This article describes kinship and social relationship characteristics of the Minangkabau people in West Sumatra, Indonesia. The Minangkabau people are famous for their “matrilineal” kinship system. Nevertheless, commonalities between the Minangkabau kinship system and the cognatic Malay kinship system have so far been ignored in anthropological studies on the Minangkabau. Using a theoretical framework developed in kinship studies of the cognatic Malay world, the author analyzes kinship relationship characteristics of the Minangkabau people in the context of the social integration practices that make strangers into kin.

By analyzing the notion of kampuang, a territorial unit at the field site, the author discussed how kampuang members who shared no kinship relationship became “kin” through shared experiences of living together, forgetting genealogies, and helping each other in their everyday life. Through analyses of the preparation prose in a rite of passage among kampuang members, the author also examined the flexibility of kin relationships, as negotiated through consensus formation practices. The analysis at the end of article reveals inclusive and negotiable characteristics of kinship relationships of kampuang among the Minangkabau and in the Malay world.

This paper argues for a re-assessment of the writings of Khái Hưng (Trần Khánh Giư, 1896-1947), a prolific writer of the Self-Reliant Literary Group (Tự lực văn đoàn) which was founded in Hanoi in 1933. Executed by the Việt Minh in 1947, Khái Hưng produced numerous fiction and journalistic works during the French colonial period and the Japanese fascist occupation period. However, Khái Hưng’s contributions have largely been erased from histories of Vietnamese literary modenrity. My paper attempts to counter these erasures by deciphering his last full-length novel, Thanh Đức (1943).

According to A Dictionary of Vietnamese Writers and Literary Works (Hanoi, 2012), “Thanh Đức shows a high level of development in the art of psychological portrayal, but the way they pursued physical pleasures then celebrated and enjoyed an immoral and decadent way of life confirms the impasse and stagnation of the Self-Reliant Literary Group.” The fact that this work was written between 1941 and 1943, when the author was a political prisoner of the French colonial authorities, and that it was written in a very specific space, has been largely overlooked. This paper traces the situation in Vietnam and in related countries which emerge through a more active reading of the text produced over two years of contemplation in prison.

We thus can read Thanh Đức as an allegory of Khái Hưng, who listened to historical wisdom and had a journalistic eye, quickly digesting new ideas in the world, worrying about the future of the country, and caring deeply about the people at a critical time. Khái Hưng’s literary works are a valuable resource for depicting the folds of history and social realities that are difficult to see in official documents.

This article explores the growth of the call center industry in the Philippines and its effect on Filipino employees by critically comparing two recent books. Unlike those of the US and India, call centers in the Philippines have been relatively under-studied. More than one million Filipino employees have worked as call center agents, not only in Manila, but also in major regional cities such as Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, and Dumaguete. Their contribution to the Philippine economy has been decisive. Two recent books, A Nation on the Line: Call Centers as Postcolonial Predicaments in the Philippines (2018) by Jan. M. Padios and Lives on the Line: How the Philippines Became the World’s Call Center Capital (2019) by Jeffery J. Sallaz are welcome additions for understanding the Philippines’ call center industry and the lives of call center employees.

This article examines two major issues: the characteristics of call center work (low turnover rate and feminized jobs) and the effects on call center employees. Call centers in the Philippines have relatively low turnover rates and Filipino employees have rather affective attachments to their work. For university graduates, women, and/or single mothers in a precarious financial state, call center work is a profitable option because of its attractive salary. Considering this, the promise of escape from vulnerable conditions serves to lower turnover rate. The low rate represents neither a sense of satisfaction nor absence of worker resistance. Call center work in the Philippines is gendered. As emotional and affective labor, women are ideally suited because of their social skills and empathetic capacity. This resonates with other common professions among Filipino women, such as nursing and domestic work, both at home and/or overseas. This feminized labor process oftentimes clashes with normative practices, including Filipino masculinity. For this reason, heterosexual Filipino men are discouraged from working in call centers.

These works indicate that call centers in the Philippines should not be considered electronic prisons, as has often been asserted; rather, as exceptions, they could be important focus of academic inquiry on the growth of service work in the Philippines. Examining the responses of employees to issues such as unionization is a subject requiring attention in the future.

Since its independence, Indonesia has recognized only six world religions as official religions of the state, including Islam and Christianity. Other religions, like indigenous religions or new religions haven’t been regarded as religions (agamas), but as “beliefs in One Supreme God” (kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa), or simply “kepercayaan” or “beliefs,” and managed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The purpose of this paper is to examine the contents of the publications of the “Beliefs” Development Directorate of the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Two books of the Literature Study series, one on traditional sayings, the other on the Javanese calendar system, published in the first fiscal year of the newly-born directorate, are in close ideological harmony with Indonesia’s traditional values, especially those of Java. On the other hand, an article written by the first director of the directorate in one of the books of the Development series indicated close attention to contemporary Indonesian legal circumstances surrounding “beliefs.” As a result of the strong disinclination of Islamic organizations towards “beliefs,” shifting them from “religion” to the category of “culture,” the “belief” development project became subject to many restrictions.

In late 1980s, the directorate published the results of large scale research project on the situation of “beliefs” in the main 12 provinces. Each was conducted by a team consisting of at least five specialists, and each publication could be described as the first comprehensive academic exposition on “beliefs” in that area.

Those series of publications on “beliefs” have showed that the government respected the traditional culture of its own country and intended to use its spirit for development. The “beliefs” leaders of the directorate, while acknowledging the diversity of Indonesian culture, intended to provide each “belief” group with a common foundation, specifically Pancasila’s first pillar, “One Supreme Divinity.” The 1980s was the decade when the reality of “beliefs,” which had been vague and amorphous since Indonesia’s independence, gradually became clear, and the foundation of the government’s promotion policy was built.

I have suggested elsewhere that the Ba Maw government built up a framework of “Independent” Burma with the Japanese military in spite of repeated all-out conflicts. This research is based on the assumption that the government rose up together to face the Japanese military. However, cabinet members Thakin Tun Ok and Thakin Ba Sein are said to have trusted Japan to the extent that they were regarded as pro-Japanese. If this is the case, it is possible that they disrupted Burmese unity by bowing to Japanese military power. Therefore, focusing on Tun Ok and Ba Sein, this paper explores their relationships between Thakin party Kodaw Hmaing faction and Ba Maw. Whether the interpretation described above is correct is to be determined.

Section I suggests that the relationship between Tun Ok and his comrades and the Kodaw Hmaing faction was not restored during the Minami-Kikan reign. Backed by Shozo Kokubu (a former naval lieutenant), Tun Ok and Ba Sein had a strained relationship with Keiji Suzuki who assumed the head of Minami-Kikan. In Section II, it is suggested that they did not partner with the Kodaw Hmaing faction even during the Ba Maw Executive Administration. Ba Maw did not make Tun Ok and Ba Sein take the initiative to get the Kodaw Hmaing faction on his side. Section III discusses the sidelining of Tun Ok and Ba Sein and their move to Singapore. The reasons why a part of the Japanese military supported them is also discussed.

This analysis demonstrates that Tun Ok and Ba Sein occasionally lobbied more strongly for autonomy and independence from Japan than Ba Maw and his cohorts. Although it is true that they tried to compete against Ba Maw, this does not mean that they bowed to Japanese power. Anyway, a part of the Japanese military backed Tun Ok and Ba Sein. This section of the Japanese military supported Tun Ok and Ba Sein intending to secure one of confronting powers to use beyond the boundary between pro- and anti-Japan factions. Such measures had been used for years by Japanese troops on the Chinese continent.