Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Volume 30
Displaying 1-11 of 11 articles from this issue
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 1-13
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 15-28
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.15
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Galileo and Descartes made an important contribution to the making of modern mechanics in the Scientific Revo-lution. However, there are crucial differences between their views on the nature of gravity and on the concept of iner-tial motion. They indicate the difference between their methods of science.
    Huygens supported Descartes' mechanical natural phi-losophy and based his theory of light on the corpuscular theory. But he criticized Decartes' excessive confidence in his own philosophy. Huygens gave higher priority to the solution of individual problems than to the construction of a whole system. He developed the problem-oriented method of Galileo's mathematical physics.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 29-42
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.29
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    The aim of this paper is to propound a view that philosophical epistemology has failed to comprehend the essence of experimental natural science ever since the late seven-teenth century. The first indication of the failure is given in Edward Stillingfleet's misunderstanding of John Locke. In his Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke tries to establish the distinction between the particular matters of fact and the universal theories of nature. Stillingfleet mistakenly counts him, however, among cartesians and regards his distinction as that of the objects in the mind and those in the external world. This misreading of Locke, which is common to later historians of philosophy, entails total misunderstanding of the essential trait of experimental science. The Lockean way of ideas is, if correctly un-derstood, a successful vindication of the experiments based on sense perception and has nothing to do with the cartesian skepticism towards the senses.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 43-58
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.43
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    Scientific methodologies in 17-18th centuries are very important when we think of the relation of philosophy and science in this period. Particularly interesting among them is that of Leibniz's philosophy. His method of finding laws of natural sciences was a so-called hypotheticodeductive method. What is quite remarkable in his methodology is that he not only shows empirically valid criteria for finding laws, in spite of his extreme rationalistic tendencies on one hand, but also delves into the grounds for the hypothetico-deductive method in terms of God's perfection. In this latter point, we can recognize one of the proper roles of philosophy, very clearly distinguished from but united very organistically with those of science.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 59-76
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.59
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    I attempt in this paper to survey the classical features which lie in the concept and methodology of the Newtonian science. To this end I summarize the concept of science in the Aristotelian philosophy, and utilize several recent results in the Newtonian scholarship.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 77-92
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.77
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    In this paper I show an aporia which both a subjectivist view and a functionalist view of qualia have in common, and try to change the view of qualia in order to solve the aporia. The aporia of the qualia problem is this: as long as we take a subjectivist view or a functionalist view, qualia must shift either into something other than qualia, or just into nothing. A solution of the aporia which I try to present is: qualia is neither something nor nothing, but an uncom-pleted absence.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 93-106
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.93
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    This paper deals with Quine's "inscrutability of reference" thesis. In particular, I aim to examine Quine's two problematic claims about this thesis.
    The first is that reference is relative to a background language. The second claim is that inscrutability of reference extends to our own language, that is, reference is in-scrutable not only in the case of foreign languages but also of our own language. I shall argue that both these claims are untenable. To show the latter is untenable, I use Putnam's "brains in a vat" argument.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 107-122
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.107
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Hume's account of how conventions establish artificial virtues is an integral part of his attempt to naturalize mo-rality. His argument would be a failure if conventions were irreducibly normative. Hume's conventions, though, are not norms but acts of agreement that establish norms. Their basis is men's sense of interest and their ability to communicate it. No norm or rule can guarantee the success of this communication. The analysis of promises brings this to light, since no rule about forms of words can any more secure that a promise is made, if not backed by the communication of intentions.
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  • ANOTHER INTRUSION OF PRIVACY
    L.B. Mariano
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 123-138
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.123
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 139-149
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.139
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1997 Volume 30 Pages 152-157
    Published: November 10, 1997
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.152
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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