The aim of this paper is twofold. The one is to make intelligible identity-relativism (IR) and its accompanying theory of proper names by making amendments to Peter Geach's corresponding theories. I argue that his IR can be reconstructed as a hidden variable theory of ‘identical' and that a kind of ontological deflationism is needed to make his semantics of proper names compatible with IR. The other aim is to show that even IR with the seemingly refined semantics and ontology bears a serious problem of the requirement for an absolute identity. I argue that IR cannot by itself solve the problem.
The argument against incompatibilism is that freedom and alternative possibilities are incompatible. This argument presupposes a dogma on freedom debate, which says that freedom always improves our rationality and control. Since the dogma is not valid, because it is not adequate for the descriptive aspect of our concept of freedom, incompatibilism need not worry about the incompatibility between freedom and alternative possibilities. We must reconsider the relationship between the two aspects of our concept of freedom; alternative possibilities and agency. Then alternative possibilities should be regarded to weaken our agency.
In this paper, I evaluate Donald Davidson's strategy to escape from “mediational epistemology (ME)”. He presents a critical argument against the crucial idea of ME that conceives of our empirical beliefs as depending on mental intermediaries that convey information to our minds. However, it seems that Davidson shares “inside/outside picture” with ME, and this fact leads him into the wrong direction. After reviewing his approach, I explain which role the picture in question plays within his strategy and argue that, in order to escape from ME satisfactorily, we have to question this picture itself.
What is “otherness”? What is “mind”? Shigeki Noya has been in pursuit of unique answers to these questions through inheriting but confronting the philosophies of Shozo Omori and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book is positioned as an arrival point of Noya's philosophical investigations. In this paper, I examine how Noya innovatively develops his theory of “otherness” and “mind”, while referring also to the original work of Noya. In addition, introducing criticisms on Noya's previous works, I examine whether new developments in this book provide answers to those criticisms. Last of all, I examine the appropriateness of Naya's theory.