Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 1-13
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    In order to contextualize the subjects the contributors discussed in the workshop by giving them some backgrounds, first (§1) I will relate how the relationship between biology and physics has been dealt with in the philosophy of biology so far, intending to make a connection with Mr. Morimoto's argument. Then (§2) I will provide some historical background on how such concepts considerably, if not exclusively, distinctive of biology as 'function', 'purpose', or 'design' have been the targets for philosophical considerations so far, building a connection to Mr. Otsuka's argument. Finally (§3) I will present my little analysis of the problem of the scientific status of some 'historical sciences' Mr. Minaka is concerned with from a somewhat different angle from his.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 15-27
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.15
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Probability concept is indispensable to evolutionary theory, particularly to mathematical models of population genetics. Recently philosophers of biology have discussed the meaning of probability concept in evolutionary theory. Most discussions are based on the assumption that evolutionary theory can be reduced to a fundamental physical theory, either classical or quantum mechanics. I will criticize the reductionists' arguments and show that evolutionary theory can't be reduced to particular fundamental physical theories. Instead, using the concept of coarse graining, a basic theoretical tool in statistical mechanics, I can explain the true relation between evolutionary theory and fundamental physical theories.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 29-41
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.29
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Much of the controversy of function revolves around two concepts, namely selected effect (SE) function and causal role (CR) function. Each of these proposals and its reciprocal critiques are examined, and it is shown that each concept embodies two different research strategies in biology, one the search for adaptation (SE function) and the other the reduction of biological phenomena (CR function). But this conceptual difference does not entail a separation in scientific practice. The proper attribution of SE function to a trait requires careful analysis of CR function in its developmental origin -- this is the idea of developmental modularity. It turns out that the ideal condition for developmental CR function analysis (i.e. near decomposability) also facilitates the mosaic evolution of -- and thus the attribution of SE function to -- organismal characters.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 43-54
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.43
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 55-66
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.55
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    The opinion that chance is a crossing of the causal sequences is popularized. But the crossing is a point on the causal sequences, then by what meaning the crossing is chance? Moreover a causal sequence will cross other numerous causal sequences and there are lots of crossings, so every crossing is chance? Further, in a game of chance, what causal sequences cross each other? Besides, probability treats what aspect of chance?
    This paper discusses these questions.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 67-79
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.67
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    It is common in any natural language for more than one thing to have phonologically or orthographically the same proper name. There are two different views on this. According to one, in such a case there are distinct names which have the same pronunciation or spelling. According to the other, in such a case there is only one name and its referent can vary from context to context. It seems that when you discuss the latter view (the ambiguity view of proper names), you need to take the ontological problems of words into account.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 81-93
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.81
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Representative theory of perception has used the analogy of watching television screens to explain the perception of material objects. To this analogy, there has been a wellknown objection. Contemporary representative theorists, called "New representationalism", claim to have a way out of the objection, and I shall argue that their argument is well-grounded. Seeing things through television screens can be direct perception of those things. Unfortunately, however, this argument has its own drawback, and one of the essential ideas of representative theory would have to be compromised, i.e. that the subject cannot be aware of sensedata.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 95-102
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.95
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2007 Volume 40 Issue 1 Pages 103-111
    Published: July 30, 2007
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.40.103
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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