Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
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Displaying 1-15 of 15 articles from this issue
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 1-13
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    I treat in this article Duhem's philosophy of science to clarify the exact sense and the reach of it, by confronting it with some dominant tendencies in the contemporary philosophy of science.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 15-30
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.15
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    This paper proposes to provide a general view of Duhem's epistemological thought, which is now well-known perhaps only for so called Duhem-Quine thesis.
    This holistic idea on the 'structure' of the scientific activities is, in Duhem's real work, accompanied by the representationistic idea on the 'aim' of the same activities, and forms with it a total rejection of two dogmatisms, that is, physical realism and empiricism. But although destructive with regard to these dogmatisms, neither holism nor representationism succumbs to skeptic relinquishment. It is the cogency of the scientific history that saves them from stranding in skeptic despair, as well as reinvigorating themselves in dogmatic ambition.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 31-43
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.31
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    Duhem-Quine thesis that a single theory can never be tested and decisively refuted by experience is well known among philosophers of science. But Duhem himself did not argue for that thesis. His argument was restricted within physical theories.
    Duhem has been interpreted as an instrumentalist or conventionalist. But he did not deny the existence of a reality behind the theory. Duhem's realism is very different from contemporary scientific realism. To understand his philosophy of science, it is important to note that he was a Pascalian and argued for intuition as well as logic. His philospophy of science is similar to that of M. Polanyi.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 45-60
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.45
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    Prof. Kobayashi criticized the Duhem-Quine thesis from an original point of view in his recent book Philosophy of Sience. His point is that there is "a difference of degree concerning theoreticity" which means the vulnerability to a theoretical revision in the whole system of physical theory. But, in my view, scientists cannot uniquely determine which is the object of revision between main hypotheses and auxiliary hypotheses. While in the "normal science" period auxiliary hypotheses are revised by falsificational experiments, only in the "scientific revolution" period main hypotheses are falsified. Therefore the so-called crucial experiment is no other than an honorary title which is awarded by historical consideration in a later period.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 61-75
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.61
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    It is proposed that cybernetics and general system theory, founded by N. Wiener and L. von Bertalanffy respectively, may be united to form system cybernetics. The nature of system cybernetics and its post modernity as well are discussed, while modernity is characterised by a set of three features somewhat annoying. System cybernetics is expected to play a part in overcoming that modernity.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 77-94
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: December 07, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.77
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    This paper presents general systems theory on the basis of ontology. In this systems theory, systems are epistemic frameworks from a nominalistic point of view, and systems objects are positioned through the systems corresponding to their objects. It is not until the correspondence between a system and its systems object that the reality comes into existence. Systems have to be transformed in conformity with changes in objects' environments. This is in cybernetic processes. Norbert Wiener developed the thought that rigidity must be rejected, so his line of thought is the same as the author's. Thus, postmodern sciences start from ontological commitment and rejection of rigidity.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 95-105
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.95
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    Cybernetics first introduced by Norbert Wiener in 1940's has been inter- or meta-disciplinary science and this has been one of the most attractive and fruitful aspects of the cybernetics community. In this kind of community many new ideas have been emerged. Here two major conceptual developments of cybernetics would be pointed and discussed. One is the line from self-regulation to self-organization, autopoiesis, and self-reference, and the other is the line from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics. Finally the potentiality of cybernetics to open the door to the new era in the area of medicine and psychotherapy would be discussed with a few brief examples.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 107-125
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.107
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    Lukasiewicz-type completeness proof of classical propositional logic is presented coupled with the axiomatic rejection for the logic. This is to the effect of much simplifying the completeness proof. On the basis of the consistency of the logic the cut-elimination theorem in the sense of Gentzen is also demonstrated of the logic making use of the axiomatic rejection.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese], [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 127-137
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.127
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    Axiomatic rejection for Aristotle's syllogistic is not fully arranged as a formal system because one of its rejection rules contains a meta-concept. In this paper, we restrict our discussion to the classical propositional logic and reconstruct the rejection system as a formal system with assumptions. Furthermore, we give the axiomatization of satisfiability through a similar way of the reconstruction of the rejection system.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 139-153
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.139
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    During the 1980s, two research programs in formal semantics were established: dynamic semantics (DS), which provides a discourse interpretation, and generalized quantifier theory (GQT), which deals with quantification in natural languages. In the 1990s, proposals to integrate GQT into DS were made; unfortunately, many of them failed to include the problems of anaphora in contexts of quantification. This paper redefines problems of quantification as problems of characterization of finite classes. It defines a semantic framework, dynamic theory for discourse interpretation, and demonstrates how problems of plural pronominal anaphora can be treated properly within it.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 155-167
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.155
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    In this note I examine the criticism of Quine's "Two Dogmas" given by Crispin Wright in his "Inventing Logical Necessity". Wright claims, in opposition to Quine, that certain metalogical statements are indeed immune to revision. Without committing myself to Quine's position, I show that Wright's argument is flawed since (1) he overlooks the indispensable role of intuitive reasoning in metalogic, and (2) even if the acceptance of a metalogical statement is presupposed in the test of a certain theory, it does not follow that the very same metalogical statement must be presupposed whenever we put a theory into empirical test.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 169-181
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.169
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    It is still an open question whether there exists an absolute truth, i.e., a proposition which is true in every epistemically possible world.
    I have proposed an argument for the existence of such a truth, in my paper "'Ontological Argument' for the Existence of Absolute Truth". In this paper, I shall examine this argument in the following two points: whether avoiding selfreference by differentiating language levels can invalidate the argument, and whether this argument is circular (com-mits a petitio principii) or not.
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 183-193
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.183
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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    This paper is an examination of Jerry Fodor's internalist position in his controversy with externalists. His internalism is not to be taken as the contention that the whole of mental content is independent of the surrounding world. Rather his point is that the scientific explanation of behavior requires that the relevant mental content should be causally efficacious and therefore supervene on brain states. If we have to give the content of a propositional attitude a semantic value, we can interpret "narrow contents" as functions from both their contexts and mental states to "wide contents".
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 195-220
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.195
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    1996 Volume 29 Pages 223-229
    Published: November 15, 1996
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.29.223
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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