年報政治学

はじめに

川人貞史

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_3-1_6
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_3

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［特集］　民主政治と政治制度

近代日本における多数主義と「憲政常道」ルール

―政権交代をめぐる制度と規範―

村井良太

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_13-1_39
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_13

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  The Meiji Constitution created a bicameral Imperial Diet, which included a House of Representatives with members chosen by direct election. However, this was not what made the party cabinet system a necessity. The selection of prime minister was on the elder statesmen's consensus directed by protocol.
  Nevertheless, under the slogan “The Normal way of the Constitutional Government,” the situation changed in the direction of democracy. From 1924 through 1932, party leader possessed political power. And from 1927, there was a two-party system by the Seiyukai and the Minseito. A certain Japanese journalist said in 1929 that Japanese politics was almost the same as the British politics in respect of this.
  The purpose of the paper is to explore the establishment and collapse of norms for change of power by a relation with institutions from 1918 through 1936. Mainly, three actors; people who selected the prime minister, party leaders and observers (scholars and journalists) are observed in the paper. And the majority rule in the pre-war Japan is also considered.

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1925年中選挙区制導入の背景

奈良岡聰智

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_40-1_61
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_40

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  In 1925 the Law of the election of the Lower House was revised, and the medium-sized constituency system was introduced. This system had been continued for about 70 years and given great influence to Japanese politics. Why and how was the medium-sized constituency system introduced in 1925? The aim of this paper is to answer this question.
  It has often been said that the three parties in power introduced it in order to escape from competing each other and to keep their base. This is the case, but the background was much more complicated. This paper focuses on three points.
  First, quite a few medium-sized constituencies had already been made when Hara Cabinet revised the Law of the election of the Lower House in 1919. It reflected wishes of Upper House, which was afraid of Seiyukai's mastery over Lower House, and wishes of some Seiyukai or independent MPs, who were afraid of changes of their constituencies.
  Second, the small-sized constituency system was greatly criticized among journalism and academic world after World War I. They insisted that corruption in election and higher cost for election was due to the small-sized constituency system, and they were generally welcome to proportional representation and multi party system in Europe. In 1923 Advisory Committee on Law expressed that proportional representation should be adopt. These voices promoted the review of the small-sized constituency system.
  Third, it was Kenseikai rather than three parties in power that took the initiative in introducing the medium-sized constituency system. Kenseikai did it in order to avoid returning to the large-sized constituency system, which was likely to make excessive multi party system, and to introduce the favorable election system to it. The medium-sized constituency system was favorable for Kenseikai in that it would not lose heavily. Kenseikai aimed to grow as one party in two party system, and the plan really came true after that.

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衆議院選挙制度改革の評価と有権者

山田真裕

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_62-1_78
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_62

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The purpose of this article is to examine the effects of electoral reform and tendency toward Duvergerian equilibrium in the lower house elections in Japan to voters. At first, using aggregate data of voting, we confirm the tendency to the Duvergerian equilibrium at the single-member district level. Next, in order to test the relationship between voter turnout and effective number of candidates (ENC) in the SMDs, we estimate OLS regression. After that, combining calculated the ENCs with survey datasets, we observe voters’ perception about satisfaction to election results, belief to function of election, and external efficacy.
Here we have two main findings. The one is the positive relationship between voter turnout and the ENCs at the SMDs. The other is the robustness of the voters’ perceptions to electoral reform and the tendency toward the Duvergerian equilibrium at the SMDs. From these findings, we conclude that Japanese voters do not share so pessimistic views as some critics to current electoral system and bi-partism. Simultaneously, we argue that we should be cautious of abstention and the validity of survey datasets.

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内閤不信任の政治学

―なぜ否決される不信任案が提出されるのか？―

増山幹高

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_79-1_109
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_79

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Why do opposition parties propose votes of no-confidence they know will not pass? Although there is an extensive literature on the confidence relationship between parliament and the executive, it tends to focus solely on the vote of no-confidence as a mechanism for the parliamentary majority control of the executive. This article fills a gap in the literature by exploring the vote of no-confidence as a tool of the opposition, focusing on its use in the Japanese Diet. I suggest two possible reasons for the vote of no-confidence to have utility to the opposition, even when they know it will not pass. The opposition might use the no-confidence vote for legislative gains, using the no-confidence vote as a delay tactic or filibuster. Or the opposition might use it for electoral gains, using the no-confidence vote as an opportunity to publicize unpopular government policies or actions. Although the traditional literature on the Japanese Diet has suggested that the opposition uses the no-confidence vote for legislative gains, the evidence presented in this article suggests that electoral gains hypothesis better explains no-confidence votes in postwar Japan.

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選挙制度の非比例性に対する機械的効果

福元健太郎

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_110-1_139
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_110

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This article defines the mechanical effect of electoral systems according to the literature on causal inference. An electoral system is decomposed into six parts: assembly size, district magnitude, malapportionment, geographical vote distribution, interaction between these, and electoral formula. The article proposes a new index of disproportionality, which is derived from the log likelihood ratio of the multinomial distribution. The mechanical effect of electoral systems on disproportionality is illustrated using simulation as well as election data from both Houses of Japanese Diet from 1890 to 2007.

