Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies
Online ISSN : 2433-1872
Print ISSN : 0913-7858
Volume 20, Issue 2
Displaying 1-24 of 24 articles from this issue
  • Fumihiko HASEBE
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 1-5
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Kazuhiro SHIMIZU
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 7-26
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Fumihiko HASEBE
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 27-51
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Hidemitsu KUROKI
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 53-71
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Masashi HANEDA
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 73-75
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Barbara Watson Andaya
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 77-105
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Philippe HAUDRÈRE
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 107-117
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Masashi HANEDA
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 119-130
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Yutaka HORII
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 131-144
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Katsumi FUKASAWA
    Article type: Special Issue
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 145-169
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Reiko OTSUBO
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 171-196
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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    Qat is cultivated in certain areas of South Arabia and East Africa. Its shoots contain cathinone which has stimulating effects. Chewing the fresh shoots in the afternoon is very common among Yemeni people. The purpose of this paper is to compare the characteristics of qat consumption in 1970s with those of the present, revealing why and how people living in San'a^^-' chew qat or not, and pointing out their diversified ways of qat consumption and changes of its meanings. In Section II, characteristics of qat consumption in 1970s are described. In those days people gathered for the qat session at mafraj, a small and decorated room on the top floor, enjoyed kayf, euphoria produced by qat, spent a silent and yet happy time called al-sa^^-'a al-sulaymaniya, and felt a sense of unity. They were socially forced to participate in the session, and it was unusual to consume qat alone in private. In Section III, data taken through interviews and questionnaires in 2003 show recent characteristics of qat consumption in San'a^^-'. 80% of men and 30% of women are chewing qat though since 1970s more qat has been produced and consumed over Yemen. Many men are too busy to chew qat every afternoon; some chew it only on the weekend, and others chew while working. A housewife could chew it everyday, but many women do not. Moreover, some people chew qat alone, and a few have stopped or tried to stop chewing it by various reasons. Not only mafraj but also other rooms are used for the session, and workplaces are also important for men to chew qat. People who chew qat feel relaxed and energetic rather than kayf. Section IV reveals that the meanings of chewing qat have been changing. Qat was a way of tying people together; people chewed qat to be united. Now they can chew qat privately, which was regarded as anti-social behavior in 1970s. They can also choose not to chew qat. Qat, sometimes got attention and sometimes neglected as a strange drug, is very similar to cigarette and coffee, which are not called drugs but in fact induce stimulation just like drugs. These socially accepted stimulants have experienced changes from collective consumption to individual one. But qat is still on the way of changing. Qat-chewers and even those who do not chew qat know that qat has not lost its old function to unite people and that the session is a social place.
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  • Akari IIYAMA
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 197-220
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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    Furu^^-', in Arabic, has been translated in English as 'positive law' by contemporary scholars since J. Schacht wrote 'positive law is called furu^^-' 'in his famous book An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964). The concept of positive law, however, is essentially different from that of furu^^-'. Most of the contemporary scholars have taken furu^^-' as positive law without authorities and founded reasons, but some of them like N. Calder and B.M. Wheeler translate it simply as rules or regulations. In this article, I present two examples of Muslims' conceptions of 'law' through the books of usu^^-l al-fiqh so as to reconsider the appropriateness of translating furu^^-' as positive law. Muslim scholars such as Juwayni^^- (d. 478/1085) and Qara^^-fi^^-(d. 684/1285) regarded furu^^-' as shari^^-'a, that is, orders the God set down. For furu^^-' is originated in the God and derived from revelations by following strict principles and methodologies, it is shari^^-'a no less. Moreover, in the historical reality, furu^^-' had been applied to real cases at least by the end of 19th century and it can be said that this explains the perception. For in Islam, lawgiver is only the God. The two scholars have never denied the probability of furu^^-', but at the same time, they have never regarded furu^^-' as the law which man can legislate and change. In the center of the concept of positive law, there are some fundamental factors. For example, it is regarded as the counterpart of natural law, and is legislated by man, and is fallible and changeable. These factors, however, are not found in Muslim scholars' perceptions of furu^^-'. In addition, contemporary scholars apply the western-originated dichotomy (natural law / positive law) to Islamic law even if the dichotomy dose not exist in Islamic law originally. To identify furu^^-' as positive law contradicts perceptions of furu^^-' of Muslims. In my opinion, it is not appropriate to translate furu^^-' as positive law. The words 'positive law' would just drive us far away from understanding its original meaning and semantic structure. It is sufficient to translate furu^^-' just as concrete rules or norms like N. Calder dose. It seems that contemporary scholars have studied Arabic texts through the filter of translated concepts, using the words 'positive law'. As a result, they regard Islamic law as if there is a dichotomy between shari^^-'a and furu^^-' in it just as western law (natural law / positive law) although Muslim scholars such as Juwayni^^- and Qarafi take furu^^-' as a part of shari^^-'a. Islamic law should never be to studied through western-originated concepts or explained in western contexts. We have to study the texts in original language paying attentions to the words' own semantic structures so as to respect the uniqueness of Islamic law and derive its universality as law. I believe this approach should contribute to the more sincere study of Islamic law in future.
