Yusuf Idris, one of the greatest contemporary writer not only in Egypt, but also in whole Arabic world marked an epoch in the Egyptian literature with his first collection of short stories "The Cheepest Night" (1954), where the true "Egypt" appears embodied through the Egyptian peasant life. Idris found the truth of Egypt in the emotion of each Egyptian, and his works realized "the peculiarity of Egyptian literature", the theme which had been pursued by modern Egyptian literature since "the Modern school". It is his outstanding realism that made Idris possible to realize this. His realismhas been much discussed regarding how Idris sees the reality, and labeled various names. But nothing has been truly discussed on the expressional level of his realism, though the distinguished feature of his realism could be realized only through his excellent expression. Idris's realism which could be named "the subjective realism" because of its subjectivity, is examined in this essay from the expressional standpoint, especially from "the viewpoint of the story" and Egyptian colloquial dialect "ammiya", taking "A Sight" as a typical example of the distinguished expression of Idris. It is a premise of the realism to fix the certain viewpoint in a story and depict the story only through this viewpoint, and "A Sight" shows clearly despite its extreme shortness that in Idris's work the fixed viewpoint in the first person is not merely a premise of the realism, but the essential motif of the story in which the subjective realism is fully realized. Idris was criticized because of his abundant use of "ammiya" expressions which were regarded unliterary and also regarded should not be used in the literary works. But "A Sight" indisputably shows that "ammiya" in Idris's work realizes the true literary nature.

抄録全体を表示

This article deals with the formation of the "aghawat stratum" in Damascus in the first half of the nineteenth century. Emphasis is laid upon three points: 1) period in which the aghawat constituted themselves as a social stratum; 2) their relations with other social groups; 3) their economic bases. Since 1965 when the first attempt was made by A.Hourani to clarify the a'yan's (notables') activities in modernization of their country, the subject has proved of sufficient interest for not a few scholars to follow Hourani's path. Their researches show that these notables belonged to two social 'classes: the efendiya and the aghawat. The former was composed of high-ranking civil officials and the religious establishment. The latter consisted of the commanders and officers in charge of the Janissary corps (Damascus garrison) as well as the mercenary troops brought into Syria since as early as the 17th century. In earlier days, these commanding officers used to live in the barracks alloted to them. They began one by one to leave there and conduct a family life in the city. At first their houses concentrated in the Maydan and Salihiya quarters outside the city wall. Afterward some moved into the city itself, and were followed by others. By 1831, their houses had scattered all over the city and as a result the aghawat gained influence in their quarters. Between 1790s and 1830s they grew to form a distinct "stratum" in Damascus. Historical sources called them "aghawat al-balad" (the aghawat of the city). In 1831 under the leadership of the aghawat citizens rose against a new taxation in every quater of Damascus and thus put an end to the new tax. Between 1784 and 1831 various social disturbances occurred in Damascus: oppressive measures taken by the walis (governors), unrest caused by various domestic and foreign incidents, epidemics, popular uprisings, armed conflicts, etc. The serious armed conflicts were of three types: a) the wali against troops; b) some troops against the other; c) a new wali against his predecessor. In the frequent struggles between the yerliya and the qapiqulu (local and imperial Janissaries respectively) the citizens of the Maydan quarter took the former's side and those of the Shaghur and 'Amara quarters took the latter's. Through these fightings, the aghawat increased their political power, which gave them the opportunity of intervening eagerly in disputes between troops. The aghawat in neutral position often acted or were called upon to act as peacemakers. Mediation by the aghawat in command of the mercenary troop deli was especially effective, because this troop was ranked third in strength after the yerliya and the qapiqulu. At the beginning the aghawat lived essentially on their wages. But they were seen, as early as in the second half of the seventeenth century, to take up many side jobs. First, within the bounds of Damascus city, having made themselves appointed shaykhs of guilds, some were in control of these corporations from whose members they collected taxes, Some held warehouses for daily goods: grains, meat, coal, etc. and made profits by manipulating market prices. Some engaged in trade with other cities, Istanbul, Baghdad, Cairo. They spent their money in founding waqfs (charitable endowments) and maintained their rights over them. Second, outside Damascus, the aghawat undertook land management through tax-farming (iltizam) in agricultural areas such as Ghuta, Hawran, Biqa'or purchasing gardens in the suburbs of Damascus. It was in these conditions that they legally became landowners by virtue of the edict of land reform in 1858.

