Matthew Calbraith Perry visited Japan twice, in July 1853 and the early spring of the following year. On the first visit he successfully delivered President Filmore's letter addressed to the Emperor of Japan to the Shogun's representatives at Kurihama on the 14th of July. Along with the Presidential communication asking for the opening of Japan, Perry presented his own “three” letters addressed to the Emperor of Japan. But according to the Japanese sources, Dai Nihon ko monjo available since 1910 in a published form (Tokyo University Press), there was a “fourth” letter handed presumably on the same day to the Bakufu officials along with “two” white flags. The letter explained that in case of war between the United States and Japan, Japan was bound to be defeated. “Then Japan should ask for peace by hoisting the flags.”
Curiously enough, this piece of document has never been seriously considered in the historiography of U. S. -Japanese relations. Even at the height of the anti-American campaign of the post-Pearl Harbor years during the Pacific War, that intimidating letter of Perry's was never mentioned in Japanese literature. A natural question arises: How did this happen? One obvious reason, as was discovered in the course of research for this essay, was attributable to Perry himself. He destroyed it from all American sources to keep his record clean from having deviated from the President's explicit instructions not to resort to hostile actions as the mission was for friendly relations.
No mention had ever been made of the letter and the flags in American literature until a partial exception was made by Peter Booth Wiley in 1990 based on an English translation from the Japanese documents noted above. The Japanese scholars who assumed that all the primary sources were apparently to be found in the United States duplicated the American writers' mistakes. Still it does not seem fully to answer the question why the Japanese writers, among them especially the specialists in American diplomacy toward Japan, had not become aware of the existence of the document in two versions of Japanese translation in a published form since 1910.
There are many conceivable reasons. But one outstanding cause which this essay explores concerns Inazo Nitobe. In his virgin book, The Intercourse between The United States and Japan: A Historical Sketch (The Johns Hopkins University, 1891), he came close enough to disclosing the threatening letter of Perry's but refrained from doing so. He presented even a Japanese document which had an explicit reference to the “white flags, ” but from his abridged English translation, Nitobe chose to drop the reference even by distorting the meaning of the paragraph. In his mind U. S. -Japanese relations were much too precious to be adversely affected by the reminder of such an episode. His students of American studies at the Imperial University of Tokyo in the 1910's and their students after them must have accepted it as a tradition.
It is indeed proverbial that while Perry destroyed a historical document for the preservation of his own honor and his illustrious family's record in U. S. history, Nitobe and his students kept it away from public knowledge for the sake of Japan's smooth passage into a “civilized and enlightened” modern nation in friendship and “mutual understanding” with the American nation.

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During the course of forming the Meiji state, there occurred several examples of senior government officials whose views on foreign affairs and understanding of international relations directly reflected the considerations of internal politics and diplomacy. This feature is, needless to say, deeply related to the question of Japanese nationalism. Such men were constantly preoccupied with the dilemma of how to protect Japan's political independence by matching the strength of the Western powers on the international stage of Eastern Asia. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to accurately reassess Japan's diplomatic stance in the early Meiji period by investigating the international outlooks of two representative diplomatic leaders and ministers of Foreign Affairs, Soejima Taneomi and Terashima Munenori. This is presented through a comparative analysis of their respective perceptions and interpretations of international law and diplomatic relations in addition to the policies they actually implemented while in office.
The Confucian ethics particular to a scholar of Chinese classics were central to Soejima's international perspective, generating his argument for discipline through moral influence and inspiring recourse to the diplomatic guidelines of the chronicles of Lu in his approach towards Russia and Asian states, especially Formosa and Korea. This should be recognized as a significant element in effecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' departure from its hitherto essentially moderate diplomatic policy and the adoption instead of a hard line approach.
On the other hand, Terashima was a strong advocate of moderation and attached much importance to ideas of equality and negotiation between sovereign states. His subsequent appointment to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, therefore, should have presented an opportunity for revising Soejima's hard line diplomacy in favour of the more temperate model of the past. This was prohibited, however, by the lateral pressure that the powers of Europe and America were exerting in Asia.
In order to ride crises of internal disorder and foreign pressure, the leading voices in government ventured instead on a scheme of sustaining Soejima's uncompromising line while at the same time replacing his rationale with a Western-style logic of power politics. It is perhaps reasonable to accept the view that the double-edged character of Meiji diplomacy, with its aggressive stance in Asia and simultaneously subordinate attitude to the powers of Europe and America, first took shape when this strategy was actually in place and operating in Japanese foreign policy.

