The land owings system by a select few in South Vietnam in the early 20th century was broken down by agrarian reforms onforced under the South Vietnam Liberation Front and the regime of the Repulic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. This paper highlights the process of dissolution of the large land holding system in the Agrarian Reforms under the Republic of Vietnam by examining the case of Khanh Hau Village in Long An Province.
Since 1918 when the village was first established and up until 1958, most of land in Khanh Hau Village, belonged to only one landowner who had a monopoly over the land, thus leaving the majority of villagers as land-ownings farmers of small plots of land or as tenant farmers. Although Agrarian Reform under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime abolished such a monopoly, the tenant farmers still remained.
The “Land to the Tiller” program enforced in 1970 by the Nguyen Van Thieu regime abolished the land owner and tenant farmer relation-ship. However, all that these two reforms achieved was a random redistribution of too small plots of land, which did not necessarily allocate enough land to families for subsistence. That most of the new landholders in Khanh Hau village had small areas of land did not lead to the stabilization of agricultural management.
The Agrarian Reforms during the regimes of Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu enabled most of the tenant farmers in this village to become land-owing tillers. Despite this, the scale of agriculture of these land-owing tillers has remained the same as it used to be, or has even decreased due to the smaller land plots, custom of egalitareian inheritence and population growth in the 1960's.
On a positive note, since the 1960's intensive farming methods using a double-cropping rice system in the village has developed faster than other areas in the Mekong Delta, and achieved increase in agricultural productivity. That has meant good but in temporary solution for saving subsistence level of new landholders after Reforms. The village faced to more difficult situation caused by increase of population after 1975 and forced to mass immigration to frontier in Dong Thap Muoi region for searching new land.

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Since 1980's, Vietnamsese agricultural cooperatives are being transformed. Collective production is replaced with household farming. Legally, cooperatives are agricultural service institutions.
But before 1980's cooperatives substantially had roles of administration and selfgovernance too (especially in north Vietnam). Now some cooperatives maintain these roles, though others only fill agrucultural service roles.
This study analyzes accounting documents of one coopetative (Coc Thanh agricultural cooperative, Vu Ban district, Nam Dinh province) in 1995. The purpose is to give one example of cooperatives' validity and to search for reasons of this validity.
The analysis shows 5 points.
(1) Peasant households of this cooperative have to pay heavy taxes and other fees (particularly agricultural service fees to the cooperative). Taxes and fees on agricultural land amount to about 30% of average yield.
(2) These agricultural service fees to the cooperative are not only heavy but also consist of many categories (such as pump fee, coopetative administration fee, clop defense fee, veterinary fee, public peace fee, road maintain fee). This means the coopetative fulfills many and very important functions for household farming.
(3) System of assigning taxes and fees to each household is very complicated. The cooperative can completely follows this system. Its ability of keeping accounts seems very good.
(4) The cooperative perfectly collects almost all the taxes and fees. Its business ability is very good.
(5) This cooperative maintains some roles other than agricultural service, for example: collecting taxes and fees, building and repairing roads, farming some cash crops and so forth.
Coc Thanh cooperative is one of most active cooperatives in Viet Nam. It carries out numerous agricultural services with good ability. It maintains other roles: administrative roles like collecting taxes and building roads and role of managing cash crop production.
Of course this activeness owes much to its maintaining the caracter before 1980's. But there are other reasons: conditions of agricultural production in this area, ability and policy of local administrative institutions, and peasants' way of adapting themselves to market economy.

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This paper sets out to investigate the transfer of the royal palace's location in the post-Angkor period, and will at the same time consider the change of character of the Longvêk—Oudong dynasty.
Since the French Protectorate era, a considerable number of studies have been made on Angkor period. However, little attention has been given to the post-Angkor period. Reasons were that it was deemed a “Dark-Age” and an iota of historical materials. As such, we attempted a research on the Longvêk—Oudong region, about 30km north of Phnom-Penh. We had examined some aerial photographs, measured the royal palace's sites, made maps, picked up fragments of pottery, and lastly compiled information relating to the beginnings of villages and temples.
There was a saying that in the post-Angkor period, the capial of Cambodia was transferred from Angkor to Basan (Kampong-Cham Province)—Phnom-Penh—Lonvêk (Kampong-Chhnang Province)—Oudong (Kampong-Spu Province). The first capital, Basan, occupied a key point on the Mekong River. The third and the fourth, Lonvêk and Oudong, were in close proximity. They held a strategic point on the west bank of the Tonle-Sap River. The second and the present capital, Phnom-Pemh is situated on the confluence of the Mekong River and the Tonle-Sap River. Based on the royal chronicle of Cambodia and some foreign sources, we knew that Basan and Longvêk-Oudong were rivals.
The following resulted from our research:
1) From the central temple in the Fortress of Lonvêk to the Sacred Mountain of Oudong, we found the ruins of shrines belonging to the Angkor period.
2) There is a square site surrounded by walls which we had determined to be Lonvêk, the capital in the 16th century.
3) We found that the royal palace of Oudong in the 17th century was on the first height next to the west bank of the Tonle-Sap River.
4) There are two remains known as Veang-Chas (old palace) and Khleang-Pram (five storehouses). The former was the second royal palace of king Ang-Duong and the latter was also his first palace, situated 4km west to the royal palace in the 17th century.
Therefore, we concluded that:
A) The capital Longvêk—Oudong kept close relations with Pursat, south of the Tonle-Sap Lake.
B) The transfer from Longvêk to Oudong during the 17th century came from the development of Ponhea-Lu as a river port in the “Age of Commerce”.
C) However, with the end of the “Age of Commerce” and the control of Saigon by the Vietnamese, this situation was changed. King Ang-Duong tried to build a new network which could connect Pursat and Kampot via Oudong. In doing so, he built his palace 4km inland.
D) Under the French Protectorate, Phnom-Penh became the capital of Cambodia and the network which centered on Phnom-Penh and the Mekong River was completed for the first time.

