There is an emerging experimental trend in bioethics and neuroethics. We briefly review several topics in this trend and discuss how the existing and future studies can have normative implications related to bioethical/neuroethical issues. Particularly, we consider three major ways to draw such implications; (1) contributing to conceptual analysis and philosophical (counter-)evidence, (2) figuring out the unreliability of moral thinking and thereby providing a debunking argument, and (3) estimating the feasibility of ethical norms and policies.

    It has been almost ten years since Bem published the psi study in a prestigious social psychology journal, which ignited the replicability crisis in psychology. Since then, drastic and systematic changes in research practices have been proposed and implemented in the field. After a decade of such controversy and reformation, what is the current status of psychology? We provide an overview of the 10 years of credibility revolution in psychology by taking the perspectives of “researcher's degree of freedom” and “specification space.” Based on the view, we propose possible future directions for psychology to proceed as a scientific discipline.

    In this paper, I show what philosophical topics we should examine in order to answer the question “Do holes exist?” First, I point out that the meaning of “concreate” is to be clarified in order to explicate the ontological status of holes. Then, I argue ontological problems of holes in relation to property theory and space-time theory. In my opinion, the ontology of holes should be approached in relation to space-time theory. But in that case, some distinctive features of holes we ordinarily acknowledge might be lost.

    This paper aims to defend McDowellʼs disjunctivism about perception from misunderstanding, to explain it in more detail, and to point out his own error. In section 1, I summarize disjunctivism and show that the common objection to it is based on a misunderstanding. Section 2 describes ideas that are useful in avoiding misunderstandings and then provides an argument for disjunctivism based on these ideas that are applicable not only to perceptual knowledge but to knowledge in general. In section 3, I explain how the content of section 2 is incompatible with McDowellʼs conception, and that McDowell misunderstands the nature of perception and thought. My conclusion is that perception is thinking.

    In recent years, David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have developed views on metalinguistic negotiations. A metalinguistic negotiation is a dispute where both parties use (rather than mention) a term to express a view about what the term should mean. Plunkett, Sundell, and others have presented philosophical views with the assumption that there are metalinguistic negotiations. For example, they consider that some (or many) philosophical disputes are metalinguistic negotiations and that contextualists about predicates of personal taste can defend their view by invoking the notion of metalinguistic negotiations. Moreover, the linguistic mechanism of metalinguistic usages is tried to explain by dynamic semantics and Gricean pragmatics.

    Those engaged in natural science have strong subliminal tendency to regard imaginary representations appearing in scientific descriptions as real objects, although they are not aware that such a spontaneous and tacit background toward the recognition of real objects could be induced by confusion in the use of lexica for theoretical conception and macroscopic observation. This short communication is to present an example where a typical imaginary representation is unknowingly transformed into a concrete scientific belief of a real object since its definitional expression involves the imaginary representation for the relevant theory.

    In this paper, I will present a way to reorganize constitutionalism,one of the major metaphysical positions on cases of spatially coincident things such as a bronze statue and the lump of bronze from which it is formed. After an overview of constitutionalism and its problems, I will construct a hylomorphist theory to revise the relation of constitution from two independent perspective of the metaphysical grounding concerning forms and matters and the mutual parthood of coincidents. It is only a sketch of basic ideas, but it would contribute to a new basis not only for a full explanation of the mechanism of constitution and but also for an ontology of bodies and persons.