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In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”
The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.
However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

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Dr. Kan'ichi Asakawa (1873-1948), Professor at Yale University, had studied in Japan and the United States and graduated from Yale University. His speciality was comparative legal history, especially in the medieval era. But other than his special studies he had a positive interest in modern East Asian international relations and its relations with United States.
He published in English his book “Russo-Japanese Conflict” in 1904. He criticised Russian expansionism in East Asia, especially in Manchuria and toward Korea and supported the Japanese stand in the Russo-Japanese War. But, on the other hand, he criticised Japanese diplomacy in East Asia after the war and he wrote his Japanese book “Indication of Japan's Disaster” in 1909. He stressed two principles relative to China, principles of territorial integration and open door (or “equal oppotunity”) which were advocated by Secretary Hay in 1889 and 1990, as the stand of “new diplomacy”. “Old diplomacy” is the expansive and imperialistic diplomacy. He asserts that Japan took the stand of “new diplomacy” against Russian “old diplomacy” at the Russo-Japanese War. But, he asserts, Japan took the policy of “old diplomacy” after the war. And this change promoted American antithapy toward Japan and he surmised even the possibility of Japan-U. S. War in the future. He inspected various elements in Japanese action in Manchuria and especially advocated the retrocession of leased territory in China.
In spite of his criticism Japan magnified its imperialistic policy in China. He wrote many letters to his seniors and friends, such as Shigenobu Okuma, Soho Tokutomi, Yasaka Takagi and others, and appealed for change to Japanese foreign policy. Concerning the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915 he warned the Shantung problem might be the turning point to determine Japan's destiny. In the letter of April 29, 1917 to Tokutomi he requested the concert of the three nations, Japan, China and the United States. Concerning the Washington Conference he asserted that Japan should take positive action and he hoped Japan would initiate discussion on the problem of the agenda of the Conference.
Concerning the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War he rejected Japan's policy of relying on military power. He foresaw the isolation of Nazi-Germany and predicted German defeat and Hitler's suicide in the letter of March 6, 1938 to his friend. Accordingly he was opposed to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. He expected change in Japan's foreign policy before the catastrophe but the prosect was very poor. So Asakawa joined the movement to dispatch a letter from President Roosevelt to Japan's Emperor. He, with his collaborators, wrote the draft of Roosevelt's letter to the Emperor. In fact the President sent his letter to the Emperor immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. But the contents of the letter were very different from Asakawa's draft and he expressed his disappointment in a letter to his friend.

