This article examines how, in multilateral security alliances, the third party perceives and reacts to the diplomatic disputes between the other two allies through an investigation of Australia’s approach to the ANZUS crisis (1984-1985). The ANZUS crisis was a disagreement between New Zealand and the United States as a result of Wellington’s decision to ban nuclear-armed ships and aircrafts from New Zealand territories. In July 1984, David Lange, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, announced his plan to ban the entry of nuclear-armed ships and aircrafts from any country into New Zealand’s territory. The United States requested New Zealand to withdraw the plan as it was concerned about the negative impacts on its global nuclear strategy, Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND). Subsequently, both countries initiated negotiations to find a compromise. Nevertheless, these attempts failed since both failed to come to a consensus. Consequently, Washington lost hope for future cooperation with Wellington and withdrew its security commitments to New Zealand as stipulated by the ANZUS treaty.

The analytical focus of this article is, although, not on New Zealand and the United States, but on Australia which was watching the unfolding of the ANZUS crisis as the third ally of the treaty. Previous studies claim that Australia avoided involvement in the Crisis and did not intervene in the dispute. Through an investigation of newly opened primary documents and secondary sources, this article argues, however, that Australia worked below the surface and involved itself in the Crisis. Canberra was concerned that the aggravation of the Crisis might trigger off dilemma that an intricate choice had to be made between maintaining relations with New Zealand or the United States. Canberra also envisioned that New Zealand’s reactions to the United States would harden if the United States coerced the former. Thus, it urged Washington to restrain pressure against Wellington through diplomatic channels.

Finally, the article implies Australia’s approach had impact on the dynamics of the Crisis. It puts forward the hypothesis that Australia’s involvement was a cause of the complicated negotiations between New Zealand and the United States. New Zealand feared punishments from the United States as a result of its banning of ports visits by nuclear-armed ships. Therefore, it could be said that New Zealand would have withdrawn the plan of banning such ships if the United States had issued threats or implemented retaliations. Because of this, it can be concluded that Australia’s urging of the United States to restrain coercions against New Zealand indirectly aggravated the crisis.

Michael W. Doyle offers three main explanations for imperial expansion: the first being a metropolitan model, the second emphasising peripheral problems and the third based on the systemic model. The British Empire was dismantled by the early 1970s, but Britain resumed military engagement from the mid-1970s. Although this is not imperial expansion, the second explanation is appropriate: Britain renewed its commitment to the former imperial area because of its involvement in the local crises.

Some crises in the former imperial area included those in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Caribbean Sea and the South Atlantic. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy had maintained its presence since 1968, and the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron was organised in 1974. This squadron and pro-Soviet forces in the littoral states posed a threat to Western interests. In Belize, there was the possibility of an invasion from neighbouring Guatemala in 1975 and 1977, and Britain was obliged to reinforce the garrison; Guatemala was demanding over a third of Belizean territory, and the dispute was not successfully resolved. In the Falkland Islands, the tension between Britain and Argentina increased in the late 1970s, resulting in the British government being unable to withdraw its ice patrol ship, which had merely maintained a token presence, and dispatching a task force during the 1977 crisis. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought a regime change that was no longer pro-Western. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created tension in the Persian Gulf and put both the United States and Britain on alert. Then, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 endangered the passage of merchant shipping through the Straits of Hormuz or within the Persian Gulf, resulting in the United States, Britain and France starting zonal patrols. All these crises lead to a study of Britain’s priority two commitments (i.e. its commitments outside NATO). However, it was not until the Falklands Conflict in 1982 that the British government decided to maintain its power projection capability, including three aircraft carriers.

Why did Britain resume its commitment? It is difficult to find the cause in the metropolitan model, since the trade between Britain and the Commonwealth dwindled in the 1970s and the British economy was in decline, often cynically called the ‘British sickness’. It is also impossible to explain it using the systemic model, in light of the fall of Britain and rise of the Soviet Union and the Third World. Therefore, the local crises are the most persuasive argument for the reason for British engagement.

Corruption is a well-known, pervasive problem in Russia. When describing the state of resistance against corruption in the country, researchers tend to focus on its weaknesses. In this context, emphasis is placed on the leadership’s lack of political will and the limited role played by civil society actors and international NGOs. The leadership’s behavior could be owing to the weak incentives for promoting anti-corruption policies that might inconvenience the incumbent elites.

However, this does not mean that Russia has not promoted anti-corruption policies. Various anti-corruption measures are found in domestic legislation. Especially during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, beginning with the approval of the federal law “on countering corruption” in 2008, a series of anti-corruption measures were introduced. It is worth exploring the mechanism by which the government promotes such anti-corruption policies that do not necessarily benefit the incumbent elites.

In this paper, I take the example of the asset declaration system for public officials. This is one of the typical anti-corruption policies, which led to a strengthening of the control over the incumbent elites. In Russia, the asset declaration system was introduced in 2010, in connection with ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In 2012, the system was amended to oblige public officials to declare not only their assets and incomes, but also large-scale expenditures. By tracing the introduction and evolution of the asset declaration system, I try to demonstrate the factors that made the Russian government strengthen control over the incumbent elites.

