The Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia (SEAMCED) was convened in Tokyo in April 1966 by the Japanese government. All Southeast Asian nations participated except Burma (the Union of Myanmar). SEAMCED was the first international ministerial conference for which Japan had taken initiative since the end of WWII.
The objective of this research is to illuminate the aim of the Japanese government in convening SEAMCED. Though almost 40 years have passed since the inaugural conference, there continues to be great disagreement among conventional wisdoms on why the Japanese government committed to convene this conference. On the one pole, there is a view that Japan merely followed the president Lyndon B. Johnson's regional approach, which was a $1 billion plan to aid the economic development of Southeast Asian countries with the aim of supporting the US government's Vietnam policy. Others assert that since the influence of the US in Asia had been decreasing due to its deep commitment in the Vietnam war, the Japanese government intended to exercise its diplomatic autonomy vis-à-vis the US by creating a new regional economic order. Thus, there is no completely unified opinion among the conventional studies. However, there is a common understanding that SEAMCED was an opportunity for Japan to increase its foreign aid.
This research aims to revise those conventional ideas by empirically analyzing the process of decision-making regarding SEAMCED. The main reason why Japan promoted SEAMCED was to determine how the funds allocated for the Johnson plan would be spent. Japan itself was also supposed to donate, but the main donor country was the US. Japan, which at that time was determined to finance the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and economic cooperation with South Korea and Taiwan, had neither the ability nor the intention to be burdened with aid for all of Southeast Asian nations. As the US had deepened its commitment into war with Vietnam, however, the Japanese government thought that the US would need to avoid direct involvement in development aid in the region so as not to induce unnecessary repellence, in particular, from non-liberal countries such as Cambodia and Indonesia. Japanese government tried to convene a “conference for Asia”, and after discussing the development project among the Asian countries in attendance, it would request the investment from developed countries, mainly the US. In order to accomplish this purpose, Japan had to persuade Asian countries and domestic public opinion that SEAMCED was not directly related to the “Johnson plan” and did not aim to form a political grouping.

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The existing literature argues that NATO membership has been an effective incentive for the democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) in post-communist Europe. It also points out considerable delay in establishing DCAF in the countries that are not likely to be candidates for NATO membership in the near future: typically, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (the former Soviet states excluding the three Baltic countries). On the other hand, the literature pays little attention to the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in this area.
This article argues that norm setting and the international promotion of norm implementation on the OSCE platform have contributed to the domestic legalization of DCAF in the CIS states. In this argument, the OSCE is regarded, not as teacher or nanny of norms (independent actor in international politics), but as a school of norms (site or process of norm teaching). This is a case illustrating the Constructivist functions of the OSCE process to re-constitute the “democratic state” at the international level by adding a DCAF element to democracy, and then literally to constitute the legal constitutions of the former communist countries.
The main body of this article is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the DCAF regime developed at the OSCE, which consists of the two Documents of the Copenhagen and Moscow Meetings of the Conference of the Human Dimension (1990 and 1991) and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994).
In the next two sections, I analyze norm setting and the promotion of norm implementation within the OSCE framework respectively. Legitimization based on OSCE principles, politically binding nature, and the consensus rule are three basic features of OSCE norm setting. Its activities to promote the implementation of the DCAF regime include follow-up conferences, information exchange, seminars, and comments on constitutional drafts and bills. I also identify teachers and students of the DCAF regime.
Fourthly, this article examines the impact of the OSCE process on national legislation in the CIS region. The DCAF norms, especially democratic decision on the use of force, the political neutrality of armed forces, and a ban on irregular forces, influenced the CIS constitutions adopted or amended nearly one year after the adoption of the OSCE Code of Conduct in December 1994. At the law level, the CIS countries have enacted some or all of the laws on defense, the state of emergency, mobilization, military service, alternative service, and the status of persons since 1994.