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The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), originating from the YMCA movement, was established in July 1925 in Honolulu, Hawaii. This period suffered from bitter and growing frictions between the East and the West. These frictions were caused not only by incompatible political and economic interests, but also by racial antagonisms and cultural conflicts. For instance, the United States Congress had passed the Oriental Exclusion Act in 1924, which wounded Asian sensibilities and aroused anti-American feelings, especially in Japan. The Chinese Nationalist revolution led by Sun Yatsen was powerfully growing and anti-foreignism directed against the Western powers, especially against Great Britain, was widespread in China.
Aware of the gulf between the East and the West, and eager to throw a bridge across it, a group of men and women devised the idea of holding a non-official conference of leaders personally based from Pacific countries to discuss problems of mutual concern, and to promote deeper mutual understanding and peace.
The first IPR Conference was held in Honolulu in July 1925. Its 150 members came from Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the Philippines. The men and women of different national backgrounds worked together and cooperated to share intellectual and cultural knowledge. They had a common belief or visionary goal that if they could get together for friendly, frank discussion of the problems of the Pacific, these problems might prove to be less difficult than they seemed.
In case of the second Hawaii IPR Conference in July 1927, in addition to the orignal members, a newly formed British group attended, two members from the League of Nations and a member from International Labor Office attended with the qualification of observer. Afterwards, IPR continued its activities until 1961 under the drastically changed international environments.
This paper focuses on the problems of the Peace Machinery in the Pacific area at the first and second Hawaii IPR Conferences. This is one of the most important subjects for IPR.
In the first Hawaii IPR Conference, the Peace Machinery Problem was discussed rather abstractly and optimistically. It is indicated in the public address presented by H. Duncan Hall.
In the Pacific we must not make the mistake of subordinating the development of peace to the prevention of war. What is required in the Pacific is some sort of loose conference machinery which would bring governments together at regular intervals to promote international co-operation.
from “POLITICAL AND LEAGAL CO-OPERATION BY H. DUNCAN HALL” INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1st CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1925, (Honolulu, 1925) pp. 136-138.
This kind of abstract and optimistic attitude reflected the trends of liberalism and pacifism after World War I.
Coming to the second Hawaii IPR Conference, the discussions on the Peace Machinery materialized and were realized. This change was brought on by James T. Shotwell, professor of History at Columbia University, who was well known as the central figure for drafting the so-called Paris Peace Treaty. Shotwell presented “Draft Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and …”.
Shotwell drafted it keeping in mind that it should be accepted between Japan and the United States. Japanese IPR members criticized Part I, Article 2. a. It was an exception which was made of the Monroe Doctrine. But Japanese members and liberal intellectuals knew well that the draft treaty was the attempt to state a compromise between American history and precedent and the new experiments by Shotwell; they supported his draft treaty in principle.
Nevertheless, they could not exert influence against the Japanese government to accept the draft treaty when the Paris Peace Treaty was politicalized as a domestic political issue. Since most Japanese IPR members were liberal intellectuals, and Japanese

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The Anti-Japanese Immigration Act which the Congress of the United States of America passed in May, 1924, shocked the Japanese very much. There was a strong possibility that it might cause the Japanese, who believed that they had been one of the five big powers in the world since the first World War, to get rid of the attitude of “Leaving Asia and Identifying with Europe” which they had taken since they opened up their country to the world; in other words, it could possibly shake the basis of the Japanese national identity. This identity crisis could be understood from various public opinions expressed after the establishment of the Anti-Japanese Immigration Act, that is to say, the arguments for reconsidering the meaning of the relationship between Japan and the United States of America which had been continuing since Perry's visit to Japan, the arguments for close relations with other Asian countries, and the arguments for emigration to the Asian Continent which was said to be impossible because of historical reasons.
It should be understood that these opinions were expressed on the basis of the very sense of crisis over national identity and the foundation of the Japanese existence and from the point of view that it would be possible to overcome the crisis by identifying with Asia. After all, however, the arguments were gradually absorbed into the insistence that Japan should advance upon China.

