Since the theory of socialism in one country has come out as a device to defend the cause against the hostile states harassed by the emerging revolutionary government, it has opened the door for the diverse forces each trying to make a socialist experiment in their own peculiar way. When socialist movements came up to the political scene of Europe and America, differences among them were already quite clear as they were backed by the social forces different in their scope as well as in their social structure ever-changing as the economic development were going on in their respective states.
Present voice of dissent or even of controversy among the socialist states or parties can be significant so far as socialism itself was and is still a fruit of imaginative power enabled by the increase of economic production envisaged since the days of industrial revolution.

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Dans cet article, on a essayé de comprendre les idées de Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon et de Charles Fourier comme les formes de réponse au développement de la société industrielle moderne en France (et en Europe en général), indépendent du point de vue traditionnel de les situer dans le genre du “socialisme utopiste”. On peut penser que le caractére fondamental des idées de Saint-Simon consiste à ce qu'elles représentent le forme inséparé des images du style de production capitaliste et des conceptions socialistes. Ce point de fusion n'est que l'image de “la société industrielle” dans son contexte théorique. Le principe de cette société est l'industrialisme organisateur et projeteur. C'est aussi la technocratie, qui avait été réalisée par les Saint-Simoniens sous le Deuxiéme Empire. Cependant it est certain que ses discussions sur «la société de planning» avaient donné la vision de futur au mouvement ouvrier qui devenait vigoureux surtout après la Monarchie de Juillet.
D'autre part on reconnaît plutôt l'esprit de l'anti-commercialisme ou de l'anti-mécanisme dans les idées de Fourier. Le phalanstére dans son idéal, c'était une espèce de petite coopération organique. En cela on peut dire qu'il avait hérité le socialisme agrarien du XVIII^e siècle. Mais la critique de “la civilisation moderne”, l'image de l'association idéale, ou la théorie du droit au travail, qui se présentent de la manière particulière dans son ouvrage, ils sont aussi absorbées et utilisèes par le mouvement ouvrier de ce temps-là.
Par conséquent on avait besoin de l'intermédiaire actuel du mouvement ouvrier pour que les idées de Saint-Simon et de Fourier pussent se transformer comme les théories du socialisme. Et ce ne sont que les socialistes du XIX^e siècle qui avaient accompli cette transformation dans la sphère intellectuelle. Or, l'influence de deux fondateurs sur eux, elle a apporté la variété remarquable au socialisme français. C'est non seulement parce que leurs théories originales étaient équivoques, mais aussi que les héritiers avaient chacun l'individualité différente qui se combinent uniquement avec le climat ou la culture de la France. Et puisque cette individualité française est en meme temps l'individualité nationale de la classe ouvrière en France, on comprend la raison que le socialisme français pouvait occuper la position unique après l'apparition du Marxisme internationaliste. (Ici, dans cette relation on devrait reconnaitre l'importance positive du Blanquisme ou du Proudhonisme dans ce siè;cle.)

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Socialism involves a challenge to existing society. For a movement to take root, however, it must accommodate itself to its environment, and for the socialist movement this inevitably raises a dilemma. This dilemma was most obvious in the case of socialism in Great Britain, where traditional institutions and values had survived to a remarkable degree the impact of industrialisation.
The mid-1880's witnessed the so-called ‘Socialist Revival’. The word socialism, as under-stood at that time, held heavy overtones of state interventionism. This latter was basically a Radical formula for political adaptation to changing conditions. Socialism, in the narrow sense of the term, emerged from within this Radical climate, and early socialist bodies had to make considerable efforts to give themselves an identity separate from Radicalism, which in fact attracted the support of a large section of the politically active working class.
In the previous decades, the working class had established its own distinctive way of life, and was keenly aware of its existence as a class. Politically, however, it was a ‘tail of the great Liberal party’. Here again, therefore, the early socialists had to face strong resistance to their proselytising activities.
Following the first two chapters analysing the milieu from which British socialism was born, the next chapters describe the controversy over socialist goals and tactics among such socialist groups as the Social Democratic Federation, the Socialist League, the Fabian Society, and conclude with the foundation of the Independent Labour Party.
The author, apart from his research experience in Britain, has relied almost exclusively on already published materials, and has tried to give a general picture of Great Britain in the last decades of the 19th century, with the growth of Socialism as the focal point.

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I Introduction II The Russian Revolution and the American Intellectuals III The New Deal Coalition and the Left-Intellectuals IV The End of Ideology and the American Ideology
In contrast with the question posed by Werner Sombart at the turn of the century in the title of a book, “Why Is there No Socialism in the United States?”, this article examines the ideological adaptability of American Liberalism, as a surrogate for socialism, to the contemporary crisis home and abroad.
The impact of Russian Revolution on American liberals who shared the optimistic expectation of the inevitable spread of democracy throughout the world, had failed to impress them as a challenge on the basic value-system of American regime, because of the misunderstanding about the nature of the Bolshevik regime by the narcissistic projection of American creed. That moralistic idealism, often indicated by the reformist prejudice for the machine politics, had prevented from the. understanding about the nature of “Revolution of rising expectation” in the developing areas.
In addition to the creed, the unique character of New Deal coalition in terms of the ethnic, cultural heterogenity, the nationalization of socialism during the happy day of “popular front”, had contributed to the postponement of radical reapprasement of American creed. After the war, the democratic coalition had become so furiously disintegrated by 1952. The domestic crisis in the tortuous period of political indecision and pluralistic stagnation at a decisive turning point in America and world history, is largely a refection of the fact that the nation no longer has an effective majority and never has an stable organized opposition.
Although the American Liberalism, saved by the twenty-five years' war, hot and cold, survived under the optimistic atomosphere of “The end of Ideology”, we cannot neglect the fact that “The end of Ideology” did not mean “The end of American Ideology”, particulary for the hard-boild, tough-minded realists.
On the other hand, the reaction to “hard-boild” radicalism, with its exaggerated faith in the efficiency of direct political involvement during the day of “popular front”, often took form of the exaggerated skeptism about politics. However, it is no accident that “brilliant realists” of the Kennedy Administration has been so little concerned with the non-European world that the underdeveloped areas home and abroad was the blind spot of the Kennedy foreign policy as well as the negro problems.

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