This paper aims to show a picture of self-knowledge in light of Moran's view. What kind of feature does self-/other-knowledge asymmetry have? Characterizing the first-person authority (FPA) as cognitive immediacy to one's own thought involves the unacceptable Cartesian picture. But any formal or "grammatical" characterization of it cannot explain a distinctively first-personal feature in turn. I suggest that the best way to see self-knowledge with the FPA as substantial one is to take it as consisting of cognitive stance plus practical stance to one's own thought. The source of the FPA itself is not cognitive immediacy, but the kind of immediacy the latter stance has. It is the intrinsic capacity for us to be rational agents, though what does not work in a particular case.
According to recent researches on middle- or later-Wittgenstein, it has sometimes been claimed that he showed that self-knowledge (at least, one as having a form of propositional attitude) concerning phenomenal experiences was impossible. But his original arguments seem to be unsuccessful. In this paper, I will present another case for the above conclusion, employing some ideas from early-Wittgenstein. If the argument is correct, then it will follow that one cannot know that she herself is in pain, and moreover, that the epistemological problem concerning why self-knowledge about phenomenal experiences has some kind of authority cannot arise.
The redundancy theory of truth is normally considered to be a form of the deflationist theory of truth. Frege is sometimes counted as an advocate of the deflationist theory, because he emphasizes the redundancy of the truth predicate. In this paper, following Thomas Ricketts's interpretation, I will argue that this is a misunderstanding of Frege's view. Even if Frege is a deflationist, it cannot be because he accepts the redundancy thesis. Indeed, truth plays an indispensable role in Frege's picture of judgement and assertion. In light of his notion of judgement and assertion, what the redundancy of the truth predicate means to Frege will be clarified.
For a philosophical analysis of the sciences, Jean Cavailles introduced the "philosophy of the concept", which he opposed to the "philosophy of consciousness", in which category he placed Kant's transcendental critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Although he took a position against transcendental philosophy, Cavailles did not make common cause with logical empiricism in this opposition. This paper will first explore Cavailles' reasons for opposing the philosophy of consciousness, and his criticism of logical empiricism. Cavailles' notions of "concept" and of "experience" will be examined in order to shed light on the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of "concept" in his philosophy, i.e. its structure and historical dialectic. The paper will then consider the works of some French philosophers, who adopt the philosophy of the concept as a philosophical method. In these investigations, the paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the philosophy of the concept in the contemporary context of philosophy of science.
David Chalmers presented a zombie argument, from which the falsity of physicalism allegedly follows. Although many authors who criticize this argument attack the derivation of the metaphysical possibility of zombies from the logical possibility of zombies, in this paper I will argue against the very first premise of the argument: the logical possibility of zombies. I will show the a priori impossibility of zombies, through what I call the Blinking Qualia argument.
In this review I comment on the papers in Shiriizu Kokoro No Tetsuhaku, or Philosophy of Mind Series (2004), edited by Y. Nobuhara. This series consists of three volumes, Human Part (vol. 1), Robot Part (vol. 2), and Translation Part (vol. 3). I shall comment on each paper in the first two volumes, since the last one consists of translations of classic papers of philosophy of mind in English-speaking countries.