This essay explores the Jordanian Muslim Brothers(JMB)' activities in legislative politics. Since the mid 1940s, JMB has enjoyed popularity among Jordanians as a state-authorized social and missionary association. JMB, not only became the largest Islamist organization in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but also gained political power through the struggle against the anti-state movements led by the leftists and the pan-Arab activists from the late 1950s to the 1970s. JMB has deeply committed to legislative politics since the break through 1989 lower house elections, to promote its Islamic concept and methodology in political sphere. In the first stage, JMB enjoyed its strong position as vanguard of Islam in the lower house, sole legislature chosen by Jordanians. Contrary to its radical discourses concerning domestic and foreign policies, JMB has shown its flexibility in the lower house. For example, during the Persian Gulf Crisis, though JMB mobilized masses and organized a pro-Iraqi bloc in the lower house, it joined the cabinet for national unity. However, the organization has been involved in the great debates and structural transformation in the lower house since the early 1990s. Thus, the domestic and international political processes and social movements in Jordan that changed arguments in the lower house will closely be scrutinized. Peace negotiations with Israel were the main cause. Because JMB used to criticize Israel as Zionist enemy, the government's normalization policy toward Israel made JMB irritated. Thus, JMB formed an anti-normalization group in the lower house, and often criticized the government. Regarding those issues above, JMB has had inner and outer problems. First, JMB experienced political dichotomy inside in the mid 1990s. Despite its strong position as Islamist group in the lower house, JMB felt ambiguity whether or not cooperate with the government that sought to reach a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover, its experiences in the lower house confirmed that JMB did not represent a homogenous framework from ideological or political standpoints. JMB conservatives claimed its withdrawal from the lower house, however, the liberals preferred to stay in legislative politics. Not long after, JMB met powerful challenge from its political branch, Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP). IAFP gradually acquired its own voice, and then challenged JMB's authority. In 1997, finally, JMB and IAFP crashed over their participation in the 1997 lower-house elections. Secondly, I attempt to clarify the complicated relationship between the government and JMB (IAFP) in the lower house, in regard to state in society discipline. I also attempt to clarify why the relation between the government and JMB (IAFP) became so deteriorated, and why the government took series of actions which continuously worsened relations with JMB and IAFP, key actors in the lower house. And there were seeds of trouble not only with the peace process but also in debates on "democratization." JMB and IAFP strongly opposed to a series of attempts by the government to inactivate the lower house's role. Moreover, I will examine political backgrounds in Jordan. In this argument, there has been a serious dichotomy among urban and local since the 1993 elections.