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This paper considers how the Japanese forces stationed in Leyte, Philippine and the Filipino civil government in the province conducted a foodstuffs policy during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1944.
Most of the historians assume that the foodstuffs in the occupied area during the Japanese occupation were procured by means of coercive manner and violent pillage. During the past of several years there can be seen some academic researches regarding the Japanese foodstuffs policy during the wartime in the Philippines. According to the work of Ricardo Jose, the procurement of foodstuffs of the Japanese in the Philippines was carried out in a well-done collaboration with the Filipino civil government and the controlled economy. He also points out some deficient situations of foodstuffs, especially of rice and corn, in the country originated from the colonization period of American regime, which brought about not only a serious plight to the Filipinos but also seriously affected the replenishment system of the Japanese forces. Although his work gives full and excellent explanation to the situation of foodstuffs during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines, it does not go beyond the analysis focusing on the situations in the nation capital, Manila. Therefore, this paper tries to supplement his work by the research regarding the problem of foodstuffs in the provincial area of Philippine, Leyte, during the Japanese occupation.
The policy of foodstuffs during the Japanese occupation was based on the fundamental outline for waging war in the occupied area established before the Pacific War broke out in 1941, of which three principles were formulated. Of those three a self-subsistence for supply of foodstuffs to military forces in the occupied area was very important. Controlled economy was put in force by the Japanese military administration in collaboration with the Filipino civil government assuming complete control of food supply to the Filipinos in order that the Japanese could acquire necessary foodstuffs for its military demand. However, the basic policy of foodstuffs based on the said controlled economy was evolved in different manners in each occupied area in which different social or political environment or condition affected the social system.
In Leyte, which is at more than five hundred kilometers distance from Manila, the controlled economy was not carried out completely for some complicated reasons: a meager agricultural situation; an administrative problem for development and distribution of rice and corn; defective function of National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) created during the Commonwealth regime before World War 2; and ubiquitous guerrilla societies in the island. These three factors prevented the Japanese military forces from implementing complete economic policy in Leyte.
Leyte was under the Japanese occupation from May 1942 to the end of October 1944 until US forces landed at the seashore of the provincial capital, Tacloban. The occupation in the island lasting just only for two years and six months or so may be divided into two periods; a moderate military occupation under the Nagano Unit and the Omori Unit from May 1942 to October 1943; and a fierce military occupation conducted by the main force of the 16th Division and the 20th Regiment against anti-Japanese guerrilla groups from October 1943 to October 1944. Considering the complicated situation in which the controlled economy could not be carried out, in the former period, both Nagano and Omori Unit groped for an efficient way of procuring foodstuffs not by means of coercive pillage but moderate way, such as like propaganda activities or consideration of plan for cultivation in Ormoc area. In the latter period, Japanese 14th Army decided to concentrate troops of main forces of the 16th Division in Leyte in order to conduct a mopping-up operation against active guerrilla groups, and to prepare for anticipated landing of

