The model of language presupposed by the verificationist theory of meaning and the two holistic models of language such as W. V. Quine's are of marked difference. But in theoretical details, they have interesting points of contact. The paper considers the verification condition of meaningas formulated by Prawitz, on the basis of which the verificationist and non-verificationist aspects of Quine's theories are discussed. The contrast is also related to that of classical and intuitionistic logic. And Quine's view on the "obvious" in the translation of logical connectives is criti-cally examined along with the dogmatic presupposition of the grasp of meaning by the intuitionists.
The following relation between operations F and G is called an adjoint situation or adjunction, and such a relation occurs almost everywhere in logic and mathematics; F(C)→B ⇔ C→G(B). The relation between A∧ and A⊃ which are primitive connectives in logic is a well-known example. So to understand the primitiveness of these connectives, it is necessary to clarify the essence of adjointness. For this purpose the author thinks tentatively that two operations G and F in an adjunction ultimately correspond to two mental functions (i.e. projection and reflexion) which are always found in a primitive state of our consciousness.
This paper tries to establish the following three points about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. The first is that this book is not a collection of fragments about knowledge but the record of Wittgenstein's systematic thinking that aims at a single question. The second is that it is the explication of the meaning of particular certainty Moore showed when he stated he knew, e.g., he had hands that Wittgenstein's thinking aimed at. The third is that Wittgenstein's answer to this question showed a dramatic shift from the "public" interpretation of Moore's certainty to the "private" one about 10 days before his death.
The subject of this paper is Hume's concept of mind, especially the arguments concerning the mind-body problem, in A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. I will try to clarify the aspect of Hume's naturalism by showing that it aims to explain the human cognitive processes in terms of human nature. Hume's arguments on the cause of thought show that the relation between mind and body may be regarded as causal one, since the constant conjunction between objects constitutes the essence of their causal relations. It will be found through the examinations of the arguments that Hume's sceptical arguments are to introduce the naturalistic programmes.
In this paper, I examine the problem of "Rule-Following" given by Wittgenstein. In discussing this issue, he considers this problem in terms of "Natural History", and characterizes it as blind obedience. So it seems that his purpose is to reduce Normativity to Natural History. In that case, our knowledge about Rule-Following would disapper. But through the consideration about "agreement in form of life", I'll show that a knowledge about Rule could function as negative operation.
This paper deals with the problem whether Popper's falsificationism has been refuted by the Duhem-Quine thesis. According to the Duhem-Quine thesis it is not an isolated hypothesis but a theory as a whole that is subjected to an experimental test. And it is claimed that by adding an ad hoc hypothesis or by changing a minor auxiliary hypothesis any falsifications of a theory as a whole can be evaded or at least main hypotheses can be saved from falsifications. Against this I claim that it is not always possible to evade the falsifications. Thus Popper's falsificationism has not been refuted by the Duhem-Quine thesis.
Goodman's Grue Paradox may be intransigent as a version of the problem of induction, but may be resolved within the more limited context of confirmation theory in which the task is to explicate the basic notion of evidential relevance. Although the green and grue hypotheses are equivalently confirmed if we follow Goodman's use of the Hempelian instance confirmation relation, there are asymmetries than can be exploited if we adopt an "ontic" confirmation theory that uses a causal notion of evidential relevance. I sort out a variety of interpretive confusions about the intended content of the definition of grue and show how the causal approach resolves each in a way that is not paradoxical.