The Agricultural Marketing Journal of Japan
Online ISSN : 2424-0427
Print ISSN : 1341-934X
Volume 20, Issue 3
Displaying 1-5 of 5 articles from this issue
  • M. ONO, K. FUYUKI
    2011 Volume 20 Issue 3 Pages 1-2
    Published: December 31, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: June 22, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Hiroshi ISODA
    Article type: Paper
    2011 Volume 20 Issue 3 Pages 3-23
    Published: December 31, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: June 22, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purposes of this study are firstly, to review the Rice Policy Reform (2004 2009 FY), secondly, to characterize the transition form the Rice Policy Reform to the Pilot Program for Direct Payment of Income Support, and thirdly, to consider further policy implications based on the examination of the results of the latter program. The Rice Policy Reform was a policy package to reduce governmental commitments for preventing oversupply and relieving the decline of rice prices. However, its income stabilization program for selected farmers couldn't compensate them for the decline of rice prices. As a result, the strengthening of paddy farming structure, which was one of the most important aims of the Reform, couldn't be achieved. The Pilot Program for Direct Payment of Income Support, started in 2010 FY, succeeded the previous policies in its aspects of making the rice production control program selective, and coped with the decline of rice price exclusively through income stabilization measures. On the other hand, the production supports for food rice and other strategic crops on paddy fields were coupled with their planted areas and applicable to all farmers. These aspects are discontinuous from the previous policies. The 2010 rice price was much lower than the previous year, mainly because of oversupply due to the selective production controls and weakened consumers purchasing power. The government inevitably decided to implement some price support measures, as well as the Program's income stabilization payment, which worked as a deficiency payment. As a result, the economic ability of larger farms to rent more paddy field seemed improved. These facts imply the necessity for rebuilding an effective rice production control system and stable price supports, along with deficiency payments for the full-dressed Program for Direct Payment of Income Support.
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  • Manao KIDACHI
    Article type: Paper
    2011 Volume 20 Issue 3 Pages 24-34
    Published: December 31, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: June 22, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The aim of the paper is to analyze how retailer-led marketing systems have been developing in Japan, especially in the food-marketing sector. The paper begins with a discussion of the theoretical issues, including postponement-speculation theory and relationship in supply chains. Secondly, the recent reorganization of Japanese food retail market and the characteristics of vertical integration initiated by food retailers are analyzed. Thirdly, the private brand strategies of food retailers are discussed. The conclusions are as follows. The advantage of retailer-led marketing systems is beyond that of manufacturer-led marketing systems, as the former are more open and consumer-oriented than the latter. However, if retailers do not invest their own resources leading to sophistication of the supply chain and PB product development while depending on manufacturer resources, the relationship between retailers and manufacturers will be increasingly unstable and weakened because of a lack of collaboration and sense of partnership. In order to strengthen the relationship, it is essential to share the aim of business and collaborate on coordinating their supply chain functions to create value chain.
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  • Yasuhiko SUGIMURA
    Article type: Paper
    2011 Volume 20 Issue 3 Pages 35-49
    Published: December 31, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: June 22, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this article is to clarify the changes in food wholesale trade and changes of the wholesale market after 2001. After 2001, some food wholesale companies merged on the basis of the leadership of the business firm. This brought concentration of handling for the food wholesale trade; in particular, in sales at the eight highest ranks has been remarkable. In 2011, it was noted that profit rates were insufficient even for large-scale companies, as found in the case of a food wholesale company selling two trillion yen. The change that is most important with regard to the wholesale market system is a law that was revised in 2004. In the case of vegetables and fruit, sales concentration is seen in the wholesale market. In contrast, some wholesale markets are increasing customers by widening the assortment of products. However, this necessitates a large amount of investment capital. In this regard, such efforts as wholesale markets do not necessarily lead to the improvement of profit rates.
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  • Tomoyuki YUTAKA
    Article type: Paper
    2011 Volume 20 Issue 3 Pages 50-56
    Published: December 31, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: June 22, 2020
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper investigates the cause of problems which threaten food safety and reliability, the mechanisms under which unjust behavior in the market arises and the consequence thereof, and the means of prevention of such problems which result from market function. Market demand of commodities under asymmetric information situations in which sellers have more information about commodity safety is described as 'distinction accuracy.' Behavior models both of buyer and seller who face such market demand have been described, along with analysis of the combined consequence to both the distributor vs. consumer market (i.e. the retail stage market) and the producer vs. distributor market (i.e. the wholesale stage market). The conclusions are as follows. When there is a difference of distinction accuracy between the wholesale stage market and the retail stage market, and the fall of market price is larger in wholesale stage market, temptations for unjust behavior emerge. The mechanisms through which these arise include the distributor of high quality commodity wanting to buy and sell when the producer cannot meet the supply needs. Although the producer of low quality commodity wants to sell to the distributor, if the distributor buys and tries to sell, the distributor must set a price less than the desirable price. In this, the distributor often commits an unjust act in attempting to sell at an unrealistically high price. In such a situation, the high quality commodities decrease in the market. In order to prevent market injustices, the difference of distinction accuracy between markets of different stages must be reduced and the level of accuracy in markets at any stage must be raised.
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