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Decision-makers, coping with global environmental problems, are plagued with the high uncertainty and expertise. Then assuming states uncertainty reducers, theory of epistemic community (hereafter EP)-a transnational network of experts-argues that EP plays a decisive role in actors' interest perception, (1) when the members have consensual knowledge, and (2) when they are embedded in national bureaucracy. This article, through the study of African elephant trade regulation, shows the limit of EP theory, and discusses the importance of norm to see the effect of scientific knowledge.
Following recommendations of AESG (African Elephant Specialist Group), an epistemic community for African elephant conservation, parties to CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) had kept African elephant in Appendix II (hereafter App. II), which obliged traders to submit export permits in importing its products.
However, after COP6, many Western countries, pressed by intense NGOs' campaign, and many range states, concerned about the sharp decline of their elephant populations and its negative impact on tourism industry, began to argue for App. I listing to ban the trade. At COP7 (1989), based on CITES listing criteria, AESG unanimously recommended to keep the sound populations of some Southern African countries in App. II. Nevertheless, parties voted to list all the populations in App. I. They have continuously ignored AESG recommendations till COP9 (1994), nominally in fear of poaching resurge. But, at COP10 (1997), they voted for the downlisting proposals from Southern African countries even though AESG made no recommendation for them.
As mentioned above, at COP7 and thereafter AESG lost its leading role. Unexpectedly not only parties without AESG members embedded but also parties with, systemically ignored the consensual recommendation of AESG till COP9. Then at COP10, they accepted the downlisting proposals without any change in the level of embeddedness.
Why did EP theory lose its explanatory power? In short, it is because decision-makers rarely delegate their authority to the EP members and less eagerly listen to them when the opinion of EP collides with industry's interest and public opinion. In such a conflictive situation EP is to lose its influence, and simple interest-based approach (hereafter IBA) gains explanatory power. This was the case for COP7 to COP9.
While appearing effective in a conflictive situation, EBA cannot explain the COP10 result, because there has been no significant change in instrumental interest of parties since COP7. To answer the COP10 puzzle, I propose a norm-effect hypothesis that the downlisting was made possible as an effect of a norm and rule (a derivative of norm).
To start with, CITES has listing criteria as rules, which are born from conservationism norm on which CITES is founded. Given scientific knowledge, they can tell parties in which Appendices species should be listed. Even though at COP7 they deviated from the criteria, they could still justify it based on a situational logic that App. I listing was required as an “emergent” measure to alleviate the uncontrollable poaching crisis, implying that the ban was still consistent with conservationism norm.
At COP9 South Africa submitted its downlisting proposal which set trade limits to non-ivory product alone, based on the consensual knowledge that for a physical reason non-ivory trade does not arouse poaching. Then parties became not able to maintain the argument against downlisting without relinquishing CITES's conservationism norm by preservationism which denied hunting in principle. Actually they were not a real self-interest seeker beyond the boundary of norm. Therefore at the very COP9 parties showed their clear will to solve the African elephant issue based on the criteria and scientific knowledge at COP10 through inter-COP dialogue meetings.

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In 1998, the Public Record Office released a top-secret file. The file contained Britain's 1945 war plans against Russia, her ally at the time. Just after the German surrender, Winston Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, instructed the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) to draw up war plans against Russia. This apparently contradicted the British policy towards the wartime grand alliance. Through reviewing these war plans and their background, this essay will re-examine Churchill's image as a wartime leader. In particular, it will consider the following questions: Why did Churchill enter the World War II? Why did he instruct war plans against Russia to be drawn up? Why did the planned war never eventuate? What was the implication of the failure of these plans?
In May 1940, just after the German advance into the Low Countries, Churchill took the office of the Prime Minister. Despite this crisis, he decided to continue the war, calling for the New World to enter the war. It seemed, however, that Britain's dependence on America might trigger the dismemberment of her empire. Churchill, unlike conventional statesmen, envisioned a new world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. He believed that with common citizenship and the common use of military bases, Britain and America could work together. His vision was, however, obstructed by Russia's unexpected victory over Germany in 1941, which was considered to be a serious threat to the British Empire and Western civilization.
To save his civilized world, Churchill instructed the JPS to make two war plans against Russia just after the German surrender. The first plan, “Operation Unthinkable, ” was an offensive war plan. The object of the plan was “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire.” The planned date for the opening of hostilities was 1 July 1945. The Allied powers were to count upon the use of German forces. However, the JPS concluded that UK-US numerical inferiority on land rendered even a limited and quick success doubtful, thus proving Churchill's surprise attack plan ultimately unthinkable.
The second plan, retaining the codeword “Unthinkable, ” was a defensive one. Wearying after the pessimistic first report, Churchill asked the JPS to study how Britain could defend her islands against a possible Russian advance into France and the Low Countries. This time, they concluded that Russia, without rockets and other new weapons, would not develop into a serious threat to the security of Britain.
Churchill was a statesman who fought for his ideal of a civilized world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. His war, however, spawned unexpected and disastrous results. Russia became an enemy of the Empire. The Cold War, an Anglo-American imperial war, became inevitable. Thorough inviting the Americans into her empire, and also decolonizing her empire, the British fought the war against communism. This became a basis for a new globalizing world order under America and her allies.