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分割政府の比較政治学

―事例としてのアメリカ―

待鳥聡史

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_140-1_161
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_140

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This article proposes a framework for the comparative study of divided government and applies it to the U.S. cases. A recent theory of comparative politics, comparative analysis of political institutions, emphasizes there are many variations of the presidential systems. They come from two institutional arrangements: electoral and executive rules. These rules lead to the variations of divided governments by making differences in party systems and organizations. In the case of American divided government, it had been a combination of two-party competition and weak intra-party unity until the 1970s. Since the 1980s, however, American two-party system has been with a strong intra-party cohesion. This transformation has also changed the policymaking process of the divided government. By some data and a case study, the author finds that confrontations between the President and Congressional majority party become sharper, although these are continued not so long.

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［論文］

清水澄の憲法学と昭和戦前期の宮中

菅谷幸浩

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_162-1_182
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_162

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Toru Shimizu was a scholar of constitutional and administrative laws in Modern Japan. He lectured the Taisho Emperor as an employee of the Imperial Household Ministry, and young Showa Emperor as an employee at the educational section of the prince's palace. The objective of this study is to elucidate the political processes in the pre-war Showa Era, in which the Meiji constitutional system unsettled and collapsed, by reviewing the doctrine of Shimizu and its political position. In this study, the doctrine of Shimizu is compared with the constitutional theory of Tatsukichi Minobe from the viewpoint of constitutionalism and liberalism. In detail, the author discussed the commonalities and differences regarding the Emperor's political power, the state minister's consulting responsibility, the Imperial Diet's position and roles, party cabinet system theory, and electoral system theory, etc. In addition, the author attempts to conduct a comprehensive analysis, discussing how the doctrine of Shimizu was evaluated by the emperor's entourages including Nobuaki Makino and Kouichi Kido, middle-class army personnel, and right-wing constitutional scholars, and to position his presence in the Japanese political history in the 1930s.

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国会法の制定

―GHQの合理的行動と議院自律権の後退―

梶田秀

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_183-1_207
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_183

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Parliamentary reform between 1945 and 1947 was one of the key policies implemented in Japan during the Allied occupation. It brought a fundamental change to the institutional arrangement of the Japanese legislature. This article finds that it was truly a by-product of the U.S. congressional reform around that time. The newly established National Diet of Japan bore a significant resemblance to the U.S. Congress reorganized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Some novel institutions proposed by congressional reformers were struck down at home but survived on the opposite side of the world. Although the main content of the reform was not optimal for Japan, it was the best choice from the subjective view of GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo. The author also contends that GHQ/SCAP expected the House of Councillors to be an obstacle to the democratization of Japan. Thus it was rational for GHQ/SCAP to provide the House of Representatives with veto power that would infringe the autonomy of the upper chamber.

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1967年11月の佐藤訪米と沖縄返還をめぐる日米交渉

中島琢磨

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_208-1_231
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_208

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PM Sato's Visit to the U.S. in November 1967 was one of the important phases in the process of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. In the Joint Statement following the summit meeting, the two governments announced the agreement on keeping the status of the Ryukyu Islands under joint review, guided by the aim of reversion. Furthermore, the joint communiqué referred to Sato's hope that the agreement would be reached between the two governments “within a few years” on the date for the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands. As it turned out, the two governments agreed on the time of Okinawa reversion two years later.
This article analyzes the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in November 1967, with special focus on the process of completing the joint communiqué through negotiations. The negotiation process was characterized by its complexity. While Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted negotiations with its U.S. counterparts, Sato sent his personal emissary to the White House to negotiate on setting the timetable for the reversion “within a few years.” This was because the MOFA had had a negative attitude toward Sato's plan. This article examines the development of Japanese “dual diplomacy” on the basis of documents from both countries.

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小選挙区比例代表並立制の存立基盤

―3回の議員調査の結果から―

濱本真輔

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_232-1_256
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_232

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  Electoral systems are distributive political institutions that shape party system and policy outcomes, yet are themselves endogenously shaped outcomes of political choices.
  In this article, I examine whether legislators are motivated by self-interest, values, ideology, or all of these when evaluating proposals for changing electoral institutions. Using survey data from Asahi Shinbun (1995, 1996, 2003), I verify four hypotheses. Four hypotheses are 1) vote seeking 2) office seeking 3) electoral self-interest 4) policy preference and ideology.
  As a result, mixed electoral systems are supported than other electoral systems (SMD, SNTV, PR). The supports for mixed electoral systems consist of party electoral benefit, coalitional benefit, self-interest, policy preference, ideology.
  One of the notable features of mixed electoral systems is two different incentives.
  Legislators who are elected by SMD prefer more disproportional systems, while legislators who are elected by PR prefer more proportional systems. The feature causes the last of mixed electoral systems.