抄録全体を表示

As earlyas the 3rd century A.H. (9th century A.D.), less than a century since paper making has spread to the Islamic world, an occupation known as warraq (pl. warraqun) was introduced. This term derives from the Arabic term waraq (paper). Warraq deals with entire process of book making. In biographical dictionaries of the time, we can see many people identified as warraq as his nisba (occupational title). For example, in Ta'rikh Baghdad of Khatib al-Baghdadi which contains 7831 individual biographies, there were 116 warraqun recorded in this material (approximately 1.48%). This proportion is similar to the figures recorded in katib (secretary, 127 persons, approximately 1.62%). Thus we must recognize their influence. The origin and the works of warraq in the 3-4th centuries (9-10th centuries) of Baghdad was examined by famous biographical dictionaries. The works of warraq consisted transcription, book making, selling books and paper. They came from native-born of Baghdad or immigrants from Khorasan also known for its producing of paper. Warraqun were active in Baghdad which was the center of culture those days, therefore they played an important role in the popularization process of the use of paper in the Islamic world. In Egypt, warraq was virtually unknown until the mid-4th century (mid-10th century), since Egypt was a papyrus producing district. But gradually paper drove out papyrus, and at the same time kaghadi (paper maker) took the place of qiratisi (papyrus maker). The knowledge of Islamic studies was a prerequisite for the works of warraq, therefore 'ulama' engaged in these tasks. Moreover it was a method for 'ulama' to gain income. In Baghdad, there were suq (bazar) al-warraqin where many intellectuals gathered in quest of information concerning new books and learnings. But after the 5th century (11th century), with the establishment of madrasa, no longer was it necessary for 'ulama' to work as warraq, for they were supported by the madrasa. On the other hand, paper become widespread throughout the Islamic world, the work of warraq was divided into several specialized tasks, such as transcription, bookbinding, painting, bookselling, paper selling and etc. Thus the name of warraq was no longer seen in historical materials.

抄録全体を表示

"Positive Neutralism" came to be acknowledged as one of the main ideologies of the diplomacy of the Egyptian revolutionary government in 1956, when "Suez Crisis" took place. In this connection, it might be possible to consider the period 1952-56 as a formative one. The revolutionary leadership, quite contrary to its authoritarian image, had to decide its policy deliberlately, considering international and regional political developments as well as internal satability during this period. Egypt had inherited its quest for neutralism, so to speak "Passive Neutralism", from its former regime. It was during this period that the "Passive Neutralism" changed into the "Positive Neutralism", through the process of withdrawal of British troops from Suez area and struggle against the Baghdad Pact. And the ideology of "Positive Neutralism" was maintained by realism from the context of the Cold war, and also by Arabism ('uruba) from the context of Arab regional arena.

抄録全体を表示

Distinction between "law" and "ethics" or "morals" is said to be found in whether enforcement of power exists or not. While the former allows the application of power by authority based upon certain fixed criteria, this is not the case with the latter, in which the only criterion is voice of each individual's conscience or rational judgement. In Islam, characteristically law itself is ethics and vice versa. Moreover, law is of divine origin, Every human action ought to be taken just in order to please God and only when man can be successful in doing so, he could expect his reward in his life on the earth and hereafter. Indeed, the official expositions of faith may dictate each Moslem to act following the injunctions of al-Lah, and failure to cope with them shall necessarily be accompanied by Divine wrath, but at the same time any Moslem tends to fail to observe these injunctions as strictly as he should. Though it does not follow that the Shari'eh is nothing but nominal, in everyday activities, the observance of Divine orders, whether intentionally or not, seems to have been neglected. The field of commercial activities is no exception in this regard for there has been an obvious discrepancy between the Shari'eh stipulations and actual business proceedings. In this paper, present author will, in the first place, analyze some characteristic features of Islamic commercial ethics,in particular, those of Twelver Imami shi'ism. Then, he will present one concrete case of a merchant named Hajji Mohammad Hasan-e Esfahani Amin Dar al-Zarb, who was one of the most influential businessmen in the latter half of the 19th century Iran. By this procedure, we could compare theory and practice, so that we might get aclue to answer some of our basic questions; whether does commercial ethics per se truely exist?, and if so, to what extent is theory observed or on the contrary neglected? We hope this case study could help our better understanding of Islamic economy, society and history.