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60 years after the Pacific War, Japanese Foreign Ministry published on October 14 2004 relevant documents related to Japan's Final Memorandum delivered to the U. S. Government at the outbreak of the War. The documents were found in the files of diplomatic archives by the author in 1999. They reveal that the Ministry was supposed to submit to the U. S. Government the Final Memorandum which was originally worded to express an intention to enter into war. This formula was not accepted and the Memorandum was changed to simply inform Japan's intention to terminate the Japan-U. S. negotiations. When Final Memorandum which was divided in fourteen parts was cabled to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the 14th cable embodying the concluding paragraph was withheld for 15 hours while its phrase underwent subtle wording change. A withholding of cabling the final phrase as well as additional corrigenda for 15 hours caused a fatal delay in transmitting the Memo to the State Department at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time), just before Pearl Harbor attack.
There had been no serious in-depth investigation by the Japanese Government to pursue the reason for suspending the telegram of the 14th part of the Memo at the Tokyo side, and in its stead, a wrong search focused on a confused cable-handling and typing of the Final Memorandum by the Japanese Embassy. The delayed dispatch of final part of the Memo could be traced to an obstruction made at Tokyo Central Telegraph Office on the same day in connection with a clandestine army operation carried on by Major Tomura of Communication Section of Japanese Army's General Command when they withheld for ten hours the American President's message to the Emperor. During the seizure of Roosevelt's message, it is conclusively analyzed that a secret decoding was done by the Army before its delivery to the U. S. Embassy at 10: p. m. on December 7 (Japanese time). Major Tomura admitted later that he feared the Emperor might be induced to accommodate the President's appeal to delay the war. This Paper examines that the Foreign Ministry must have been informed of the decoding, and therefore, it had to adjust the wording of the last paragraph of the Final Memo to respond to the final position of the U. S. Government. Also a cover-up of delayed dispatch of correcting cables to Washington was made to block reinvestigation up till now.
Author observes that President's Message intended to delay war with Japan since he preferred to fight with Hitler first. Roosevelt opted for a last-minute attempt to send his Message directly to the Emperor to avoid war, as suggested by the Japanese Embassy.

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Most historians would not take exception with the assertion that Yoshida Shigeru's basic security policy rested on the reliance on the military strength of the United States, and a gradual development of Japan's own self-defense forces. Nevertheless, many studies have shown the tendency to confuse Yoshida's foreign policy with so-called “Yoshida Doctrine, ” and thus they have done little to clarify the policy-making process as it defined this security policy. By placing Yoshida's ideas for national security in the broader context of the intellectual milieu in which he operated, this essay examines the policy choices open to Yoshida. In so doing, it analyzes various other plans that existed at this time, while also considering the domestic and international context of Yoshida's security policy.
During the occupation, there were roughly three plans regarding postwar Japan's security: the first of these plans argued that Japan should seek political, social, and economic stability under the benevolent presence of U. S. forces in the Pacific region. Originally promulgated by General Douglas MacArthur, this plan was followed by such State Department officials as George F. Kennan and Philip C. Jessup. It did not foresee either U. S. military bases in Japan or Japanese rearmament, although MacArthur himself later accepted their necessity, albeit on a limited basis.
The second plan was promoted by John Foster Dulles. More military-oriented than the first plan, it revolved around the U. N. -endorsed concept of collective security. This plan foresaw Japan, in the defense of “free world, ” strengthening its own military power and providing the United States with military bases. This plan found a receptive audience amongst “old liberal” Japanese and Ashida Hitoshi.
The third plan was the brainchild of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like the second plan, it drew inspiration from the U. N. collective security, as the framework of offering military bases to the United States. Although regarding Japan's security as an integral part of international security, this plan did not welcome Japan's rearmament for the contribution to the “free world.”
The eventual course Yoshida adopted had points in common with all three of these plans. He readily admitted that Japan's security could not be maintained without a U. S. military presence in the Japanese mainland, although he did not regard rapid and large-scale rearmament at that moment as desirable or necessary. He believed political, economic, and social stability and development were the nation's first choice, as MacArthur or Kennan did. At the same time, Yoshida was sympathetic to U. N. collective security, or the defense of the “free world, ” and sought to support this by non-military means. In short, Yoshida's ideas concerning Japanese security embraced all three plans-or at lease aspects thereof-which he combined to form Japan's security policy.

