Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 1-14
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    In what follows, I would like to point out some basic aspects of the message in communication. First, a holistic agency as "the society of mind" (Minsky) emerges from interactions among its individual agents. Second, the messages which are sent out or received by the agents consist of two different constituents: "citation" and "commentaire" (Sperber), where the former is the invariant part of their meaning conditioned by semantic rules, and the latter is the variant one showing the agent's intention to perform the speech act. Third, what is expressed in the message of communication is a speaker's intention, making use of the "quoted" propositional meaning only as Stoff for its performance.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 15-27
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.15
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    The development of science and technology has posed again the problem of the "legitimacy" of science and technology. Philosophy of science in the nineteenth century had such concern but recently it has lost the sensitivity to such a problematique. This article claims the recovery of this sensitivity in the sense of Social Epistemology advocated by Steve Fuller and argues that scientific research should be analyzed as a collective activity of knowledge production at face value. Then it is argued that justification of scientific knowledge is intrinsically social activity, and the identity of the content of scientific knowledge is not to be presumed but to be explained.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 29-43
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.29
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    To naturalize philosophy of science radically and thoroughly, we must re-examine the ontological character (not ontological commitment) of theories and ask how theories are realized in this physical world. Paul M. Churchland dare to answer to this question and claims that a theory is a partition across activation space which is realized by a specific pattern of synaptic weights in a brain. He also tries to justify some Feyerabendian strategies for doing science well in terms of neurocomputational functions of our brains. In this paper, Churchland's project to naturalize philosophy of science is defended against some criticisms. Then, a minor deficiency of his theory is pointed out and a way-out is suggested.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 45-54
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.45
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Higher-level (mental, sociological and biological, etc.) entities are said to be supervenient on more basic, lower-level (physical, micro-level) entities, and there is a view that lower-level theories can completely and sufficiently explain higher-level events. But Harold Kincaid criticizes such a view. He does not deny that lower-level theories do explain something, but argues that they are only partial and incomplete, because they cannot refer to higher-level kinds which supervene on the relevant lower-level entities and answer important questions about causal laws. I will argue that the completeness or sufficiency of explanation is often evaluated interest-relatively, and, against Kincaid, that higher-level explanation cannot be sufficient without mentioning lower-level causal mechanism.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 55-66
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.55
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Since Kripke's paper "Outline of a theory of truth", many theories of truth have been proposed toward contribution to explicating or solving the liar paradox. So the aim of this paper is to survey theories of truth which are given by Kripke and other authors, and to consider the relationship between these formal theories of truth and the liar paradox which is captured at an intuitive level. I shall argue that their theories of truth fail to solve the liar paradox.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 67-81
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.67
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Swampman is a philosophical creature invented to show that some form of externalism in the philosophy of mind is wrong. Many philosophers seem to take it for granted that swampman's coming into being is conceivable, and therefore metaphysically possible. In this paper I question that very assumption while admitting the significance of the inference from conceivability to possibility. For evolutionarily and naturalistically motivated externalists, I suggest, the best way of responding to the swampman-argument is to deny the metaphysical possibility of the existence of swampman. I show why that is metaphysically impossible from a naturalistic viewpoint.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 83-86
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.83
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 87-98
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.87
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1999 Volume 32 Issue 1 Pages 101-106
    Published: May 15, 1999
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.32.101
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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