The purpose of this report, in connection with protecting rice and paddy field farming in Aomori Prefecture, is to describe the factor of contributing to poor harvests and the developing trends of local agriculture. Aomori Prefecture, with rice and apples as its base, is one of the leading agricultural areas in Japan. However, over the past twenty years, the prefectural agricultural economy has undergone changes. Rice production has dropped from 50% to 30% of total prefectural agricultural production and the production of rice in Aomori Prefecture was the poorest in the country last year. Though the largest cause which brought on these changes was the cool weather, another factor is the continued lowering of the official rice price. A trend which began in the latter half of the 1980s. The third factor is the series of trade liberalization measures. Which have adversely affected rice-growing areas. At the same time, there have been attempts at diversifying production. Recently vegetable production has increased in Aomori Prefecture. Rice is being marketed through the "special-cultivated rice" route, the direct delivery system for rice which connects consumers directly with producers. But another problem has emerged, which is shipping costs. From the cost angle, it's even more difficult to see the result than the producer had imagined (higher profits).

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Currently, Niigata prefecture is the place called the hometown and the center of "Koshi-Hikari", now a famous rice whose name has been established as a top brand rice in Japan and consumed and eaten adoringly. In the world of rice distribution, it has been said that "without the free-market rice, the vehicle of rice distribution in Japan does not run" and thus, the Koshi-Hikari from Niigata has been sought on target by every dealer of free-market rice. In the fall of 1993 when the poorest rice crop was experienced first since the world war II, eyes of every dealer of free-market rice were glued to Niigata more intensely than usual year, since Hokkaidoh and Tohoku districts were struck by destructive damages in rice crop. It is because these districts were found to be rather favoured, compared to above districts, with the rice crop index in Niigata shown to be "89", comparatively rather better value in the poor harvest circumstances. Presently, such rumour spread that the free-market rice dealers, who had purchased mainly in Hokkaidoh and Tohoku regions previously, rushed into Niigata, and it was true that resultantly thus the persons of agricultural cooperative got to be nervous. The dealers began to act behind the scenes late August, the harvest time of "Aki-Hikari". Such high price of 23,000 yen for sixty kilograms had been offered. Naturally, they were also aiming at getting Koshi-Hikari. Farmers of Uonuma districts were experiencing attacks and approaches continuously from the dealers. It is because not only the free-market dealers but also the retailers came up there to buy and contract the free-market rice. They offered 32,000 yen for sixty kilograms of rice! In order to make up for the loss of poor crop last year, farmers cannot help consenting to make contracts. Beyond, in October, such case occurred that black market rice was forced to be transported out by truck from the warehouse of the authorized rice dealer in Kata-Higashi village, Nishi-Kanbara-gun. Mass media reported vigorously the transportation of black market rice carried out with the guard and watch and stop by Local Food Agency Offices neglected and ignored, because it should be said to symbolize the autumn of confusion in rice distribution. The autumn of confusion treatening these districts producing the brand rice and the rice disturbance in Heisei followed by it. Among these events, there was on thing demonstrated, Adherence and attachment of Japanese people to the "rice produced in Japan".

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify reasons for rice shortage in 1993, to estimate effects of its future partial import liberalization, and consider measures to sustain its production and distribution in Kyushu. The results of this study are as follows: (1) Reasons for shortage of rice in 1993 include reduction in paddy fields caused by policies, a poor harvest effected by climatic factors, such as, a cool summer and typhoons, and a decline in farmer's production incentives. (2) If rice production decreases by 10% due to future partial import liberalization, total production in Kyushu will shrink by 54.4 billion yen, which can be estimated by input-output analysis. (3) Because of low returns resulting from low prices and high production costs, rice farmers in Kyushu have been losing the incentive to maintain rice production. It is necessary to foster large-scale farm management bodies that can adopt new farming systems to economize production costs and to get high returns without arresting sustainable agricultural development. (4) In order to prevent the inflow of rice to Kyushu from the other areas, it is necessary to produce and to distribute high quality rice in Kyushu.