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The existing researches about the authoritarian regime have given only the narrative account for the paradox that the vulnerable regime can be durable. In this article, we make it clear the instinct time mechanism of the authoritarian regime and its relation with this paradox. We examine mainly the regimes that were formed in the countries with democratic tradition and had beaten the previous democratic regimes. We call such regimes the “temporary authoritarian regime”.
While in the existing research, the durability of the authoritarian regimes has been analyzed and compared only from a viewpoint of the political structure of the regime, in this article, we analyze it attending the instinct time mechanism.
The authoritarian regimes also face time limitations. Time limitation is instinct in the temporary authoritarian regime, and it includes the “temporality” and the “periodicity”.
The “temporality” is that the regime itself declares the time limit of rule. And the regime acquires the durability by it. The “periodicity” manifests itself in the form of periodical elections or plebiscites, referendums. It is generated from the pressure of the return to the democracy, and it's inherent of the temporary authoritarian regime.
For the temporary authoritarian regime, the establishment of the “temporality” is important moment to acquire durability. In some cases, it includes not only the definition of the term of rule, but also the succession. And there are various patterns of establishment of the “temporality”.
The Chilean 1980 Constitution is one example. The term of rule and the succession manifested clearly and simultaneously in it. The Franco regime in Spain is another. The temporality had become clear gradually from “Law of Succession” to “Law of the Organization of the State”.
How do establishment of the “temporality” make the impact upon the durability of the regime? At first, the regime acquires the important basis of the existence by the fact that the constitution or fundamental law was approved by the plebiscite. Secondly, the establishment of the “temporality” has the effect both for the division of the opposition and integration of the pro-regime and moderate forces.
Even though having beaten the democracy, the authoritarian regime can raise its durability by the process of the establishment of the “temporality”. But that durability is limited essentially. And the phase after the establishment of the “temporality” is complex and ambivalent.
However, when looking around the other time and region, non-temporary type authoritarian regimes are more general. What kind of the time mechanism working in such regimes? It is the problem we should solve in the future.

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From 1955 to 1956, Japan conducted a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union to normalize the bilateral relations. During the negotiations, the most difficult obstacle to agreement turned out to be the issue of the Northern Territory, as Japan refers to the four disputed islands in the Kurile island chain. While difficulty on this issue had been expected, it became even more difficult because of U. S. involvement in the process. Based on archival evidence, this article analyzes the role of the United States in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, and investigates how U. S. and Japan's negotiation strategies interacted.
Previous research has contributed to interesting findings about the role of the United States in Soviet-Japanese negotiations. First, it is now known that the United States constrained Japan from making concessions on the territorial issue to the Soviet Union, fearing that the resolution of the issue might encourage Japan to demand the return of Okinawa. Second, until the Soviet Union made a proposal to return two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) in August 1955, Japan had not demanded the return of the four islands including Kunashiri and Etorofu. Japan started doing so to prolong the negotiations at least partly because it feared that an easy conclusion of the negotiations might upset the United States.
However, there remain some puzzles regarding how Japan and the United States attempted to influence each other to determine how Japan would conduct the negotiations with the Soviet Union. This article aims to answer such puzzles by carefully analyzing the newly found archival documents. For instance, newly discovered archival documents show that Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu probably recognized from an early stage of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that the success of the negotiations would ultimately depend on the U. S. position on the territorial issue. Therefore, Shigemitsu devised tactics to obtain U. S. consent to Japan's giving up of Kunashiri and Etorofu in return for obtaining Habomai and Shikotan to conclude the negotiations with the Soviets. (The United States would have regarded such a concession as a violation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.) In the end, however, by issuing the aide memoire on the issue of the Northern Territory, the United States was able to take advantage of internal divisions among political factions among the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to nullify Shigemitsu's efforts.
In the concluding section, the author summarizes the main findings of this research. Then, the author argues that Japanese policy makers may have learned from this experience the difficulty in pursuing Japan's independent foreign policy, making them reluctant to conduct diplomacy in a way that might even marginally damage U. S. interests.

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