This paper discusses a method to apply the science of logic to prtobability. First this paper discusses the relations between probability and sciences. Next, this paper forcuses mathematics which is similar to the science of logic, and compares the methods to apply them to sciences. Lastly, this paper shows the formalisation and the analisys of probability in a problem of cryptography by the science of logic.
Cryptographic schemes must be presented with a security proof based on complexity theory. However, security proofs tend to be complex and difficult to verify, because an adversary can access various kinds of oracles. The use of formal methods is a way to tame such complexity. Hoare logic has been used to verify properties of programs and its probabilistic extension has also been provided. In this paper,we introduce a probabilistic Hoare logic and its application to verification of security proofs of public key encryption schemes. Adversarial attacks are formalized as programs with probabilistic execution and security properties are formalized as first-order logic formulae.
It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.
Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called “self-deception” should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.
The aim of this paper is to propose anomalies of classical logic in view of relevant logic and to suggest how to treat them in relevant logic. Although a semantics for relevant logic exposed the fact that there are two kinds of anomaly in classical logic, the very fact makes the semantics unnatural (that is, pure) due to its disunited treatment. Thus, in order to obtain a natural (that is, applied) semantics for relevant logic, we should offer some unified and natural explanation for those anomalies.
The generality problem is usually taken to arise only for externalist theories of knowledge or justification. In this paper, first, I argue that even internalist theories run afoul of a variant of the generality problem. This is because S may have multiple pieces of evidence concerning the reliability of the token process by which S forms the belief in question, and they determine the degree of Sʼs internalist justification differently. Second, I offer a solution to the generality problem for internalist theories: Sʼs practical reason rather than epistemic reason picks out a piece of evidence concerning reliability as relevant.
According to the standard form of conceptualism, which comes from McDowell (1994), the conceptual content of experience is propositional. But this is at variance with naive realism, which conceptualism craves for. Given that, we should seek non-propositionalist forms of conceptualism, which make room for naive realism. In this paper I propose such a conceptualism, exploiting Sellarsʼs idea of visual experience as “thinking in color”, although he himself has never been conceptualist. Elaborating the idea will lead to the conception of visual experience as analogous, in a unique way, to drawing a picture. I argue that this enables conceptualism to take seriously the particularity and concreteness of perception, which are emphasized by naive realism.
This paper concerns so called ‘concept formation thesis' that we can find in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. I will deal with this topic by focusing on his view of the relation between a problem and its solution in mathematics. In his ‘middle' period, he had the view that some problems (or conjectures) expressed by the sentences involving quantification over infinite domains are senseless. This is very important because it suggests that the problem-solution relation is such that the solution gives the grammar to the problem. In a special sort of language activity, ‘riddle', words in the question also receives some new meanings from the answer. I will compare mathematics with riddle, which enables us to see the change of perspective that determines similarity and dissimilarity.