Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Volume 34, Issue 1
Displaying 1-10 of 10 articles from this issue
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 1-6
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 7-19
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.7
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Frege's well-known thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic leaves unexplained what is the gain of the reduction and what he means by logic in principle. First, the author contends that the real interest of the reduction consists in a form of conceptual reduction: it frees us from the ordinary naive conception of numbers as forming extremely peculiar genus and replaces it with a very general and basic conception of them. Second, it is pointed out that Frege's concept of logic involves two elements. One is based on the iteratability of the operation of abstraction and naturally leads him to accept a sort of denumerably higher order logical language. The other is based on the so-called comprehension principle. Each of the two elements could be said to be logical in some sense but they are inconsistent with each other. Still, we can learn much from his attempt to search for as extensive and global a conception of logic as possible.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 21-35
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.21
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    It is often said that Brouwer's views on language were extremely solipsistic so that there was noting to learn from him about language. It is true that he held the impossibility in principle of communication. But in some of his works, especially in Brouwer [1929], he presents important insights into language. I would like to insist that Brouwer presents two conceptions of language there-communication-based conception and one that makes semantic analysis possible-and that he criticizes the latter because of the excessive productivity of language. I will also show how such an interpretation of his works is possible in his whole philosophy and what this interpretation brings in our understanding of the foundational debate.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 37-48
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.37
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    Russell's theory of denoting in Principles (1903) was rejected by his theory of descriptions in "On Denoting" (1905). But the notion of denoting itself was not rejected. It is used even in Principia (1910). In this essay we shall determine what has been removed by the theory in "On Denoting", and what is preserved by it. In order to do so, we must investigate the early Russell's manuscripts, and grasp Russell's view of functions, which was framed out of the principles of dependent and independent variables, and the theory of denoting. Then we can solve the entanglement concerning the notion of denoting.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 49-60
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.49
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    This paper deals with the so-called Julius Caesar Problem. Crispin Wright has recently shown that it is possible to derive the axioms of second-order arithmetic from a principle which is called Hume's Principle (HP). Depending upon this result, Wright resurrected a version of Fregean logicistic project. But historical Frege suspected HP as not a fundamental law of arithmetic in the face of Caesar Problem in his Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik section 66. He supposed, I think, that this problem was to be solved through axiom V, the basic law in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. But this strategy failed because of the inconsistency of axiom V. And this failure must be seen from a point of view of semantic ill-foundedness, which in general would be included in Fregean abstract principle. This difficulty is an important reason for Russell's Paradox, thus makes it impossible to give any answer to Julius Caesar Problem.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 61-74
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.61
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    In this paper, I will try to seek answers to the following questions: (1) Why, in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, did Frege believe that the solution to the Julius Caesar problem must be found ? (2) Why didn't Frege deal with the Julius Caesar problem in Grundgesezte der Arithmetik, in spite of the fact that he was well aware of the difficulties involved with it in the context of Grundgesezte? In exploring these questions, I will investigate the various contexts in which the Julius Caesar problem arises.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 75-87
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.75
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    In this paper, I examine van Fraassen's original version of modal interpretations, which have the increasing significance in the foundational research concerning elementary quantum mechanics. I argue that although van Fraassen's modal interpretation has a salient advantage over the standard Dirac-von Neumann interpretation with the projection postulate, it is confronted with two kinds of interpretive difficulties stemmed from one and the same fact of experience, repeatability of the first kind measurement.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 89-93
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.89
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 96-104
    Published: May 30, 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.96
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • ERRATUM
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 105
    Published: 2001
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.34.1_105
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