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It has been pointed out that there are some crucial differences about the nature of the Japanese language education in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. It, however, is difficult for us to recognize the differences because “assimilation policy” and “kominka policy” have been interpreted imprecisely.
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the case in Malaya with that in the other territories of Southeast Asia on the Japanese language education under the Japanese occupation (1941-45) and direct our attention to the case in Malaya within the framework of the history of Japanese language education.
In the early period Military Administration of the Japanese occupation, the Gunseikambu (Military Administration) attached a great deal of importanceto primary education as a means of popularizing the Japanese language. In the middle period Military Administration, however, it shifted the emphasis to the Japanese teaching coordinated with the spiritual training of Rensei Kyoiku. In the late period Military Administration, it emphasized more on strengthening Japanese language education and primary education.
But at the final stage of the late period, the Gunseikambu shifted to relaxing its language policy, because the policy that instructors employed only Japanese as a teaching language was implemented too soon, so that it failed.
For the reasons stated above, the Gunseikambu played a minimal role in the education policy, particularly during the initial and middle periods of the Japanese occupation. We can confirm that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya during the late period was more directly influenced by the Japanese language education policy of the Japanese government than that in the other Japanese territories of Southeast Asia.
This policy in Malaya, however, was entirely based on the kokugo (national language) ideology, and the same teaching methodology used to teach in Japan and the Japanese colonies was employed in Malaya. Therefore, we can say that the Japanese language education policy in Malaya was ideologically a copy of the internal Japanese language education policy itself in some school, and it was most influenced by the kokugo ideology in the Japanese territories of Southeast Asia. But it eventually failed in Malaya because Japanese was not a Malayan common language nor the kokugo Malayans. In this sense, the nature of the Japanese language education in Malaya was different from that in the Japanese colonies.

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Japan occupied Indonesia-the Netherlands East Indies from March 1942 through August 1945. In Java the Japanese Military Administration re-opened the elementary schools in April 1942 which were called Kokumin Gakko (Sekolah Rakjat, six years, there was another three-years system called Shoto Kokumin Gakko, in this paper call them together as Kokumin Gakko). The curriculums and educational system under the Dutch rule were replaced by the Japanese-style based on the ideology of “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
This paper analyzes the education in Kokumin Gakko through 38 volumes of textbooks published by the Japanese authority. All the first edition of these textbooks were published by the end of 1943, except one book which was published in May 1944.
Only one textbook which was faithful to the Japanese educational ideology was Yoi-Kodomo (Good Children) vol. 1 which was published in May 1944. The contents of other textbooks published by the end of 1943 under the Japanese rule did not differ very much from those used during the Dutch colonial rule. There was a clear gap between the formal educational policy and the contents of the school textbooks under the Japanese rule. The Japanese made up for this shortcoming by extra-curriculum activities which strongly reflected the Japanese war-time ideology. As far as the contents of textbooks are concerned, we can easily find out continuity from the Dutch rule to the Japanese occupation, and even to the independent Indonesia after World War II.

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Tarekat (the Sufi orders) are considered to have played a vital role in the Islamization of Southeast Asia. However, very few reseachers have sought to undertake a determined examination of this topic because of a perceived scarcity of materials. Based on fragmentary information, tarekat seem veiled in such vague notions as: in early times tarekat activities were connected with commerce; tarekat have Indonesian Islam. He discloses the underlying aspects of tarekat and presents several new points relevant to our knowledge of Islam in Indonesia.
First, he emphasizes that after the very first introduction of this new religion, the further Islamization of the archipelago was promoted by Indonesians themselves, since at least the 17th century. Indonesians went to Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) where they studied tarekat in theory and in practice, then brought home the fruits of their studies. Indonesian students often preferred Kurdish teachers because they taught tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism) tinted with Indians mysticism. So the influence of Kurdish Islamic culture still remains in Indonesia although none of Kurdish ulama visited that area. Islam was accepted selectively, and Indonesians chose elements which accorded with their mentality and customs.
Bruinessen further criticises earlier discussions of Islamization, suggesting that in the very first stage of Islamization, Sufism and its accompanying metaphysical ideas came to Indonesia, but not necessarily organized Sufi religious orders. Futhermore the lack of clear evidence makes him doubt the hypothesis presented by Anthony Johns that tarekat's activities were closely connected with commerce. The conversion of kings and notables to Islam was motivated rather by the desire for access to or the acquisition of supernatural powers and the legitimization of their authority. Such tarekat practices as dzikir, ratib and wirid were expected to make them more powerful than could pre-Islamic mantra or devotions. So some rulers at first restricted their subjects access to tarekat teachings. However, as far as it can be judged from the oldest surviving Islamic manuscripts from Java and Sumatra, fiqh (Islamic jurispruden) was established there by the year 1600, as was tasawwuf. Also, most of the famous Indonesian Sufi authors have written both on fiqh and tasawwuf, indicating that they understood these to be two complementary, not contradictory sides of Islam. Some ulama showed tremendous knowledge of tasawwuf tradition, but tarekat teaching easily changed into saint worship because of the popular desire for relief by the intercession of a saint's miracle-working powers. The religiosity expressed by the populace at large was quite different from that of ulama.
Bruinessen sees the 19th century as a turning point in the development of Islam in Indonesia. It was in this very period that social institutions enabling the transmission of such Islamic traditions as pesantren

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