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  • Kenji FUJIKI
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 221-243
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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    Craftsmen and tradesmen (esnaf) in Ottoman cities had formed guilds until the nineteenth century. Previous research has focused on the relationships between Ottoman guilds and their government, with an emphasis on their autonomous status in society. This study, however, aims to create a more concrete picture of Ottoman guilds by considering various factors such as differences among crafts and trades, contemporary socioeconomic conditions, and their relationships with other social groups. Here, the actual state of Ottoman guilds is brought further into light through a look at the guilds of butchers and tanners in eighteenth-century Istanbul, with a focus on their structures and the processes of their trade and production. The relationship between guilds and the government is also reconsidered in this study. The principle resources used in this paper are Ahkam Defterleri, which was published as Esnaf Tarihi by Istanbul Arastirmalari Merkezi, and A. Refik's Istanbul Hayati series. The butchers' guilds consisted of four factions including the sheep-butchers, cow-butchers, Jewish butchers, and ceyrekci-butchers selling in front of mosques and catering to the population. Each guild, except for the Jewish guild, had two leaders (kethuda and yigitbasi). Masters of the trade (usta) rented and ran shops in partnership, based on the gedik system. They employed workers called kinadar to manage the actual sale of the meat. Butchers were supervised strictly by government officials called kassabbasi because the government felt it was part of their own responsiblity to provide well to the inhabitants of Istanbul. The butchers were allowed to purchase sheep, cows and goats from drovers only at predetermined spots called Tokat and Kara Ahmetli ciftligi, which were looked over by the kassabbasi. The tanners organized guilds according to the districts where their workshops were situated, such as Kazlicesme, Kasimpasa and Tophane. Their guilds had as leaders not only kethudas and yigitbasis, but ahibabas as well. Ahibabas, originating from ahi organizations in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, are said to have held authority over traditional and technical matters. It was rare for tanners' guilds to interfere with or cooperate with each other with regards to the purchase of raw materials and the sale of leather. In addition, they were not controlled by government officials like kassabbasi. For this reason, when a problem arose either between tanners and butchers or among the tanners' guilds, the tanners called on the kadis or the government to arbitrate. This paper concludes that not all guilds were autonomous organizations, and that the relationships between guilds and the government varied according to crafts and trades.
