Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Showing 1-9 articles out of 9 articles from the selected issue
  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 1-10
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    As is well known, Tooby and Cosmides argued that the evolutionary point of view is indispensable in the social sciences; they criticized the standard social science modes (SSSM), and proposed instead the integrated causal model (ICM) based on the evolutionary psychology. Since their proposal adopts the adaptationism, I wish to analyze the structore of the adaptationism, examining some of heir key words: adaptation, function, and module. Since the adaptationism was severely criticized by Gould and Lewontin, I wish also to examine how well it can overcome such criticisms. This review will serve as an introduction to the philosophicalc onsideration on the relevance of the evolutionary theory to the theories of mind and society.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 11-23
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Evolutionary psychology is a psychology informed by evolutionary biology of Homo sapiens. Evolutionary psychology postulates that the human brain, thus human psychological mechanisms have been shaped by natural selection in the specific ecological niche in order to cope with various problems that our ancestors met. Those mechanisms must be the sets of adaptive information-processing, and decision-making algorithms. In order to find out those algorithms, we should have a detailed knowledge about the course of Homo sapiens evolution and its ecological niche as well as a detailed knowledge about the workings of modern human minds. Some examples of previous researches and the future prospects of this decipline are summarised.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 25-44
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    The common concept of sex has consisted of many factors, like culture, tradition, scientific fact, and personal experiences and so on. As a result, it includes several prejudices. To explain the true nature of sex, we may have two different types of cause, ultimate and proximate causes, which the variational model of the modern evolutionary theory has and which we cannot find in the usual normal state model. And why-type question is generally answered by using the ultimate causes, and how-type question by using the proximate causes.
    Using two different types of cause, we explain the development, the structure and the adaptation of sex. In particular, the adaptive explanation of sex, consisting of the explanation of the existence of sex, sexual selection, and the sex ratio, shows not only the mystery of sex but also the emergent meaning of sex.
    Then we analyze the philosophical meaning of two different types of cause and their relevant problems. Genetic determinism and naturalistic fallacy are interpreted from the ultimate point of view. Lastly the convention, which is introduced as a local law in biology, is clarified naturalistically.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 45-57
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    This paper discusses how evolutionary biology can contribute to sociological theory. I maintain that a biological understanding of human being can function as a common language among various competing trends in sociological theory. Sociologists do not use biological insights much, but one of the reasons for this is that simply they are not sure how such insights relate to their own research interests. My main purpose in this paper is to give an example of an enhancement of social theory (a conflict analysis of stratification) from an evolutionary point of view, hoping to remedy the 'biophobic' attitude of some sociological theorists.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 59-74
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Quantificational logic was developed by some ingenious mathematicians towards the end of the 19th century, especially during the 1880's. It was indeed, as Quine once wrote, a decade when quantification was "breaking out all over". While it is acknowledged that Peirce was among those founders of modern logic, his specific achievements and contribution to the field seem to deserve more notice. The present paper focuses on the emergence of Peirce's quantificational logic, deriving most of the material from his original writings. We shall also glance through O. H. Mitchell's work, which is little discussed in the history of logic.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 75-87
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this paper is to investigate how descriptions relate to proper names. Against what is called the description theory Kripke argues that no description gives the meaning of a proper name and that no description determines the reference of a proper name. I agree with kripke on the former point, but regarding the latter point I will argue that when we use a proper name in order to refer to an object, we must have at least one parasitical description which shows that we use the proper name in accord with the social use of the proper name. In other words, referring to an object with a proper name presupposes referring to the object with the proper name in society. This fact suggests that it is impossible to frame a reductive theory of reference.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 89-100
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    These days, "biological determinism" is getting popular, corresponding to the pubulic interest in biology. Such determinism is a false opinion, which is ethically destructive. But, not only popular determinists, but "real" biologists also try to explain human characters by genes, which are segmented by the researchers' arbitrariness or social bias. On this point, there's no difference between popular determinists and real biologists. Human mind should not be understood as determined by genes, but as an "emergence" from life system which consists in the interaction between genes and proteins. From this point of view, we can make scientific researches on the human freedom.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 101-116
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    In this paper, I have explicated the logical relation between the Maxims and the Cooperative Principle (CP, hereafter) as stipulated in Grice's theory of conversation. First, by showing the existence of cases where the CP is followed but the relevant maxim is not, I have shown that those maxims are logically independent from the CP. Second, the Maxim of Relation (MR, hereafter) has been misleadingly conceived to provide the basic notion of "relevance" for the theory of conversation. But, when a speaker, while deviating from the MR, or failing to "be relevant" literally, still follow the context in some sense or other, it must be another kind of "relevance" that is highlighted. That kind of "relevance" in conversation is required by the CP. I have called this kind of relevance CONNECTEDNESS as opposed to the RELEVANCE as required by the MR.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2001 Volume 34 Issue 2 Pages 117-124
    Published: November 10, 2001
    Released: May 29, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
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