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自律性と活動量の対立

―コンピュータ・プログラム産業保護政策の所管をめぐる政治過程―

京俊介

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_257-1_278
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_257

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This article analyzes a policy-making process for revised Japanese copyright law to add provision for computer software. The policy outcome of this process had been made through the conflict between the Agency for Cultural Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The paper describes the conditions under which administrative conflicts, as a result of attempts to control new policy areas, arise and are settled. Previous research shows that such conflicts are viewed as administrative competition for additional resources. In order to modify this understanding, by introducing “autonomy” and “vigor,” the author argues, as previous studies have shown, that conflicts between both agencies pursuing vigor tend to lead to deadlocks and need arbitrators (e.g. politicians) to provide resolutions. Conversely, conflicts between agencies pursuing vigor and ones pursuing a degree of autonomy tend to be resolved without such arbitrators as policy outcomes satisfying both interests arise when the agencies’ goals are different.

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政治的ネットワーク論における理論と実証の間隙

―「2つ」の社会学モデル―

白崎護

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_279-1_302
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_279

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Social network studies treat informal network of the individual which consists of his family and friend and so on. The studies survey both the network structure and network effects on his psychology and behavior. Particularly, this article treats the political network studies which have continued since 1970’ in America.
R.Huckfeldt and his colleague classify the networks into two models: Cohesion Model and Structural Equivalence Model. Huckfeldt and his colleague regard the former as the network with persuasion, and the latter as the network without persuasion. Though Huckfeldt and his colleague derive their idea from studies by R.S.Burt, Huckfeldt and his colleague cannot precisely follow his positive method. This article compares these models, and examines the possibility of experiencing them. In addition, this article discusses studies in Japan which make use of these models.

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ドイツの分割政府と立法過程

安井宏樹

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_303-1_321
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_303

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  Federal Republic of Germany has been governed by the unified governments only for 17 years of its 59 years history. The upper house of German legislative body (Bundesrat) has no power to dismiss the cabinet, but has a de facto veto power in the legislation process. Such setting of governing system makes it difficult to keep the unified government in Germany.
  However, the period of “certain divided government”, in which the opposition parties have a clear majority in the Bundesrat, is shorter: about 13 years. Voting behavior of a “mixed state” that has a coalition government of federal ruling parties and federal opposition parties tends to be dependent on the negotiations among the parties. Therefore, for around half of the period, Germany experienced the “uncertain divided governments”, under which neither the ruling parties nor the opposition parties could have controlled the solid majority in the Bundesrat.
  While negotiations and compromises are the basic mode under the “certain divided governments”, federal cabinets in the time of “uncertain divided government” have a room for maneuver to arrange the legislative proceedings in a unilateral manner.

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汚職と経済発展のパラドックス

―韓国朴政権下における官僚の合理的行動から見た試論―

堀金由美

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_322-1_344
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_322

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Most of recent statistical studies show corruption is incompatible with rapid economic development. In South Korea, however, the miraculous economic growth was attained despite the existence of ample corruption. This paper tries to explain this riddle through deductive exploration of the rational behavior of bureaucrats in the Korean institutional framework.
The model assumes that there were various types of bureaucrats, yet all of them were basically rational utility maximizers, competing with each other for promotion regardless of their official or personal purposes and propensities. The rule was clearly defined within the newly-established merit-based civil service system, and all they had to do there, in fact, was to make greater contribution to the leadership's ultimate target of economic development. Under the extremely goal-oriented public administration of the developmental state, the performance of the economy was always closely monitored and regularly reported, by which the performance of the relevant bureaucratic agencies as well as that of the persons in charge was revealed. In other words, bureaucrats, regardless of their individual interests, always needed to achieve good performance in order to be promoted. Even if they were corrupt, their corruption should not gravely hinder the good performance.

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利害対立と妥協のかたち

―カナダ連邦結成期における議員定数配分方式の転換過程―

高野麻衣子

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_345-1_363
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_345

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This article concerns a long-term political dispute in Canada − the apportionment rule of the parliamentary seats between contemporary provinces of Ontario and Québec at the time of Confederation. During this period, Canada transformed the apportionment rule of the Lower House from one of equal distribution to distribution according to the population ratio. This was incredibly controversial because the latter would disadvantage the French politicians of Québec in terms of representation. Although previous scholars have highlighted this dispute as the main political issue of the time, they have not elucidated the actual transformation process and reason why the change was attained. In this article, I use primary historical resources for examination and clarify the process and reason why the agreement to adopt the new rule was reached. As a conclusion, I contend that the French politicians accepted the distribution of seats based on the population in return for their attainment of a “guarantee,” that is, the acquisition of a particular provincial right in the course of the Confederation debate.

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［書評］

2008年度　書評

日本政治学会書評委員会

2009 年 60 巻 1 号 p. 1_364-1_383
発行日: 2009年
公開日: 2013/02/07

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku.60.1_364

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