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  • Tatsuya YOSHIDA
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 245-268
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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    Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nda nufus bakimindan Muslumanlardan sonra ikinci sirayi alan Rumlar, ozerklik icinde yasayarak devlete sadakatle hizmet ediyorlardi. Bu durum 1821'de Mora'da ortaya cikan ve 1829'a kadar suren Rum Ihtilaliyle degisti. 1830'da Yunan Devleti(1833'ten sonra Kralligi)'nin bagimsizligi, Buyuk Gucler tarafindan kabul edildi. 1832'de Yunanistan'in sinirlari tespit edildi. O zamanki Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nda yasayan Rumlarin nufusu, bagimsizlik elde eden Yunanistan'daki Rum nufusundan yaklasik uc kat fazlaydi. Osmanli Imparatorlugu ile Yunanistan Kralligi arasindaki halkin hareketleri hakkinda simdiye kadar yapilan arastirmalarin tartismasi, ozetle "goclerin hangi taraftan hangi tarafa goclerin daha fazla oldugu" merkezinde idi. Fakat, bu arastirmalarda gocmenlerin niceligi belirtilmiyordu. Ayrica, "gocmek" ile "gurbete gitmek" kavramlarinin farkliligi belirtilmeyip, bolge ve tarih sinirlamasi da olmadigindan, halkin hareketlerinin durumu acikca anlasilamamaktadir. Zaten, halkin 1821'den sonraki hareketlerinin tam bir istatistiki durumunu cikarmak mumkun gorunmuyor. Buna ragmen hususi bir bolge ve donemin incelenmesi, gelecek arastirmalar icin faydali olacaktir. Bundan dolayi bu makale Yunanistan'in kurulusundan, yani 1830'dan Islahat Fermani'nin ilan edildigi 1856'ya kadarki surede, -ozellikle 1832'den sonra bir sinir bolgesi olan-Tesalya Bolgesi'ndeki halkin hareketlerini incelemektedir. Osmanli-Yunanistan arasindaki sinir bolgesinde, sadece Osmanli Rumlari ve Yunanistan Rumlari degil, Muslumanlar ve diger gruplar(Ulah, Arnavut) da bu hareketlere katilarak hududu gecmekte idiler. Sinir bolgesinde yasayanlar, 1830'dan onceki hareketlerine buyuk oranda devam etmektelerdi. Tesalya Bolgesindeki bu karsilikli gidip gelmeler, ticaret, hizmetkarlik, ciftliklerde calismak ve akrabalar ile gorusmek gibi sebeplerden kaynaklanmaktaydi. Hatta bazi Yunanli askerler ile suclularin Osmanli topragina, bazi Osmanli askerler ve suclularin da Yunanistan'a firar ettikleri bilinmektedir. Osmanli topragina firar eden Yunanlilar, bolgedeki Osmanli memurlari tarafindan sorusturulduktan sonra, sinirdan uzak olan ve Rumeli ordusunun bulundugu Manastir'da iskan edildiler. Yunanistan'a firar ettikten bir sure sonra geri donen Osmanli askerleri ise, Anadolu veya Arabistan'daki ordulara gonderildiler veyahut Ergiri'deki komur madenlerinde calistirildilar. Aslinda Osmanli tebaasindan olan, fakat Rum Ihtilali donemlerinde veya ondan sonraki donemlerde Yunanistan'a firar edip, bir sure sonra Tesalya ve Epir Bolgelerine donen ve tekrar Osmanli tabiiyetini kabul eden en az 1000 kisi oldugu bilinmektedir. Onlarin disinda, donmek isteyenlerin sayisi yaklasik 8500 hane ve 43 kisi idi. Ama belgelerde bu iki durum hakkinda fazla bilgi yoktur. Bundan dolayi, bu kisilerin ne zaman ve neden firar ettikleri ve geri donmelerindeki sebepler tam olarak belli degildir. Donenlere Osmanli Devleti iki veya uc senelik cizye muafiyeti verdi ve diger vergilerini de hafifletti. Ama geri donenlerin kefil bulmasi zorunluydu. Bunlarin geri donusu cogunlukla 1841'den sonra olmustur. Ozellikle 1848'de geri donus artmistir. Donus sebeplerinin, Yunanistan'daki kotu durum(isyan, haydut hareketleri, ve dogal afetler vb), Tesalya ve Epir Bolgelerinin sinir bolgesi olmalarindan dolayi Osmanli hukumetinin buralari daha hassas bir sekilde idare etmesi ve Gulhane Hatt-i Humayununa ve islahatlara baglanan umitler oldugu tahmin edilmektedir. Yunan tabiiyetinde olanlar Osmanli topraginda esnaf olabiliyorlarsa da kethudalik ve Osmanli tebaasindan birinin mirascisi olamazlardi. Bundan dolayi, geri donenler tekrar Osmanli tabiiyetini kabul etmistir.
