Although the origin and development of the chambers of industry and commerce in Germany is regionally different and chronologically complicated, they could be grouped into several types. One of them, Rhine-type, is characterized by closely cooperative relations under the chambers which reflect an interregional interdependence in one of the most industrialized parts of Germany.
The chambers came here into existence at the beginning of the 19th century as auxiliary institutions of the Napoleonic central government in Aachen/Burtscheid, Crefeld, Stolberg, Trier, Eupen and Malmedy. Only Cologne made an exception because there had been in this city an organization of merchants already in the 18th century which was reorganized later as chamber of commerce.
After Rhineland was annexed to Prussia as a result of the Vienna Congress the government in Berlin did not allow at first the foundation of new chambers. But in the 1820's it approved another form of merchant organization, “Kaufmännische Korporation”, in the eastern part of Prussia i.e. in Berlin, Stettin, Danzig, Memel, Konigsberg, Tilsit, Elbing and Magdeburg. The chambers which were founded at length in the 1830's in Rhineland i.e. in Elberfeld, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Koblenz, M.-Gladbach, Wesel, Lennep, Mülheim a.d. Ruhr, Essen and Solingen, had to be now organized after the principle of the eastern institution, compulsory membership related to the minimum of the business tax.
The new principle was applied also to the older Napoleonic chambers, which caused a serious confusion especially in the chamber of Cologne. Big merchants were opposed to a reorganization. Moreover this affair fell on the beginning of the steamship navigation on the Rhine since 1827 by Preussisch-Rheinische Dampfschiff-fahrts-Gesellschaft and the conclusion of the Rhine Navigation Act in 1831 which gave a fatal blow to the class of small sailboat owners. The both antagonistic parties struggled now for the membership and leadership of the chamber. Therefore the chamber could hardly function through the 1830's as an institution for local interests of different classes and sectors.
In this process, however, the transition from the Napoleonic to the Rhine type of the chambers was performed and the leadership of the liberal big merchant class was in Cologne established which enabled the chamber now to represent the interest not only of the city but also of Rhineland as a whole because the merchants were most clearly aware of consequence of interregional relations with Holland and Belgium which were indispensable to build up the industrial structure of Rhineland in the era of traffic revolution.
The both companies of Preußisch-Rheinische Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft and Rheinische Eisenbahn Gesellschaft were creations of the chamber of Cologne as entrepreneur on the initiative of leading merchants by this time as Merkens, Boisserée and Camphausen.

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This paper presents a business history of the Western Bank of Scotland (hereafter, cited as the WBS) during the period 1832 to 1857. The paper also attempts to compare the management of the WBS with that of other Scottish banks.
A.W. Kerr attributed the cause of the failure to the WBS's manager's mismanagement leaving the bank with a shortage of reserves, in his “History of Banking in Scotland.” On the contrary, R.H. Campbell favoured the directors and manager and ascribed the failure to the hostile behaviour of the Edinburgh banks.
Five Edinburgh Chartered banks (The Bank of Scotland, The Royal Bank of Scotland, The British Linen Co., The National Bank of Scotland, The Commercial Bank of Scotland) played a great part in Scotland. These banks still had a large amount of Government Securities (Consol or Exchequer Bill) which accounted for 1/4 to 1/3 of the total assets of the bank. In consequence, the Edinburgh banks had a very stable constitution making them apt to hesitate to advance money into the industry field.
However in Glasgow, one of the centre of Anglo-american trade, many merchants and manufactures desired to establish a bank, financed trades. Under such a circumstances, the WBS was set up in 1832.
It is obvious that the comparatively high demand for money in Glasgow accelerated the promotion of the WBS. However the WBS made the mistake of adopting a lending policy which was too financed a considerable amount of the railway investment in U.S.A. by means of letters of credit through an agency in New York, James Lee & Co.

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