抄録全体を表示

Although a rich folklore of ghosts and spirits exists in Arab Muslim societies, the anthropological study of this subject is extremely scarce. The purpose of this article is to present a description. and analysis of the Arab Muslims'belief in ghosts and spirits in the village of Kufr Yuba in North Jordan, compared with the cases in the other Arab Muslim societies and those in the non-Muslim societies, particularly in Japan. The fieldwork on which this article is based was carried out in the years 1986-1988 when I was a research fellow at the Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, Yarmouk University, Irbid. Kufr Yuba is an Arab village located at about six kilometers west of the city of Irbid, with a population of some nine thousand Sunni Muslims. Although it is originally a cereal-growing village, its occupational structure is at present diversified and the agricultural population is estimated approximately at twenty percent of the total. The literary Arabic (al-fusha) equivalent of the Japanese term yurei, which is mostly translated in English as ghost, is generally shabah. In Kufr Yuba, however, the term shabah is not always equivalent to the yurei. First of all, the villagers' general image of the shabah is quite different from that of the Japanese yurei. The yurei is generally regarded as the disembodied soul of a dead person appearing to the living in the shape of what he was before death, whereas the shabah is conceived as a kind of jinn, that is, spirits mentioned in the Qur'an. The term jinn, which is a plural in literary Arabic, is a masculine singular in Kufr Yuba, and its feminine singular form is jinniyya. A lot of villagers believe in the existence of such spiritual beings exactly because they are referred to as one of the various creations of 'Allah in the Qur'an. Therefore, not a few anecdotes have been woven around jinn, and for example, during my stay in the village, the weekly newspaper al-Haqiqa (26 May 1987) carried a report entitled "li-man raqs al-jinn ala muthallath Kufr Yuba (Who performs a jinn dance at the T-crossroads of Kufr Yuba?)". According to the Qur'an, there are good jinn and bad jinn, that is, Muslims and infidels. The people of Kufr Yuba in general stand in fear of all of the jinn, however, thinking of them as evil and harmful. It is presumably because they entertain some apprehensions about the unidentified natural shape of the jinn. The Qur'an says nothing but that the jinn were created of fire. Such 'fearful' jinn have played a very important role in what is called islamization. Islam has introduced its own spirits in the form of jinn, and has placed all the local spirits and pagan gods in the category of jinn.

抄録全体を表示

This is an anthropological approach to the political actions of the Awlad Ali Bedouins in Egypt. Its purpose consists in finding some problematic points to be further studied in the process of selecting candidates among the Awlad Ali for the general election of the People's Assembly held in the end of November, 1990. The Awlad Ali are the Bedouins now mostly settled and living in the Governorate of Marsa Matrouh on the Mediterranean coast of the Western Desert. They are divided into five tribes (gabilas), and each tribe is into some sections ('a' ilas). During my stay in Egypt in 1988-1991, I visited the area many times and thereafter lived with the Awlad Ali in one of their villages for a year and half so as to do my fieldwork on them. This paper should be considered, therefore, as one of the studies on the tribal system of the Arab nomads, and the election of 1990 is taken up just as a case. The Governorate has two electoral districts, in both of which the number of representatives are two, so that four are to be elected in sum. As the Awlad Ali hold an absolute majority of the population of the area, they consider representatives of the Governorate as representatives of the Awlad Ali. Moreover, in order that those are representatives of the Awlad Ali as a whole, they say they all must reach an agreement on their candidacy. But reaching is so much difficult because of the lack of the established political institutions. Although they say as a rule that four of the five tribes share the seats and that the remaining one is to wait for its turn in the next occasion, the outcome of 1990 did not accord with this saying. The claim for the agreement of the tribes, nevertheless, has certain effects. The Awlad Ali people think of a candidate with the agreement as more legitimate and fair than those without it. So, if one gets the tribal agreement, he can take advantage of it tactically as a merit. The better one can pretend to have obtained an agreement of the tribes, the more easily he can win. The Awlad Ali also say that the agreement of the tribes on candidates should be reached through meetings of the 'umdas and the sheikhs, both of whom represent their tribal section against other sections. I myself attended some of the meetings held before the election and there found that the agreement was not reached positively but just accepted passively. As all of the meetings are locally held and not organized into larger ones, it is impossible in such conditions to gather up the will of each tribesman into united one. Therefore it must be considered that the Awlad Ali say the agreement is reached in the tribal meeting, not because it is actually done but because it should be ideally done. The 'umda and the sheikh are titles rather than posts, and not every section has both of them. There is no established organization to which they are belonging. Some of them, especially some living in Matrouh City, are rich and strong. They have relatively large influences over other 'umdas, sheikhs and other tribesmen. It is they who, in fact, play the power game among themselves, ratify candidates and lead the process of reaching (=accepting) an agreement of the Awlad Ali as a whole. They are powerful and behaving tactically so as to benefit themselves, but they still remain under the influence of the traditional norms. Here, norms work not as a burden on the individuals but just as a guideline along which people interact with one another. Behaving as a political unit, the Awlad Ali elected their representatives. The tribal system working on the normative basis was still effective and taken much seriouly in the process of decision making and agreement reaching. But it did not prevent anyone, candidates, the influential or any, from developing his own possibility. It just guided his way in harmony with others', if possible and favored. Those points are to be cleared in other case studies in different occasions.