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  • Яёи KABAXAPA
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 269-294
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Известно, что в Средней Азии представители суфийского братства Накшбандийа расширили свою деятельность не только в политической, но и в социальной, экономической и культурной сферах. В этом регионе потомки известных шайхов играли важную роль в качестве святых семейств во многих сферах жизни. Их деятелъность на территории Кокандского ханства не является исключением в этом плане. Они принимали активное участие в исторических событиях. Исторические источники свидетельствуют, что в регионах, где ханская власть была слабая, ситуацию контролировали разные кланы святых. И эти же святые руководили многочисленными восстаниями. Однако, до сих пор еще хорошо не изучена внутренняя организация святых семейств. Основная цель настоящей статьи-рассмотреть одно из таких святых семейств маргеланское семейство саййидов, которые назывались ≪тура≫ и считали себя потомками Афака-ходжи. Нам следует выяснить их происхождение, прибытие в Маргелан, распространение их потомков в разных районах Ферганской долины и изучить их политическую деятельность в Кокандском ханстве, Основными источниками являются документы, найденные автором в ходе зкспедиции в Ферганскую долину в 2003г., среди них родословные-шаджары, документы на владение землей, а также неизвестная доселе агиография ≪Равзат ал-ансаб≫ некоего Валихан тура, одного из маргеланских тура, и устные народные предания. По информации ≪Равзат ал-ансаб≫ и шаджар, нам удалось установить, что предок маргеланских ≪тура≫ является неким Абдуллаханом, который считается сыном Адилхана, племянника Афака-Ходжи. Абдуллахан очень популярен в народном предании. В Ферганской долине часто можно слышать легенду об Абдуллахане : ≪Абдуллахан проживал в Кашгаре. Он решил пойти в Индию, чтобы учиться у Миян Абида, известного шайха-пира Накшбандийа-Муджаддидийа. И индийский император Аурангзеб выдал замуж свою дочь за Абдуллахана. От них родился сын Ибадуллахан. Потом Миян Абид отправил Абдуллахана в Маргелан.≫ Его сын Ибадуллахан тоже был известен под именем Киргил-ата или Киргил-азиз. Мазар Киргилата находится в Киргилийском районе, название которого произошло от этого мазара. А его сын Падшахан тура тоже был знаменит. Он был шайх ал-исламом ханства. Герой произведения ≪Равзат ал-ансаб≫ Валихан тура был сыном Падшахана тура. По информации ≪Равзат ал-ансаб≫, он построил широкую дорогу от Маргелана до мазара ≪Шах-и мардан≫. Он был очень богатым и имел крупные земельные наделы в Маргелане и в его окрестностях. В ≪Равзат ал-ансаб≫ упоминаются взаимоотношения Валихана тура с кокандскими ханами. Валихан тура был пиром Шералихана. Предание гласит, что одна из его жен была дочерью Шералихана. Преемники Валихана тура проживали в разных местах Ферганской долины, и их мазары сохранились по сей день. На пример, в кищлаке Сай буйи Язьяванского района находится мазар Султанхана тура. Общеизвестным Фактом является то, что в 1898г. во главе Ишан Мадалихана, известного по именем Дукчи Ишан, восстали андиджанцы против власти Российской империи. Султанхан тура является пиром Дукчи Ишана. Наши полевые материалы свидетельствуют, что Султанхан тура является потомком в четвертом колене Абдуллахана. Значит он тоже был представителем зтого семейства.После приезда Абдуллахана из Индии, его сын и внук стали ключевыми политическими деятелями в Кокандском ханстве и накопили огромное состояние. Маргеланские тура в следующих поколениях активно участвовали в жизни ханства. Таким образом, потомки Афак Ходжи сыграли важную роль, не только в истории Восточного Туркестана, но и в истории Ферганской долине в XVIII-особенно в XIX веках.
