Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
Volume 38, Issue 1
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
  • Masaharu Mizumoto
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 1-15
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Merely saying that someone believes that p does not imply anything about whether the .belief is held consciously and/ or held with certainty. In this paper I will give some analysis of such subjective differences of belief and try to express them in terms of the combinations of familiar epistemic operators such as the knowledge operator K and the belief operator B. Proper formulation of such differences will in turn clarify the interconnection between consciousness and certainty qua prop-erties of belief, and assure us that we do not have to take special care of these properties when we are concerned with formal theories of belief and knowledge.
    Download PDF (1147K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 17-29
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    We often have irrational beliefs which are not coherent with the others. If they could be explained under "The Principle of Charity", they would no longer be regarded as irrational. How can we explain irrational beliefs as such and give their place in the system of our beliefs? Donald Davidson proposed "the partitioning of mind" as the answer to this question, but his solution is hopeless because it seems to be inconsistent with holism. I propose the idea of Motivated Irrationality as an explanatory strategy of irrationality, because I think it can explain irrationality more simply than the mental partitioning and give the way out of the paradox of irrationality.
    Download PDF (1236K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 31-45
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Philosophers who study time often presuppose that the present is a durationless moment. But the reason is seldom explicitly expressed. There could be at least two arguments for it. And both arguments depend on the implicit assumption that when time passes the present becomes the past. But if we don't take the linear image of time for granted, this assumption is not self-evident though its converse proposition may be. Without this assumption I put forward a new image of the present and the past. The present is non-metrical and when we refer to an event-individual, the past emerges and the present comes to have a breadth. The emergence of the category of event-individuals and that of the past time are cooriginal.
    Download PDF (1286K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 47-61
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper deals with Donnellan's notion of the referential use of definite descriptions. First, I point out that Donnellan's examples in "Reference and Definite Descriptions" are almost exclusively those in which the speaker uses the description demonstratively. Secondly, however, I shall show that his notion need not be so restricted, and that referential use per se comprises the case of what I call "trace-based reference" -a kind of reference a speaker effects by calling the hearers' attention to the traces made by the intended referent. The rest of the paper will be devoted to the discussion of how one can explain and develop this notion.
    Download PDF (1438K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 63-78
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on Einstein's idea that a state function does not represent an individual system but describes an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. It has been believed that the statistical interpretation is inconsistent with the NO-GO theorems. However, as shown in the present paper, the statistical interpretation is consistent with the theorems, when we change the concept of momentum, energy, and spin. We discuss whether it is possible or impossible to regard momentum, energy, and spin as characteristics of statistical ensembles of similarly prepared systems.
    Download PDF (1398K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 79-92
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    In this critical notice, I point out that there are two problems for Ishiguro's interpretations of Leibniz. First, I argue that her response to Benson Mates in the defense of her interpretation of the principle of substitutivity sal va veritate as providing a criterion for the identity of concepts is not successful. Secondly, I explain why I cannot agree with her interpretation that Leibniz does not mean to eliminate relational properties in his reconstruals of relational propositions by showing that Leibniz's denial of the existence of extrinsic denominations, which he infers from the predicate-in-subject principle, is not consistent with the interpretation.
    Download PDF (1281K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 93-95
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (253K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 97-104
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (867K)
  • [in Japanese]
    2005 Volume 38 Issue 1 Pages 108-118
    Published: July 25, 2005
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (947K)
feedback
Top