抄録全体を表示

Egypt stood at the dawn of industrialization when Nasser took power in early 1950's. She had about the same number of modernized industrial enterprises as Japan did just after World War I when Japan witnessed outstanding increase of modernized enterprises and was on the point of stepping into the age of heavy and chemical industry. Very roughly speaking, I dare say that Nasser's Egypt could be compared to this Japan on its eve of industrialization, although it is a little dangerous to say anything about industrialization simply on the basis of the number of modernised enterprises. The first development policy adopted by Nasser's government was import substitute industrialization policy. Today some people criticize this policy because NEES succeeded by adopting export oriented industrialization policy. But Egypt's adoption of import substitute industrialization policy at that time was quite normal and justifiable, for no one knew in those days about the export oriented industrialization policy and no one would have beleived in its effectiveness even if he had known about it. The failure of Nasser's development poicy, therefore, can not be attributed to his import substitute development policy, but should be attributed to other causes. Among several probable causes, the one already generally recognized was, what true that in most of the advanced countries except Great Britain, no doubt, states played more or less important roles so that they might catch up with Great Britain as soon as possible, but in these cases states helped entrepreneurs grow freely, while they suppressed mercilessly workers and other victims of industrialization in order to keep "social order", and, besides, states not only gave various subsidies to entrepreneurs but also undertook state investment in infrastructure to save entrepreneurs their necessary capital. Even that notorious dictatorship of Pak Chon Hi in Korea, economically, payed maximum attention to foster the private sector while it, politically, exercised the ruthless power to suppress resistance of the people. But Nasser's regime, regretably enough, restrained entrepreneurs of their free economic adtivities. At first, Nasser's regime was eyed with suspicion by the whole societsy. Someone regarded it as a military dictatorship of right wing army officers. Others expected it to standside by side with farmers and workers. In fact, Free Officers themselves didn't seem to have any united and concrete idea about future Egypt. So it was quite natural that Egyptian entrepreneurs, not to speak of foreign investors, hesitated to do new business at first. And at this juncture impatient Nasser made a bad choice. The regime did not try to gain the confidence among the businessmen but on the contrary it began to force them to work harder and to intervene in the management of private companies, thus making them keep away from economic activities in Egypt any more. Nasser's development policy went to the very end when it declared "Arab socialism". Apparently the national resources were effectively procured and allocated under the socialistic control and the industrialization was considerably achieved at least in the statistics. But the industrial equipment thus built worked ineffectively. Capital and labour productivities were very low. Besides, the expanding West market that was to nourish NEES later years was closed to Egypt, not bcause of its declaration of socialism but mainly because of poor quality of its products. As a result, Egypt was forced to rely upon the East market that was very narrow and didn't have the capacity to contribute to Egypt's industrialization not only as a consumer but also as a capital and technology supplier. Thus Egypt's industrialization program, even its economy itself, could not help standing still in late 1960's. The imposing edifice of

(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

抄録全体を表示

There are four versions of the Arabian Nights, originally called A Thousand and One Nights, called "Culcatta#1" "Bulak" "Cullcatta#2" and "Breslau" versions. I try to examine the Cullcatta#2 in this short thesis, so the numbering of the nights cited in this paper depends on that of the Cullcatta#2. This version is now being translated into Japanese in the Oriental Books Series of Heibonsha Publishers in Japan. I am interested in the influence of old Indian folktales on the Arabian Nights. Of course, it is obvious that the Arabian Nights was influenced by many precious stories, those from ancient, and middle ages of Egypt, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and India. Especially the Indian stories influenced themes of wisdom and of wives' excuse for their husbands in the Arabian Nights. Here I will concretly analyze 5 stories told in the 578th to 606th nights of the Arabian Nights in comparison with famous Indian folktales Vetalapancavimsatika and Sukasaptati.

抄録全体を表示