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Turbah al-'Adil is the mausoleum of 'Adil Abu al-Nasr Tuman Bay al-Ashraf Qa'itbay (reigned 906/1501), the 25th Sultan of the Burji Mamluk dynasty (1382-1517). Although the reign of this Sultan was only for about 100 days, this mausoleum played an important role in the early 16th century, from the late Mamluk period to the early years of Ottoman Egypt. The purpose of this article is to explore the role this mausoleum played in the transitional period, namely from the Mamluk dynasty to the Ottoman dynasty. Sultan 'Adil was killed by troops led by the next Sultan, namely Qansuh al-Ghawri, and buried in his own mausoleum, one which had been constructed by himself. This mausoleum was situated in Raydaniya, which was an important place in those days from the military point of view. It was situated in the northern suburbs of Cairo and was a base for troops, and Sultans in late Mamluk period often constructed their tombs in that vicinity. Consequently, the Turbah al-'Adil was built according to the late Mamluk tradition. Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri frequently went to the Turbah al-'Adil during his reign (906-922/1501-1516) and tested new guns in that place. In contrast to the Sultans before him he made efforts to manufacture guns in large quantities, both because of the growth of Ottoman power and the naval power of Portugal. According to the famous historian Ibn Iyas, Sultan al-Ghawri tested new guns in the Turbah al-'Adil a total of nine times in the course of his reign, and several of these tests ended in failure. However, whenever the guns passed the test the Sultan would prepare a meal for his entourage consisting of Amirs (mamluk officers) and troops, and congratulated himself on the successful testing. Although the Sultan made efforts to strengthen his firearms his troops were defeated by the Ottoman army led by the Sultan Selim I, who entered Cairo in 1517. On his leaving Cairo however, he appointed Kha'ir Bek as the first governor of Egypt under the Ottoman Dynasty. Selim I sent his delegate with a robe of honor to Cairo, and when the delegate arrived in Cairo he stayed at the Turbah al-'Adil. Kha'ir Bek went to the mausoleum to receive him, and the delegate gave Kha'ir Bek the robe of honor at the Turbah al-'Adil. This was a ceremony for the appointment of Kha'ir Bek as the Ottoman governor of Egypt. According to Ibn Iyas, ceremonies such as the giving of the robe of honor to Kha'ir Bek at the Turbah al-'Adil, were repeated six times during the reign of both Selim I (1512-1520) and the next Sultan, namely Sulayman I (1520-1566). Hence the Turbah al-'Adil did play a significant role in the early years of Ottoman Egypt. However a question remains to be answered. Why was the Turbah al-'Adil selected as the place for such ceremonies? The answer lies in the position this mausoleum occupied in the reign of Qansuh al-Ghawri. During his rule it was a place for the testing of new guns, and so the new conqueror who belonged to the Ottoman dynasty maintained the military function of the mausoleum, and used it to strengthen his control over Egypt.

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[in Japanese]

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At the end of the Turco-Armenian war in 1920, the Red Army unexpectedly invaded the Republic of Armenia. This compelled the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) government to form a coalition cabinet with the Communist Party on December 2. Immediately thereafter, the communists expelled Dashnak officials such as Dro and Nazalbekian, and requisitioned food from Armenian farmers. This triggered a nationwide uprising in February 1921. People led by the Dashnak Right, clashed with the communists in Zangezur. However, the rebellion failed because of disputes among the Dashnakists, the NEP (i.e. the Soviet government promised the farmers that their agribusiness would be liberated), and due to a widespread famine that struck the people. After the fall of Zangezur, the Dashnak Right attempted to recapture their land from the Soviet government. They organized soldiers and discussed the strategy to accomplish their goal in their general meetings. However, they were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Ramkavar-azatakan (Liberal Democratic) Party (LDP), which consisted of the Armenian elite in the Ottoman Empire, continued to be involved in organizing political activities, even after the Armenian massacres in 1915. The LDP was occasionally in opposition to the Dashnak party, on the issue of initiatives in the Armenian diaspora abroad. During the Lausanne Conference, the two parties argued on the settlement of the dispute over the "haykakan ojakh" (Armenian homeland). While the LDP wanted to unite with Soviet Armenia, the Dashnak party did not. This leads to the obvious question of why the LDP, an Armenian bourgeois party, was so eager to cooperate with the communists. Following the Armenian massacres in 1915, the LDP lost their country. A. Darbinian, who was a member of the LDP, visited Soviet Armenia in January, 1922, and was welcomed by A. Miasnikian, chair of the Soviet government. The newly formed country impressed the LDP politician, and he therefore recommended that the party help the Soviet government with the task of economic reconstruction. The LDP attempted to influence Soviet Armenia and gain more importance than the Dashnakists in their communities overseas, with the help of the Communist Party. In turn, the Communist Party wanted to make use of the funds of the LDP and the Armenian Benevolent Union to rebuild the economy of its own country. The reconstruction of the economy strengthened the Communist Party's authority in Soviet Armenia. This led to the "self-liquidation" of the Dashnak Party in Soviet Union on November 23, 1923, under the pressure of the Soviet government. In short, Soviet Armenia became the homeland of all Armenians through the coalition between the bourgeois nationalists and the communists, despite their different aims.

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