G. Canguilhem posits in his "The Normal and the Pathological" two judgements: (1) the negation of objectivity of the pathology and the physiology because of the necessary interference of the value judgements between the two phases; (2) the importance of the biological normativity, that's to say, the understanding of the health as something essentially related to the norm and value. The health is not a fact, but a norm to which an organism makes an effort to attain by regulating its conducts. After this affirmation of the normativity in the demarcation between the normal and the pathological, I try to link it to the contemporaneous problematic of bioethics. And situating the health as a norm inside of the world of designing, I give a theoretical permission to the selective abortion in condition of a strict limitation, and to a certain positive interference to the genetic information for giving birth to a perfect baby.
In this paper, I try to review the rebirth of the philosophy of medicine with the development of bioethics in last 30 years. First of all, I will argue how the philosophy of medicine accepted the influence of bioethics. Especially, I will make clear the new concept of disease which is a most important concept in the philosophy of medicine. And I will discuss the recent arguments of the relation between the philosophy of science and bioethics concerning their influence on the philosophy of medicine. Finally, I conclude that bioethics resuscitated the philosophy of medicine in which the viewpoint of patients is respected.
This paper was prepared for discussion in the workshop titled "Towards the Medical Philosophy" held at the last study meeting of this association. It attempts to propse the new "Medical Philosophy", explaining its viewpoint and methodology. First, discussing the definition of "Medical Practice" and "Medical Science", it emphasizes that Medical Philosophy should objectify "Medical Practice" mainly. Second, it clarifies the Biomedical conceptualization of "disease". Central to its argument is the layman conceputualization of "illness", and relationship between "illness" and "disease". And then, it discusses what and how Medical Philosophy should describe as "Philosophy of Medicine".
The main aim of this paper is to argue for the following two theses: (1) so-called qualia are irreducibly non-physical properties of certain brain states, and (2) in spite of (1), qualia can be legitimately accommodated into a broadly physicalistic framework. On behalf of (1), what might be regarded as a variation of F. Jackson's 'knowledge-argument' is put forward and also a refutation of P. M. Churchland's objection that qualia are but physical properties (of certain brain states) as they are introspectively accessed is attempted. On behalf of thesis (2), the idea of qualia's supervening and nomologically depending upon brain states' physical properties is deployed. A radical criticism of some sceptical arguments concerning qualia is also included.
Shozo Omori's theory of the past, developed during his later years, is examined critically with a focus on its central thesis that the past is that which is recalled. The analysis shows that Omori's argument designed to support the above thesis contains ideas which run counter to that very thesis. Specifically, it turns out that, when contrasting recall and perception as two heterogeneous modes of experience, he tacitly supposes past perception as something other than the recalled, and that this inconsistency threatens the validity of his basic views.
According to J. R. Searle's account of perception developed in his book Intentionality, perception is "causally self-referential, " in the sense that the representative content of a perceptual experience involves reference to that very experience. This claim is untenable, and it derives from a failure to draw a sharp distinction between the representative contents of Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. An account of Intentional states can accommodate the alleged self-referentiality of perception without commitment to Searle's treatment of it, and given a proper treatment, it can be shown that the representative contents of perceptual experiences are not self-referential in the properly semantical sense.
This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.
In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to provide a picture in which our experiences give "rational", rather than merely causal, constraints on our thinking. This was to avoid both Myth of the Given, which can give us only exculpation rather than justification, and unconstrained coherentism, which sounds idealistic. This picture can be understood as a form of "internal realism", and I have a great sympathy with this ambitious project. But I find some tension among his several theses, which in turn brings about two interconnected problems. I will give my own solution to them, in terms of the notion of ignorance. Then I will depict some consequences, both positive and negative, of that modification.