Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) discussed the terms “invers-correspondence” (gyaku taio) and “ordinariness” (byojo tei) in his last essay: “Bashoteki ronri to shukyoteki sekaikan” (The Logic of Place and Religious World-view).
Nishida’s concept of ordinariness is one key to understanding the goal of his religious philosophy. The word “ordinariness” first appears in the recorded sayings of Chinese Chan (zen) monks. Originally it indicated a life of religious serenity characterized by “not doing” or “not acting” in any special way. Nishida, however, used this word to convey his own thought. In Nishida’s writings the word “ordinariness” refers to the “absolutely free individual being” (zettai jiyu no ko), the “creative individual being” (sozoteki ko), and the “historical individual being” (rekishiteki ko) that is realized through the self-denial of God or the Absolute. In other words, it is an eschatological concept.
In this essay, first I analyze all occurrences of the word “ordinariness” in “Bashoteki ronri to shukyoteki sekaikan” and then I explore the significance of this concept. In this way I clarify Nishida’s religious world-view and the way that it relates to the concrete world. I conclude by discussing the relationship between ordinariness and the concept of faith in Japanese Shin (i. e., Pure Land) Buddhism. Nishida’s philosophy is not mysticism. His religious philosophy is deeply connected to the real world. The concept “ordinariness” indicates that religious beings must work in the actual world and must create the historical world.

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In diesem Aufsatz geht es um den Gedanken von “Geviert”, über den 1949 in dem Vortragzyklus《Einblick in das was ist》in Bremen von Heidegger gesprochen wurde. In ihm bezeichnet Heidegger unsere Zeit als das Zeitalter der Herrschaft der Technik, deren Wesen “Ge-stell” genannt wird. Und in dem Wesen des “Ge-stell”, in der “Gefahr”, ereignen sich Verwahrlosung des Dinges und Verweigerung von Welt. Anderseits bringt Heidegger die Welt des “Geviertes” vor. D. h. indem das Ding Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen verweilt, dingt das Ding und weltet die Welt.
Wie ereignet sich jedoch das “Geviert” statt des “Ge-stells”? Wenn man die “Gefahr” als die “Gefahr” erfährt, kehrt sich die Seinsvergessenheit in die Wahrnis des Seyns, so denkt Heidegger. Um so zu erfahren, muß der Mensch dem Seyn zu entsprechen. Diese Haltung des Menschen wird mit Hilfe von der Betrachtung über die “Gelassenheit”, über die 1955 bei der Feier in Meßkirch gesprochen wurde, klarer werden.
Übrigens, der Gedanke von “Geviert” ist zwar reizend, aber es scheint mir zugleich, daß er schwer zu verwirklichen ist. Nach meiner Meinung stammt das daraus, daß in Heideggers Denken die Erörterung über die Beziehung zwischen dem “rechnenden Denken” und dem “besinnlichen Denken” ungenügend bleibt.

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In Sein und Zeit vollzieht M. Heidegger die existenziale Interpretation vom Phänomen Gewissensruf. Dabei betrachtet er es aber nur aus der fundamentalontologischen, nicht moralphilosophischen Perspektive. Diese Interpretation scheint uns weit entfernt von unserer alltäglichen Gewissenserfahrung und -auslegung zu sein, die Heidegger 《vulgäre》 Auslegung nennt. Er behauptet, der Ruf sage nichts, d. h. die Stimme des Gewissens spreche von 《Schuld》 als der bloßen formalen Bestimmung des Seins des Daseins, und für den Ruf sei die Bezogenheit auf unsere konkrete Schuld oder schuldbare Tat nicht primär und daher der Unterschied zwischen dem 《rügenden》 und 《warnenden》, oder 《guten》 und 《bösen》 Gewissen entspreche keinem ursprünglichen Wesen des Phänomens. Ich versuche in diesem Aufsatz, die Rechtmäßigkeit einer solchen Behauptung zu untersuchen und zu zeigen, daß und wie Heidegger das Phänomen als den phänomenalen Boden für seine ontologisch-transzendentale Fragestellung interpretiert, was aber unsere 《vulgäre》 Erfahrung und Auslegung überhaupt nicht ignoriert.

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Here we try to elucidate New Humanism in Mircea Eliade. This concept is considered as the creative hermeneutics, which points a new plane of a humanbeing’s knowledge. Although Eliade doesn’t determine this humanism clearly, he suggests that the phenomenology of religions should be a primary discipline for making it realized. Therefore, we at first take his methodology as the hermeneutics of the sacred ; this may help us understand how such a humanism could be. In this attempt, his concept totality will be our key.
In his methodology, we can find a correspondence of the relation between homo religiosus and the sacred things, with the relation between the hermeneute (as the phenomenologist of religions) and religious phenomena. The sacred reveals itself through natural objects in the profane. He explains this revelation as the dialectic of the sacred. It means that a profane object is sacralized through becoming a religious symbol or hierophany. Homo religiosus finds the sacred as a whole, total, larger system (the cosmos), uncovering a camouflage of the profane as a small and meaningless part of the natural world. Only the sacred can bring something meaningful. Correspondently, a hermeneute interprets religious meanings from religious data. A hermeneute as well as homo religiosus represents or reproduces the sacred meaning in its totality, beyond the limitation that everything seems to be just a part of the profane. And such a religious interpretation could make a hermenute participate in a total and meaningful world, as the experiences of the sacred could make homo religiosus participate in the sacred cosmos.
And we see that, from the point of view mentioned above, Eliade’s phenomenology of religions would realize his New Humanism partially. Although New Humanism in its totality couldn’t be reached, we can suppose it and can realize it partially in the creative and hermeneutic phenomenology of religions.

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During the Meiji period there were three types of ethics in Japan: utilitarian evolutionary theory, the theory of nationalistic self-realization, and the theory of idealistic self-realization. In this article I will elucidate the characteristics and transitions of the theory of idealistic self-realization.
Advocates of the theory of idealistic self-realization were Hajime Onishi and Ryosen Tsunajima, and we can see the origin of this theory in the idealistic moral philosophy developed by Thomas Hill Green in England. Green’s ultimate aim was to harmonize the conflict between modern life and Christian doctrine, so he argued that the end of our action lies in the realization of our ideal self in our actual self. Through this process of self-realization, our personality and society are morally trained to be just. In the end, we can say that Green aimed to explain and to logically reconstruct the Christian idea of Divine Providence.
Basing Green’s thought, Onishi maintained that our conscience was an expression of the evolutionary movement of the universe, and therefore a good deed meant one which participated in this movement. Onishi did not go so far as to insist that the only end of our action was self-realization, but Ryosen did. I argue that the theory of idealistic self-realization requires both doctrines to be sufficient as a theory.

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