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Post-World War Two historiography in the field of American diplomatic history has not fully appreciated the prewar ‘legalistic’ appraoches to foreign policy. George F. Kennan's critical view of the “legalistic approach” still remains unchallenged. Kennan's own work, however, shows a recognition of the substantial influence that international law had on foreign policy making. His work recognizes that the study of international law was a highly regarded academic discipline and that contemporary people believed in its relevance. This paper focuses on the activities of international lawyers and considers the implications of their discussions with regard to prewar foreign policy, particularly in the context of U. S. -Japan relations prior to the Manchurian lncident.
During the 1920s international lawyers debated the question of whether to accept change in the interpretation of international law, the legal nature of the League of Nations, and the status of the law of war. Lasa Oppenheim, of Cambridge University, argued that the League should be regarded as equivalent to a “family of nations” rather than a federation of independent states. James Brown Scott and Quincy Wright, both influential international lawyers from the United States, endorsed Oppenheim's view. Tachi Sakutaro, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University and an associate of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, did not agree. His was an ‘atomistic’ view of international relations, one which placed importance on the sovereignty of states rather than on an appreciation of a ‘family of nations’; accordingly, he stressed the need to study the international law of war. Some American international lawyers, including Wright, though, wanted to enhance the cause of peace by changing the focus of international law. They held the progressive view that the world was entering a new stage of civilization in which might should be replaced by right.
The difference between these two approaches becomes clear when one looks at their respective attitudes toward the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. Tachi produced a cynical interpretation of the Pact, noting that its effect was limited and that it did not take into account the right of self-defense. Although American international lawyers were frank in admitting that the Pact was not a perfect legal document, they tended to focus on the possibility of using it as a rallying point for world opinion. The Japanese government did sign the Pact, but her allegiance to it was dubious. This became especially clear after Japan responded unfavorably to Henry L. Stimson's diplomatic efforts in the fall of 1929 to provide international conciliation for the dispute between the Soviet Union and China over the Chinese Eastern Railway. In addition, the Japanese government was not enthusiastic about the British delegation's initiative in the fall of 1929 to revise the Covenant of the League of Nations so that it would come into accord with the Kellogg Pact.
When the Kwantung Army swept into Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese government declared that its military actions were aceeptable according to the right of self-defense. Tachi presented an argument in print to justify this opinion. Immediately after the incident, however, the Chinese government appealed to the League, warning that the edifice of the treaties that had guaranteed peace since the end of World War One was crumbling. The League and the United States also viewed the Japanese attack as a challenge to the system of peace, a system which had been “laboriously elaborated” since the end of the war. In response to the Manchurian Incident, Secretary Stimson, a strong advocate of the treaty system, issued his non-recognition doctrine. It proclaimed that the United States would not recognize the legitimacy of any situations that were taken contrary to the principles of the Pact. The legal issues raised by the Incident were the

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Pan American Nikkei (people of Japanese origin) Conventions, which started in Mexico in July 1981 and are held in a country of North or South America every two years, have finally had their sixth assembly in Paraguay in 1991. The successful people who attend this assembly have a tendency to devote themselves to their own native countries in the Americas, while maintaining a positive relationship with their Japanese origin. The Pan American Nikkei Association (PANA), with its head office in Lima, Peru, has organized these assemblies in the Americas to support compensation for World War II forced evacuations and damages. It promotes mutual help in some disasters, improvement of the working situation of Nikkei in Japan, and support for Peruvian Nikkei President FUJIMORI.
The Nikkei are sometimes considered in the Americas to be “Japanese”, even though their citizenship is not Japanese. That is to say they are like a show-window of “Japan” in the Americas. The explanation for the change in the image of Japan through the leaders of PANA will contribute to recognition of the evolution of the popular image of Japan in history, and to international relations around the “Pacific Rim”.
Today so many people cross national boundaries that it is considered necessary to maintain good relations among all peoples. This research will propose suggestions to improve the situation of people who live in foreign countries through the reflections of the change in the image of Japan in the Americas through the opinions of the leaders of PANA, from 1940 to 1992. The time and length limitations of this paper have obliged me to limit my analysis to six leaders in the USA, Mexico and Peru.