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1. Although the government controls rice production in Japan, the production capacity of rice seems unstable. First, let us take "unit productivity": A crop per ten (10) are (100 square meters). It has been fluctuating in wide range since mid eighties, and gradually declining. One of the causes of this must be weather conditions. But some other reasons should be pointed out at the same time, such as: A tendency of concentration to a few particular types of rice to raise inspired by "delicious rice" policy, the increase of side job farmers and insufficient care in raising rice for water control, etc. due to the current situation that farms have only a small number of workers and they are mostly aged. Considering this condition of producing rice, the bad harvest in '93 was not a surprise. On the other hand, regarding farming acreage in twenty five (25) years of production control, while the paddy acreage of successful change from rice for staple food to rice for other purposes and other grains is increasing, the acreage of wasteland and the land abandoned farming is increasing as well. Accordingly, the paddy acreage of rice for staple food is decreasing in approximately twenty thousand (20,000) hectare (1 hectare = 100 are) every year. Moreover, the acceptance of minimum access may result in acceleration of reducing rice paddy acreage. This is because the acceptance will bring in constant rice import which would lower the price of rice, consequently, the increase of the number of farmers who no longer will be able to continue rice production. At present, the possible production capacity of rice based on unit productivity and farming acreage in Japan satisfies only ten (10) percent above the level of domestic demands and will decline further. 2. Not only because the current food control system no longer meets consumer needs, but also because of the criticism from rice producers, a demand for a new control system with emphasis on "free" distribution is growing. Looking into the formation process of the food control system in history, however, it shows the reflection of the Japanese government's policy to stabilize the supply and price of rice since Meiji era. Although it is said that the Japanese rice policy became permanent one from rather temporary measures to the circumstances by the creation of the Rice Law in 1921, this law could not bring in a stable balance of demand and supply and price of rice. Then, the Rice Control Law was proposed to strengthen governmental control and regulation. Finally, this current of efforts ended with the Food Control Law in 1942. After the war, in accordance with the change of supply and demand situation of rice, the mechanism of the market has been introduced further into the rice distribution and control system. As the financial burden of the government by the food control system is being contracted, the system has been run by the way that is far from its original ideal. Accordingly, the tendency that rice is "cheap" for producers but "expensive" for consumers is being furthered. Nevertheless, fluctuation in rice prices is extremely small in comparison to the one in the free distribution system before the war. Also, when rice supply is unstable and its price goes up quickly, as first oil shock and the turmoil followed the devastating rice harvest of '93, the control system worked, even if inadequately, to stabilize the demand and supply and price of rice. This was proven by the large difference in rising rates between the sales price of rice producers and purchase price of consumers. This owes some government intervention through the Food Control Law. 3. Rice was imported as an emergency purpose because of the terribly bad harvest of 1993. Upon the acceptance of minimum access of Uruguay Round, however, rice will be imported continually from next year on. These two events

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The movement of Direct Transaction with food producers of consumer coops became common among all over the country through the 80s decade, caused by the growth of citizen consumer coops and their joint buying system. The coops' preference for maximization of their size gave diversification and large-scale up of their direct transaction with producers. This paper will analyses, to clear the above issues, the experience of direct transaction by Chiba region consumers coop in the 80s. Will point out four problems in the trend of diversification and large-scaled up of the direct transaction such as; 1) It is difficult to supply products from small size production are as to the big consumers coops under the joint buying system. 2) It becomes more and more far off the supplying production areas. 3) Production areas tend to accelerate their large-scale up. 4) Definition of Direct Transaction is losing its substance and has covered only commodity contents (safety and fresher etc) aspects. These issues require further integrated examination from a point of view how to collect agricultural cargos under the declining production capacity. The policy of direct transaction has to focus especially on both producing process and structure of agricultural production.

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The poultry industry in Korea has confronted Trade liberalization and now must achieve structural reform in order to raise productivity and reach economic stability for the future. Recently, the Korean government decided to introduce integration (vertical and horizontal integration) in the livestock industry. The government had also provided guidelines for the vertical integration in the area of livestock industry. We called this as government supported integration. In order to clarify the actual stages, problems and the solution of the present poultry industry in Korea, comparison between Korea and Japan was done for several aspects of the industry. The merits of integration in poultry are obtained as follows ; 1) If horizontal and vertical integration proceed, costs of production will be lower in the integrated farm than non-integrated ones, and will be achieve economic stability of price both production material (chicks) and products (matured birds) price. 2) Farmers' incomes are ensured by contract farming. The function of distribution facilities (birds processing, egg grading and packing) is very important, because it helps to organize production and marketing. A good geographical location of the distribution facilities is very important. In this case, there is the need for the integration of the functions of slaughtering, cutting, and further processing, which will reduce processing and marketing costs. The type of integration is very important because it will decide the development of the livestock industry by the integrator. If the government vision is profitable for the farmer and consumer, then it should support the integration both a cooperative and local type. For this integration to go well, the government must provide economic support, leadership and adjustment, and mediate between integrator and grower.

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