Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
Search
Advanced search
OR
Browse
Search
Volume 33, Issue 1
Displaying 1-10 of 10 articles from this issue
Show all abstracts
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
  • Self-Reflectivity and the Ability to Respond
    Takeshi Ohba
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 1-16
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    According to a prevailing view, a self is reflective solely by virtue of the self-referential nature of a human mind. Relationship with fellow beings, according to this view, concerns merely a contingent matter of psychological developments, and has conceptually nothing to do with the self-reflectivity. This view, however, seems to me totally wrong. To be sure, both 'self-locating' information processing and 'other-oriented' information processing may be necessary and sufficient for purposeful movements and social transactions. But selfhood requires an ability to entertain an "I"-thought. To have this ability is manifested by being able to identify an image in a mirror as one's own image though no one can see one's own face. This sort of self-identification requires in turn the mastery of the concept of 'being seen by' fellow beings.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1257K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 17-30
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.17
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    Neo-Bayesianism, the statistical methodology based on the idea of probability interpreted as degree of belief, formulates inductive inferences in terms of probability theory, and justifies them under assumptions of rationality. Conditional probability with condition of zero probability is among those inductive inferences formulated within the Neo-Bayesian terminology. This paper aims to call attention to the need for the justification of the zero conditional probability by pointing out that so far no theorem has justified it successfully.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1229K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 31-42
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.31
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1153K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 43-53
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.43
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    The metaphysics of "simple" objects and the syntactic theory of "expressions (Ausdrücke)" can be seen as theoretical foundations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logicophilosophicus. I shall show in this paper how these two doctrines result from his struggling with Russell's theory of types, and establish the early Wittgenstein's basic idea that structural (formal) features of language mirror structural (formal) features of the world. In order to do so, I will trace the basic line of Wittgenstein's thought back to the pre-Tractatus period.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1071K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 55-68
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.55
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    In this paper, I will consider the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates fixing a point in space in early Wittgenstein's thought. Pears pointed out that there is a tension between this comparison (which leads to holism) and separatist element in the relation between reality and sense. But I think this tension is illusion and a right interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of language will vanish this illusion. For this purpose, I will illuminate the comparison of a proposition to a set of coordinates and the motivation of this comparison.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1173K)
  • Philosophy of Mathematics and Ontological Commitment
    On Quine's and Vuillemin's Classifications
    Joseph Vidal-Rosset
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 69-80
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.69
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
    This paper concerns Quine's classification of philosophies of mathematics as sketched in "On what there is" and offers a new reading of Quine's view. In his famous paper Quine defines three positions: Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. Each of them, he says, has its modern expression, respectively, in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. According to Quine these foundational positions can be accepted or rejected on a clear and objective basis, according to their distinctive ontological commitments. Consistent with his own criterion for ontological commitment (buttressed by his view on impredicative definitions), Quine adopts the Realist (or the Platonist) position in mathematics. Later, it is shown that genuine Intuitionism is not definable by Quine but is easily defined in Vuillemin's classification scheme (in What Are Philosophical Systems? C. U. P., 1986).
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (916K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 85-90
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.85
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (640K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 91-94
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.91
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (370K)
  • ERRATUM
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 94
    Published: 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.1_94
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (18K)
  • [title in Japanese]
    [in Japanese]
    2000 Volume 33 Issue 1 Pages 97-109
    Published: May 15, 2000
    Released on J-STAGE: May 29, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.33.97
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (1159K)
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
feedback
 Top