Truth pluralism is a theory of truth stating that truth is realized in more than one manner. This theory has two goals: (1) to provide a model that can cope with every truth-apt proposition while accommodating the merit of each monist position and (2) to demonstrate that truth is substantive. To achieve these goals, truth pluralism depends on three theoretical tools: minimalism concerning truth-aptitude, platitude, and domain. In this paper, I will demonstrate how truth pluralism fails to achieve its goals since its theoretical tools are beset by some serious issues. Finally, I indicate the correct manner of truth pluralism to achieve the desired goals.

    In analysing logic of hearsay, the inconsistency of individual notions makes difficulty. Modal logic is suitable for analysing logic of hearsay. The most previous semantics of modal logic such as using possible worlds makes the formula x = y ⊃ □x = y valid. However, in logic of hearsay, it can happen that the quoting person recognises x = y although the quoted person recognises x ≠ y. As such, the formula x = y∧¬□x = y is satisfiable in logic of hearsay. In order to deal with this, this study propose a new semantics with belief structure.

    The buck-passing accounts of values, which analyze values in terms of reasons, have lately attracted attention. There are thought to be counterexamples, such as the toxin puzzle, to the buck-passing accounts. However, it is a question whether the toxin puzzle is really a counterexample to this account. This paper shows that if two theses, namely the strong relationship between normative and motivating reasons and the guise of the good, are true, the toxin puzzle is not a counterexample to this account. It follows from this that in discussions of counterexamples to the buck-passing accounts the meanings of “reasons” and “values” need to be made explicit.

    When we read Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, we often feel baffled because it is difficult to draw out a systematic theory from the text. Given this exegetical problem, it is often said that Wittgenstein never intends to propound any theory; rather his aim of philosophy is therapeutic.
    The problem of rule-following has been most often argued among the topics in the Investigations. Most of approaches to the problem, however, are not therapeutic but constructive. The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of rule-following from a perspective of therapeutic philosophy.

    Various research findings about conflict of interest (COI) converge on the worrisome influence of COI on research results. This paper aim to diagnose problems of current institutional safeguards against the influence of COI and then suggest how to improve them. I will summarize the findings about the influence of COI and the safeguards against it. At the same time, I will give the diagnosis that the lack of reliable COI risk assessment is a crucial deficit. Therefore, my proposal is a way to implement scientfic COI risk assessment, which is based on the previous works in philosophy of science and risk study.

    This is a review essay on Kohji Ishihara's Philosophy of Mental Disorder: From Classification to Dialogue. The book is a collection of Ishihara's recent works. Part Ⅰ of the book discusses the history of psychiatry that originally excluded those with mental disorders from the dialogue on psychiatry. Part Ⅱ describes the ever-changing nature of the classification of mental disorders. In Part Ⅲ, he presents what he calls the “dialogical approach” to mental disorders as a promising alternative way of doing psychiatry. The structure and subtitle of the book convey the message that the practice of classifying mental disorders will be superseded by the dialogue with those with mental disorders in the future. Contrary to this message, based on the notion of epistemic injustice proposed by Fricker, I argue that the classification of mental disorders has both merits and demerits for those whose disorders are thus classified, and that the classification of mental disorders will continue to assume the role of the starting point of such dialogue in the future.