In Japan, the more depressed or remote a rural area is, the more public investment the national government allocates to it. For this reason, national public investment policies are seen as a type of social policy. Past studies have not been able to clarify the relations between public investment and locational structure of contractors because of the secrecy of nomination processes and negotiations among contractors. The author has already attempted to overcome this methodological difficulty by inductive estimation based on bidding results. This paper applies the same technique to all of Shimane Prefecture with special attention to the hierarchical and territorial nature of public organizations.
The first half of the paper examines bidding results by three public organizations: 1) the Hamada branch of the Chugoku Regional Construction Bureau (CRCB); 2) the head office of the prefectural government; and 3) the head office of the CRCB. The head office of the prefectural government and the head office of the CRCB deal with bidding for construction work when the price exceeds a set price limit for the branch office.
The Hamada branch office nominates only the largest contractor and some other large contractors within its territory. Successful bidders are always from the region where the construction work takes place. This fact infers the existence of strong negotiation processes among the nominated companies.
In the bidding by the head offices of the prefecture and of the CRCB, leading contractors locating in the prefecture can participate in the bidding process. Although the prefectural head office uses competitive bids for every job, it may enforce the formation of a joint venture (JV) that consists of at least one contractor within the prefecture through bid advertisement. Every successful JV bidder contains contractors from the region of the construction work. This also infers the existence of strong negotiation processes among the nominated companies. The CRCB head office uses various types of bids. When contractors from other prefectures participate solely in bidding, the bidding result shows no special tendency. This infers that the bidding is carried out competitively.
Under these nomination and negotiation processes, the hierarchy and territory of the public organizations strongly influence the locational structure of contractors. In most municipalities, there is a contractor whose sales exceed 300 million yen. Furthermore, there is at least one contractor with sales volume of more than 2 billion yen in every territory of the prefectural branch office.
The second part of the paper compares construction companies in an urban area (Matsue City) and those in a remoter rural area (Ochi district). In Matsue City, vertical integration of the companies is highly developed, and large portions of primary contract works are taken by a few leading companies. In Ochi district, most of the companies are small in size and depend chiefly on primary contract works. The profitability and balance sheets of construction companies in Ochi district are better than those of contractors of equivalent size in Matsue City. Such a contrast between urban and rural areas is derived from territorial exclusivity in the bidding process.

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The purpose of this article is to clarify the process by which Chinese workers were excluded from the urban labor market and how Chinese residential segregation declined during the early Showa era in andd around Tokyo, due to the government policies on foreigners, conditions of the urban labor market, and boycott movements against them. The data used in the analysis were gathered from the diplomatic record office of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The results of the study can be summarized as follows.
The occupational structure of Chinese workers who had immigrated to Tokyo during the first half of the 1920s underwent a drastic change because of the outbreak of the Showa Crisis. At this time, the wage levels of Chinese workers employed in the construction and labor sectors fell, and some began working in various other fields such as the leather industry. After 1930, Japanese workers started boycott movements against them, and nearly half lost their jobs. Therefore, in late 1930, many unemployed Chinese had requested to return to their country and many did so with the assistance of the Japanese government.
During the late 1920s, the Japanese government's deportation policies toward Chinese was also becoming stricter. In the early 1920s, the government had already adopted a policy of refusing new Chinese workers entry into the country and implementing employment controls on workers employed in the construction, labor, and manufacturing sectors. Beginning in 1926, the number of deportations increased rapidly, but the major targets of deportation were “criminals, ” such as thieves. However, beginning in 1929, the major targets of deportation escalated to include illegal gamblers, illegal immigrants, and illegal workers, and in 1930, the number of repatriates reached its zenith. Furthermore, in 1927 the targets of deportation tended to concentrate on jobless Chinese, but beginning in 1928, they tended to concentrate on workers employed in the construction and labor sectors, who competed with Japanese workers in the labor market.
The decline of Chinese residential segregation was first caused by these government policies. Those policies excluded Chinese workers who had settled in the Sumida and Arakawa districts from the urban labor market and deprived them of job opportunities. As a result, Chinese workers were obliged to return, and Chinese residential segregation in Tokyo which began in the early 1920 s disappeared.

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