In this paper I discuss the epistemological implications of the rise of so-called “Mode 2” science. Mode 2 science is a kind of knowledge production in the context of application where knowledge production is conducted in a heterogeneous manner. Because of these features, bilateral science communications, where lay expertise has the same authority as scientific expertise, play significant roles in Mode 2 science. Features of Mode 2 (especially heterogeneity and use of lay expertise) pose epistemological questions: is Mode 2 knowledge as reliable as Mode 1?; what is the methodology used (or at least available) in Mode 2 to assure the reliability?; is Mode 2 worth the name of “science”?; if yes, what is the definition of 'science' used there? I maintain that we can enrich the philosophy of science by taking these questions seriously, and I conduct some preliminary considerations on the final question, namely the question of demarcation taking into account of Mode 2.
There are many uncertainties in the knowledge of modern sciences, especially the sciences of complex systems. Here, in the first I discuss the pseudo-sciences and indicate the pseudo-scientific tides due to the uncertainties of complex systems, whose origins are made clear such as chaos, self-organization, butterfly effect, and so on. The uncertainties are intrinsic in complex systems. In the next, I present the possible role of scientific communication, especially stressing how the scientific communicators overcome the uncertainties of sciences. This will become a fatal point of scientific communication. Finally, I add the possible cooperation between the natural and social scientists.
Since the beginning of 21st century “Science Communication” or “Public Engagement of Science” is a fashionable word in Japan. The background of this trend is a great socio-historical change in relation between science (and technology) and society in the developed countries. The symbolic message of this change will be found in the Budapest declaration (1999) witch states “science in society/ for society” as a new mission of science, in addition to the traditional mission such as science for knowledge. This paper explores the implication of this change for Japanese society and suggests that a new mission of philosophy of science is emerging by examining the IPCC report. The conclusion of this paper will be that science communication is not only informing scientific knowledge understandably to public but promoting discussion on the significance of present day science and technology for society and philosophers of science should contribute to it.
In the early 2000s a research movement called SHAKAI GIJUTU (‘social technology’ in English) emerged, and the topic of ‘science communication’ subsequently captured the interest of Japan's STS community. After 2005, some universities made also college courses designed to educate communicators and interpreters for science and technology, focusing on the communication specialist. This paper will examine from the above standpoint the relations between the full-scale neoliberal reform in Japan that started in the mid 1990s and the development of ‘science communication’ that coincided with neoliberal reforms. The theory and practice of ‘science communication’ have focused on ‘interactive communication’ (the contextual model) as an ideal situation for over ten years. However, the understanding of communication and also power are narrow and could be amplified in two ways. First, rather than understand communication and power as relations between actors, the focus could shift to ‘institutions’, the arena where inter-actor communication is made and inter-actor power is exercised. If science communication aims at the public interest, it should be made in the course of changing how broad power and also broad inter-actor communication work, that is, changing or criticizing the shape of ‘institutions’ as media for communication and power. Second, in most cases, the shape of ‘institutions’ that ‘science communication’ has pursued, i.e. ‘interactive communication’ and ‘interactive power relation’, overlaps with the ideology and the social system that the neoliberal social reform has pursued. The neoliberal reform accompanied by the complementary New Civil Society requires ‘interactive communication’ and ‘interactive power relation’ as the ideological institution and the social institution to make commercialization and public-private partnerships work well. Therefore, even if the pursuit of interactive communication looks like the deepening of democracy, the true picture is the market-oriented change of democracy, and consequently it would not realize the public interest achieved by political community. Science communication should be extended into the shape of power and communication that is able to realize the public interest of social rights and social fairness that the neoliberal thought and policy fail in.
This paper aims to interpret Jean Cavaillès' philosophical position proposed in his early works as a reconstruction of Kant's epistemology. Kant's mathematical epistemology consists of three principal components: (a) the pure concept of the understanding, (b) intellectual and sensible schemata produced by the imagination, and (c) sensible intuition. First, as a result of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, Cavailles extends (c) to cover intellectual intuition. Then, under the influence of Hilbert's conceptions of sign, he replaces (b) with the concept of sign as intellectual-sensible mixture, and (a) with certain mathematical concept. Finally, Cavaillès uses this transcendental structure to propose a new idea about the problem of the foundations of mathematics.
Achilles need not catch the tortoise, although Achilles is faster than the tortoise. Zeno's premise does not determine whether Achilles can catch up. In this paper, I clarify this fact through a critical examination of Noya (2005), which criticizes Aoyama (2002) and Uemura (2002). Noya's solution smuggles the unnecessary premise of equal ratio to make Achilles catch up. However, his solution gives a new idea about what speed is. In the last part of this paper, I develop this idea and explain the reason why Achilles usually catches up in the actual world.
In the paper I shall make a critical examination of Ichinose's book The Labyrinth of Cause and Reason: The Philosophy of ‘Because’ (2006). After summarizing the content, I address two issues concerning relation among causality, conditionals and vagueness. First, I make clear presupposition on the relation in the book and propose alternatives thereon. Second, based on the previous consideration, I make clearer his causal theory of vagueness. Finally I suggest a new direction concerning vagueness and causality.