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  • Masamichi IWASAKA
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 295-321
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Today, we cannot ignore the existence of the military in the understanding of Turkish politics. Since the establishment of the republic in 1923, Turkey has experienced military interventions three times. These interventions are very crucial to explain the civil-military relations in Turkey, and they have attracted great interest among researchers. In many preceding studies, these interventions were almost all explained in the context of the so-called "Kemalism, " a national principle established by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. These studies often emphasized the military's role as "the guardian of Kemalism, " as being a principal cause for these interventions. However, this explanation is not enough to explain the cause of the intervention, and it overlooks the practical aspects. This article intends to analyze the military intervention in 1960, as a first step for the reexamination of the civil-military relations in Turkey. It specifically focuses on the corporate interests of the officer corps, as defined by Nordlinger. The Turkish military have had a close relationship with the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), which was in power during the single-party years of 1923-1945 and for the next five years. However, there were many officers who supported the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) as a reformist power. Consequently, it can be said that there apparently existed a lack of unity among the officer corps, particularly with regard to ideology. On the other hand, however, the officer corps had a common background, such as with reference to social origins and economic conditions. Therefore, the officer corps could form an independent social group and possess corporate interests without the ideological unity. In the CHP years, the political interests of the officer corps were decreased owing to the "depoliticization" policy and the degradation of the Chief of Staff. However, there were still many representatives who had a military background, and who were related to the CHP. For that reason, the officer corps barely maintained its political interest. On the other hand, in the DP years, the government intervened in the dismissals and promotions of the officers. Moreover, through the dismissal of ex-officer cabinet members, the access of the officer corps to Turkish politics was completely disconnected. With the loss of political interests, the economic interests of the group were also damaged. The failure of DP's economic policy strongly affected the officers' lives. After the 1960 intervention, these forfeited corporate interests were recovered by the 1961 Constitution, which was formed under the supervision of the junta. The National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu, MGK) was established in 1961, to ensure the political interest and access to politics by the officer corps. The Chief of Staff joined the MGK and expressed the military's opinions there. The Armed Forces Pension Fund (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu, OYAK), which was also established in 1961, functions to secure the military's economic interests. Each of these organizations continues to exist today, and has a great influence on Turkish society. From these analyses, it would seem that the corporate interests of the officer corps influenced the 1960 intervention in Turkey.
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  • Chikako MORI
    Article type: Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 323-351
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The <<fear of Islam>> is not a new subject in France : this country's geographic location, in permanent contact with the Arab Islamic world, always brought complex relations, both close and strained, with the Islamic world. A combination of different reasons has led to the present situation : ancient history (France is a catholic nation, particularly active during the Crusade), recent history (the Iranian revolution, increasing number of <<fundamentalist's terrorist acts>> in Algeria, the September 11 attacks...), and France's sociological situation itself (with an important Muslim community). However, since several years, a sort of mutation has been taking place in Islam's representation, while the number of anti-Muslim acts is on the rise. What does this mutation consist of? What is exactly the <<new anti-Muslim phenomenon>> in French society? To answer these questions, we analyze the new anti-Islam discourses and focus on its promoters, in order to grasp the crucial issues and the underlying ideas of this phenomenon in French socio-political context. First of all, this paper will outline some of the principal characteristics of Islamophobia in France, especially the relations between ultranationalist xenophobia and current Islamophobia. Then, new forms of critical discourses towards Islam are to be studied and their relations with new Islamophobia's logics. The objective of this paper is to analyze if the latest outbreak of anti-Islamic attacks is only a variation of <<traditional>> anti-Arab racism, or if current Islamophobia presents, on the contrary, some new peculiarities, partly or entirely distinct from traditional xenophobia. Our analysis will clarify two points : first, ultranationalist racist ideology plays a nonnegligible part in the contemporary Islamophobia. This point of view, systematically amalgamating <<terrorists>>, <<fundamentalists>>, <<Muslims>> and <<immigrants>>, consists in considering the Islam as a <<potential threat>> to the French nation and, on the basis of an essentialist ideology, in excluding Islam from the phantasmagoric fabrication of a so-called <<French identity>>. Secondly, the present-day Islamophobia is nevertheless clearly irreducible to the ultranationalist anti-Arab racism : <<criticism of Islamic fundamentalists>> by several actors (experts of <<New anti-Semitism by Muslims>>, defenders of <<universal values>> or even <<Moderate Muslims>>), also exercises sometimes-in its own ways- some vicious influences on the reinforcement of anti-Muslim stereotypes, potentially leading to some latent legitimatization of its overstepped forms.
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  • Komşuoğlu Ayşegül
    Article type: Research Note
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 353-373
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Dadabaev Timur
    Article type: Review Article
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 375-385
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Manabu SHIMIZU
    Article type: Book Review
    2005 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 387-392
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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  • Takashi KUROIWA, Minoru SATO
    Article type: Islamic Area Studies in Japan
    2004 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 393-398
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Toru AOYAMA
    Article type: Islamic Area Studies in Japan
    2004 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 399-404
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [Author not found]
    Article type: Middle East Studies in Japan
    2004 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 405-410
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [Author not found]
    Article type: Middle East Studies in Japan
    2004 Volume 20 Issue 2 Pages 411-426
    Published: March 31, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: March 30, 2018
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