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During the Allied occupation (1945-52), Japan's position in U. S. policy was transformed from that of enemy to key ally. Only a few years after the war, the primary objective of U. S. policy in Japan was economic recovery, and the U. S. began rebuilding Japan as the “workshop” of Asia. The purpose of this paper is to examine how American public opinion responded to this policy of reviving Japan's economy soon after the war and how American perceptions of Japan shifted. By utilizing the extensive opinion survey by the U. S. State Department that covered various newspapers, magazines, radio comments, leadership opinions, and public opinion polls, this study focuses on an aspect of the occupation history which has not received full attention from the conventional scholarship. It should also give an insight into the patterns of American people's attitudes toward foreign nations and U. S. political culture.
The occupation period can be divided into three phases, according to U. S. policy toward Japan's economy. Even during the first phase (1945-46), when the U. S. officially declared not to undertake responsibility for Japan's recovery, a desire to make Japan a peaceful and democratic nation prompted Americans to allow her peacetime industries. During the second phase (1947-48), the Occupation began focusing on economic rehabilitation, and Washington officials started to cultivate actively the measures for Japan's speedy recovery. In 1947 a series of factors led public opinion to support making Japan self-supporting. These factors include MacArthur's proposal for early peace, the Cold War in Europe, the consequent increase in U. S. aid, the need for reducing the American taxpayer's burden, and concern with the communist threat in Japan. By 1948, with the “deterioration” of the Asian (especially Chinese) situation and with official efforts to shift occupation policy, American opinion tended to approve of making Japan not merely self-supporting but the “workshop” of Asia. During the third phase (1949-52), Washington took the initiative in executing economic recovery programs, largely neglecting democratic reform. By then, the Cold War had spread into Asia, and the public favored rebuilding Japan as an anti-Red bulwark.
Thus American public opinion generally followed the official policy, notwithstanding some dissenting views. Public comment on Japan, reflecting America's “mission” to “democratize” Japan or to fight against the communist threat, testifies to the strain of idealism of the American way of life and its promotion abroad, while self-interest often accompanied it.
American attitudes toward Japan during the occupation softened considerably. However, the softening process did not involve the fundamental improvement in perceptions of the Japanese themselves. While drastic changes of the international environment could quickly transform our perceptions of other nations in a political and strategic sense, the negative images deriving from war experiences and racial and cultural biases were hard to change.

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The purpose of this paper is to describe how the Revolutionary Government of Vietnam has recognized the political situation of the Asia and Pacific area since the reunification of Vietnam in 1975.
Since the middle of 1950s, the Vietnamese Communist Party has regarded the U. S. A. as the primary enemy of their revolution and national liberation. After the Vietnam War, the communist government still understood the international situation as a conflict between the Socialist bloc and the Inperialist bloc.
After the “Doi Moi” (renovation) policy started in 1986, Vietnamese leaders totally changed its foreign strategy and began large scale disarmament. They have improved their relations with the People's Republic of China, promoted the Cambodian peace process and set up economic relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
At the same time, the “Special Relationship” among the three Indochina countries basically changed. Vietnamese troops totally withdrew from Cambodia in September 1989 and the Hanoi government has been groping for a new relationship with Laos and other Southeast Asian countries.
The revolutionary government has strengthened economic ties with Korea, Taiwan and Hongkong. The government seems to be seeking its new development strategy from the model of these newly developed industrial countries. Vietnamese leaders are also interested in the economic development of Japan since world war II. However, they are afraid that Japan will expand not only its economic power but also its political power in Asia and Pacific area after the Soviet Union collapsed.
Vietnamese leaders' basic conceptions on “American Imperialism” are still being held. After 1989 the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union faced great political disorder, which the Hanoi government at first condemned as a plot of the Imperialists. Afterward the Hanoi government modified this evaluation, but it is still suspicious of the threat of Imperialism, which utilises political disorder in the socialist countries.
In addition, the government is also suspicious of “the hegemonism and expansionism” of the People's Republic of China, which is continuing its military support for the Khmer Rouge. Since its disarmament policy started in 1987, Vietnamese leaders has been attempting to gain national security against China through cheaper means.

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Mancur Olson's model of public (collective) goods has been used or referred to by a number of students of the social sciences. IR is not an exception and a number of its students have applied his model to the analysis of international public goods.
Olson's original model, however, may contain two points to be improved upon. First, being a partial equilibrium model, it does not analyze “income effect” explicitly. Second, it does not scrutinize the concept of each actor's “size, ” failing to set the distinction between each actor's “wealth (i. e., income size or endowment)” and its “preference.” Therefore, the effects of changes in each actor's “wealth” and /or “preference” on the individual level of the public good provision are not present in his model.
This paper tries to introduce and develop a model of voluntary provision of public goods which improves Olson's model. First, a model of voluntary provision of public goods is introduced from the field of Public Economics. Second, it proceeds to develop the introduced model so that the effects of changes in “wealth” and/or “preference” on the level of public good provision can be analyzed. In addition, the effects of the transfer of “wealth” among the actors are investigated. Finally, after providing several propositions deduced from the model, the paper interprets the results in the context of International Relations and shows that the model's implications concur with the propositions offered by the theory of “hegemonic stability.”

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