Last Thinking of Wittgenstein: An Encounter between Certainty and Contingency, aims at bringing out it into relief Wittgenstein’s philosophy of knowledge that is embodied especially in his “last” thinking, which the author extracts mainly from On Certainty, and locating it in the context of contemporary discussions on knowledge. This book should be interesting very much not only to Wittgenstein scholars but also to those who are engaged in philosophy in general. I shall make several and somewhat critical comments.

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伊佐敷隆弘著『時間様相の形而上学』を読んで

佐金武

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_59-1_74
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_59

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In his book Metaphysics of Temporal Modality, Prof. Isashiki takes a very unique and intriguing approach to philosophy of time. He begins with raising the following three questions. (i) What does it mean to say that the past is determinate or fixed whereas the future is open? (ii) Why is it impossible to see temporal transition from the present to the past? (iii) Does the present have no duration? Answering to those questions, he declares that he does not assume any linear representation of time. In this review, I shall examine to what extent the attempt succeeds and in what respects it fails.

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デカルト的な心は生き残れるか？

─小林道夫『科学の世界と心の哲学』書評─

太田雅子

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_75-1_90
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_75

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In his Book Kagaku no Sekai to Kokoro no Tetsugaku, Michio Kobayashi features on Descartes’ theory of minds as “subjective-active consciousness”, and defends it against the physicalist movement of philosophy of mind. I try to show that Kobayashi’s method has a difficulty for defending the existence of our mind because Descartes didn’t allow the scientific investigation of our mental experience from outside. In addition, Cartesian theory of mind cannot appropriately grasp the significance of “other minds”. Instead of Cartesian view, I propose the “mind in general” view, in which minds are open to our world and exists in our communication.

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討論

「点滅論法」の誤謬について

三浦俊彦, 柴田正良

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_91-1_93
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_91

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大会記録

第43回大会（2010年）記録

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_94-1_98
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_94

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ワークショップ報告

ワークショップ報告

2011 年 44 巻 1 号 p. 1_99-1_110
発行日: 2011年
公開日: 2011/10/13

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_99

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