The later Wittgenstein's philosophy is often characterized as therapeutic. According to the idea of therapeutic philosophy, Wittgenstein never intends to propound a theory of philosophy; rather he attempts to show us that philosophical problems are merely pseudo-problems generated by philosophical confusions.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify what Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy is. In order to do so, I shall investigate the methodological similarities between Wittgenstein and Freud. I attempt to show that the analysis of Freud's method of psychoanalysis gives us various insights on what Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy is.

    This paper is concerned with the interface problem: An action is guided both by an intention, whose format is propositional, and a motor representation, whose format is non-propositional. How can an intention and a motor representation interlock, while the formats of intention and motor representation are different? In this paper, first, I review the existing solutions to this problem, and point out the defects in them. Then, I propose a new solution, namely a conceptualistic solution, according to which both the format of executable action concept which constitutes an intention and the format of motor representation are not only non-propositional but also conceptual.

    This paper proposes a transformative virtue that counteracts testimonial injustice by responding to two critiques of the virtue of testimonial justice. First, I demonstrate that self-reflection can function in more varied ways than the direct detection of oneʼs own prejudices, as previously assumed in the literature. Hence, self-reflection can holistically be effective in neutralizing the influence of oneʼs prejudices on oneʼs beliefs. Second, I propose a virtue that encourages epistemic agents to be epistemically acute enough to experience dissonance between perceiving a particular testifier (who is talking in person) as trustworthy and having biased beliefs about the testifierʼs trustworthiness: transformative virtue. Third, I argue that the development of a proper indirect contact theory with relevant epistemic practices can offer epistemic environments that facilitate peopleʼs critical imagination to cultivate a transformative virtue, considering the risk of victimized epistemic agentsʼ vulnerability.

    One of the pressing issues in the methodology of metaphysics is the relationship between (analytic) metaphysics and empirical science. In her recent paper, L.A. Paul has defended the methodological continuity of metaphysics and empirical sciences. According to her account, metaphysics and empirical science have distinct subject matters, but share the same methodology. More specifically, she argues that both metaphysical theorizing and scientific theorizing can be understood as model-building. In this article, I critically examine her argument and point out some non-negligible problems with the view that metaphysical theorizing is modeling.

    This paper aims at understanding Hajime Inaba's The Making of Statistical Mechanics, which treats the history of statistical mechanics from Helmholtz to von Neumann. While this book uses some physical concepts and symbols variously according to historical contexts, this paper gives its interpretation from the point of view of modern physics, supported by some contemporary manuals of thermodynamics, statistical mechanics and cavity quantum electrodynamics (CQED). This contemporary interpretation may be helpful for understanding of Inabaʼs historical book. This paper also gives useful materials for philosophical reflections on the relation between thermodynamics, i.e. macrophysics, and statistical mechanics, i.e. microphysics, and also on the function of CQED as opening a way to mesophysics.

    Kei Yoshida's recent book Philosophy of the Social Sciences: An Introduction is the first introductory textbook on the philosophy of the social sciences written in Japanese. It concisely expounds on a wide range of topics in the discipline, while its explication of those topics is not impartial or neutral as the author himself says. This paper gives a critical review of the book. The first half of it briefly overviews and assesses the book as a whole. The latter half of the paper reconstructs the gist of the author's exposition of the naturalism/interpretivism debate and criticizes it.