Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
Volume 1
Showing 1-14 articles out of 14 articles from the selected issue
  • Arata Ishimoto, Yoshimi Fujikawa
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 9-22
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    This paper concerns the construction of a modal sentential calculus, which constitutes a subsystem of Lewis' S 1 and a decision method of the proposed calculus. The method represents a generalization of that rendered by McKinsey for Lewis' S 2 as well as for S 4 and is characterized by the construction of all the finite regular matrices containing not more than a certain number of elements specified by the given formula.
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  • Setsuo Saito
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 23-29
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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  • Tsurukichi Takamatsu
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 31-44
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    At the root of two-valued logic we use there is the assumption, which is usually not formulated explicitly, but is a basic one, and which is called the principle of two-values. This principle in twovalued logic corresponds to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle. However, the principle of the syllogism in the usual (conjunctively transitive) formulation, and the principle of contradiction, of the excluded middle are only "possible" in three-valued logic. From this, three-valued logic are connected with a modal functor such as 'M' to be called "possible" (möglich). Furthermore, some laws of two-valued logic are false in three-valued logic, among others the law (a=a') = 0. From this fact results the absence of antinomies in three-valued logic.
    Thus any of many-valued logic from three-valued to infinitely many-valued is a proper part or a proper sublogic of two-valued logic, and the latter is a superlogic of the former.
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  • Hajime Eto
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 45-54
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    Some important parts of economics are formally stated in a finite manner in the sense that their syntax is given and that their theorems are proved without resorting to the compactness just under the assumptions the rational numbers and their arithmetical rules are finitely given. Firstly the syntax introduces the linear space spanned over the rational field which is shown to meet the so-called axioms of the linear space. The simplex algorithm of linear programming provides a finite tool to develop the linear algebra and its. geometric representation which, on the contrary, usually in nonfinite systems deduce it. The basic parts of the game theory and non-linear programming are shown to be expressible in a finite manner as well. Economic behaviors besides games are also seen to be expressed by finite mathematics. Lastly it is remarked that the integer programming algorithms as the most powerful tool for finite systems are finite.
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  • Shigeo Nagai
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 55-70
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    In this paper I shall define the concept logical information distinguished from a customary concept (semantic) information, which is called "factual information" in the paper. In accordance with the contemporary theory of semantic information, if i is an analytic sentence, then i conveys no information. It means that
    inf (i) = -log m (i) = 0
    where i is an analytic sentence and inf is the measure of information. According to our intuition, however, it seems that most analytic sentences convey much more information than "A is A", which is a trivial analytic sentence or tautology. I shall give only one example here.
    1. Man is man. (S1)
    2. Man is a rational animal. (S2)
    Let us suppose that the both sentences Si and S2 are analytic. Then S2 has the same intention, and hence conveys the same amounts of factual information, as S1, whereas S2 has the more complicated intensional structure, and hence conveys much larger amounts of logical information, than S1.
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  • Hiroshi Kawano
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 71-82
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    In the world of signs surrounding us, there are two sorts of information which look contradictory with one another, (1) abstract information as "negentropy" being the measure of order by Wiener's formulation, and (2) concrete information as "entropy" being the measure of disorder by Shannon's formulation. The former, possessed by the logical composition of virtual message, informs about another one and the later, generated in the actual performance of this composition by coded signals, informs about oneself. But properly the sign can inform oneself as well as another one, and the composition and performance are two necessary stages of communication. Accordingly these two informations can be coexistent with one another in the world of signs, sounding under a sonorous counterpoint.
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  • Takechiyo Imada
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 83-95
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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  • following the W. Sellars' thesis: 'the Myth of the Given'
    Jin-ichi Ohhata
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 97-104
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    Empiricism, traditionally, has analyzed 'the foundation' of empirical knowledge in terms of 'the Given' as an epistemological category. What is 'the foundation'? What meaning does it have?. Following W. Sellars, two requirements are postulated, i. e., (1) there is a structure of particular matter of fact that is non-inferentially known. (2) non-inferential knowledge about the structure is ultimate. In this direction, a consistent picture of empiricism is drawn. In this process, 'the Given' must be construed as immanent 'awareness', on which the edifice of empirical knowledge rests. Indeed, 'the Given' as its foundation is the Myth, but this assertion does not imply the rejection of the inner, non-verbal episodes of 'observing', 'impression' or 'idea'. A new epistemology is in future.
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  • Yoshio Sezai
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 105-117
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    This paper is an introductory study for the behavioristic approach to value.
    I think, as the fundamental method of such an approach, it must be possible to understand the theory of value as follows ;
    (a) the theory of the preferential system of action.
    (b) the theory of the social system of action.
    The former (a) characterizes as the "selectiv-rejective behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of purpose and cognition in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-biological analysis of the value phenomenon.
    The latter (b) characterizes as the "role-taking behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of socialization in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-sociological analysis of the value phenomenon.
    In this paper, I treated as the subject of this paper a case of the latter (b).
    And, I verified, in this examination, the reason which is understood as the value is the social, the functional, and the normative from the following problems ;
    (1) the problem of selfhood and role-taking behavior
    (2) the problem of value-situation and process of "socialization" in the human behavior And, in the last of this paper, I found the following conclusion from this verification. Value theory is the theory of scientific inquiry of the "attitude".
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  • Jiro Hayakawa
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 119-131
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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  • Masayoshi Kaneko
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 133-145
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    In the finst place, I tried to make the meaning of the word dialectical "Contradiction" clear. It seems to me there are two usages of that term. The first, the contradiction in existence. The second, the contradiction in logical. It is my principal purpose in this two subject how we can get no contradiction.
    In my opinion, to find the contradiction in existence consists of Aristotle's principle of contradiction. As to the methodology of the expressional contradiction, for "Real Existence, " I took the cases of ideal dialectic and material dialectic, and analysed the relation between their expressional contradiction.
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  • Teisuke Takezaki
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 147-161
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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    Every science must be based on anthropology, not on philosophy. This is because every science is created by man; and philosophy forms part of anthropology-an anthropology of the inner sense.
    To explain the essence of mathematics from the viewpoint of anthropology, especially of anthropology of the inner sense, I have classified knowledge in general into five categories to define what kind of knowledge mathematics is: (1) natural knowledge and artificial knowledge; (2) knowledge of the outer sense and knowledge of the inner sense ; (3) knowledge as reality and knowledge as memory; (4) knowledge as image and knowledge as language; (5) inductive knowledge and deductive knowledge.
    To apply this classification to mathematical knowledge, we must clarify what mathematical entity is. The physiological transformation of images, an a priori cerebral function which plays a main role in the formation of recognition, serves as a clue to the understanding of the essence of mathematical knowledge.
    If one recognizes this function by the inner sense, one can grasp the inner relation of quantity as, natural knowledge by the inner sense. Artificial beings realized by this philosophical knowledge is natural mathematical entity. Elementary mathematics, therefore, is a natural science, the object of which is such entity.
    The basis of the validity of inductive mathematical knowledge lies in entity itself and agrees with the provabitity of mathematical knowledge by means of deduction from axiom (the principle of cre-ation). Mathematics is, in this sense, an ideal model of natural science.
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  • Max Bense
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 183-197
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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  • PAUL LORENZEN
    1968 Volume 1 Pages 199-214
    Published: October 10, 1968
    Released: May 29, 2009
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