A key fact in analyzing this question is that anti-corruption has become an international norm. Russia has become a member of major international treaties in this sphere. However, it has been pointed out that the ratification of international treaties, in itself, does not guarantee their realization in domestic legislations. Especially important in this context is the role played by domestic political actors, such as NGOs and opposition parties. In this study, I focus on occasions when the government’s noncompliance with international norms was politicized by such political actors.

The evolution of the asset declaration system in Russia demonstrates that the politicization of the noncompliance with international norm pressured the government to introduce stricter controls over the incumbent elites. Because the government has itself served as a major promoter of the need to accept international norms, it was difficult to counter criticism of their noncompliance. Under such circumstances, the government had no option but to strengthen control over the public officials.

The importance of African countries increased from the latter half of 1950s, and both East and West camps began to try to win those countries. One of the ways was “educational aid” keenly needed by African officials because it was indispensable for Africa’s advancement. However, it was also important for obtaining “Hearts and Minds” of African people.

One of the non-governmental actors of the U.S. which largely conducted educational aid to Africa was “Ford Foundation,” whose members participated in the diplomacy about educational & cultural affairs of U.S. government in 1960s. In previous research, Foundation’s first report of foreign aid, “Gaither Report,” the formulation process of the aid program to Africa, and the relation between Gaither Report and Foundation’s “African Program” haven’t been investigated enough. This article will solve these problems and show the role of Ford Foundation in the Cold War in Africa.

In 1949, Gaither Committee drafted Gaither Report. It warned the danger of expanding the “authoritarian regime” and recommended Foundation should concentrate on educational aid for the improvement of welfare of the world and for protecting democratic regime. Then, from 1952, the Foundation began to formulate African Program.

The first feature of African Program and its formulation process was the Foundation continually emphasized the importance of “educational aid.” From 1952 to 1956, Foundation’s members visited various universities, research institutes and government officials at home and abroad to discuss where the foundation could contribute more effectively. As a result, the Foundation tried to establish the basis of research on Africa in the U.S. in cooperation with foreign countries, especially with Britain, to define the problems of African countries. Then, not only Department of State but other non-governmental actors recommended Foundation to concentrate on aid to British Africa which already had the basis of higher-education and research. The foundation’s aid was mainly directed to university-colleges, technical colleges and research institutions.

Second feature was Foundation’s continuous recognition of ideological aspects of educational aid. The wariness toward the expansion of authoritarian regime and communist’s educational aid was shown, and Foundation regarded educational aid as a guardian of democratic regime. Ford Foundation also saw educational aid as a method of telling Western point of view.

Through these activities, Ford Foundation connected higher-education of the U.S., Britain, and African countries, which could be called the network of “knowledge.” This network contributed to protect the higher-education of East Africa from East camp’s interferences, to develop the ability of studying African problems, and to make West camp grasp the power to formulate African elites which lead better relationships between African and Western countries.

This article explores the British initiative to improve European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early years of the Thatcher government. EPC was a framework for foreign policy cooperation among the member states of the European Community (EC) established in 1970. Despite Margaret Thatcher’s reputation as pro-American and opposition to European federalism, Britain played an active role in shaping EPC’s evolution. In October 1980, Lord Carrington, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, proposed EPC’s improvement. After a year of negotiation, the Foreign Ministers of the Ten adopted the London Report in October 1981. The London Report codified existing arrangements in EPC. It also contained a wide range of improvements such as EPC’s full association with the European Commission and the establishment of a crisis procedure.

This article demonstrates that the British initiative had two objectives. First, Britain needed a more effective EPC in order to pursue British and wider Western interests. Britain, under Carrington’s leadership, attempted to launch European initiatives in international problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Britain’s view, these initiatives were intended to complement US diplomatic actions that would serve not only British but also Western interests in general. Therefore, Britain felt the need to improve EPC, as it was neither strong nor stable enough framework to conduct major foreign policy initiatives.

Second, Britain expected to overcome its isolation in European integration process by showing its constructiveness in EPC. Since the mid-1970s, Britain had been isolated within the EC as a result of a renegotiation of its EC membership and its absence from the European Monetary System. In the early years of the Thatcher government, acrimonious disputes over the British budgetary contribution led to Britain’s further isolation. By contributing to the development of EPC, Britain tried to prove its “Europeanness” and overcome its isolation in European integration process.

This article also reveals that Britain fell into a difficult situation in the course of its initiative. In January 1981, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher launched a major initiative to create a “European Union” through the establishment of “Common Foreign Policy”. The British government feared that support for Genscher’s initiative could be criticized by anti-marketeers in Conservative supporters. Also, Britain worried that Genscher’s initiative could lead to the loss of a flexible character of EPC and lessen freedom in the conduct of British foreign policy. As a result, Britain stopped overtly displaying its “Europeanness”. While Britain contributed to the making of the London Report, it failed to overcome its isolation in European integration through the initiative.