Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Volume 44, Issue 1
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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  • The Propositional Structure of Perception:
    An Inquiry into an Empirical Basis of Conceptualism
    Mineki Oguchi
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_1-1_16
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        John McDowell proposes conceptualism of perceptual content to warrant the idea that perceptual experience rationally constrains belief. To support this idea, McDowell claims that not only belief and perception, but also the world itself has a propositional structure. This view of the “unboundedness of the conceptual” is, however, doubtful. In this paper, I shall explore how we can defend conceptualism without accepting the above view. To do this, I shall propose a mechanism that gives a propositional structure to perception before it is established as a conscious experience. In so doing, I shall employ two empirical theories: the visual index theory and the sensory classification theory. This inquiry aims at revising conceptualism and giving it an empirical basis.
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  • What does the ‘Transparency of Experience’ Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?
    Yasushi Ogusa
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_17-1_33
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_17
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.
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  • The Elucidation of Plurality of Epistemic Norms with the Knowledge Model of Attributor Contextualism:
    toward to Mediation between Internalism and Externalism
    Keiichi Yamada
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_35-1_47
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_35
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        Until now, Many philosophers have tried to elucidate plurality of epistemic norms in terms of plurality of aims with which we acquire knowledge. In this paper, I try to elucidate them in terms of plurality of aims with which we evaluate knowledge. For this purpose, I construct the new knowledge model which is composed of the idea of Attributor Contextualism and the conception of language games by Wittgenstein. With this model, I want to suggest a new research program of epistemology which can contain both Internalism and Externalism that have caused a lot of controversy in contemporary epistemology.
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Critical Notice
  • Keiichi Yamada’s The Last Thinking of Wittgenstein:
    An Encounter between Certainty and Contingency
    Yasushi Nomura
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_49-1_57
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_49
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        Keiichi Yamada’s first and recent book, The Last Thinking of Wittgenstein: An Encounter between Certainty and Contingency, aims at bringing out it into relief Wittgenstein’s philosophy of knowledge that is embodied especially in his “last” thinking, which the author extracts mainly from On Certainty, and locating it in the context of contemporary discussions on knowledge. This book should be interesting very much not only to Wittgenstein scholars but also to those who are engaged in philosophy in general. I shall make several and somewhat critical comments.
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  • On Takahiro Isashiki’s Metaphysics of Temporal Modality
    Takeshi Sakon
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_59-1_74
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_59
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        In his book Metaphysics of Temporal Modality, Prof. Isashiki takes a very unique and intriguing approach to philosophy of time. He begins with raising the following three questions. (i) What does it mean to say that the past is determinate or fixed whereas the future is open? (ii) Why is it impossible to see temporal transition from the present to the past? (iii) Does the present have no duration? Answering to those questions, he declares that he does not assume any linear representation of time. In this review, I shall examine to what extent the attempt succeeds and in what respects it fails.
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  • Can Cartesian Mind Survive?
    Masako Ota
    2011 Volume 44 Issue 1 Pages 1_75-1_90
    Published: 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: October 13, 2011
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.44.1_75
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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        In his Book Kagaku no Sekai to Kokoro no Tetsugaku, Michio Kobayashi features on Descartes’ theory of minds as “subjective-active consciousness”, and defends it against the physicalist movement of philosophy of mind. I try to show that Kobayashi’s method has a difficulty for defending the existence of our mind because Descartes didn’t allow the scientific investigation of our mental experience from outside. In addition, Cartesian theory of mind cannot appropriately grasp the significance of “other minds”. Instead of Cartesian view, I propose the “mind in general” view, in which minds are open to our world and exists in our communication.
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