The purpose of this article is to analyze how the sales organization—Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company—was established and developed in the prewar Japanese pharmaceutical industry. An analysis of this achievement is very useful for explaining the process by which the distribution “keiretsu” was formed in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. It was during the period of high economic growth that the distribution keiretsu was introduced in the Japanese industry in earnest. However, the distribution keiretsu had already been introduced by some pioneer companies before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Some of the companies belonged to the pharmaceutical industry. We consider Taisho Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. as the pioneer companies that introduced the distribution keiretsu in the prewar Japanese pharmaceutical industry. However, it is necessary to study another key company—Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company—in addition to these two companies when we attempt to clarify the origin of the distribution keiretsu in the industry. This is because it is understood that Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company was the pioneer that first introduced the distribution keiretsu in the industry. This article analyzes the period from 1906 to around 1923-1924, because during this period, the sales organization of Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company operated to a large extent and functioned most effectively.
The purpose of this article is to clarify roles of high school graduate workers in Japan from the 1950s to the early 1960s. In particular, I address the following questions: Did high school graduate workers play the same roles as junior high school graduate workers in factories? And, if they played different roles, how were their roles different from those of junior high school graduate workers? In post-war Japan, high school enrollment ratio substantially went up, which led to the increase of high school graduate workers. High school graduates had worked as engineers and white-collars until the 1950s, while junior high school graduates had worked as skilled blue-collar workers. As a result of the increase of high school graduates, they came to be employed as blue-collar workers. The primary goal of this article is to reveal the impact of high school graduate workers on the production and working systems. To make clear the impact, first, I examine questionnaire surveys and other documents. From these surveys and documents, I derive two hypotheses: One hypothesis is that high school graduate workers were employed as substitutions of junior high school graduate workers and thus simply took same roles as junior high school graduate workers. The other hypothesis is that high school graduates contributed to the development of production systems as workers suitable for dealing with new technology, equipment or machines and thus had different roles from junior high school graduate workers. Then, I confirm those hypotheses using the data and reports by the University of Tokyo on three major companies; Hazama-gumi, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries, and Toyo Koatsu Kogyo. All investigations and reports for this study were made in the 1950s or the early 1960s. After examining these data and reports, I statistically analyze whether high school graduate workers had a positive impact on factory's production by using quantitative data. Finally, I make a concluding statement on roles of high school graduate workers and their impact on production systems.
This paper clarifies the structure of the management development in prewar days of a large-scale brewer in Nada, Hyogo Prefecture, observing the source of the profit in the distribution process. Tatsuuma-Honke in Nishinomiya is adopted as an example. The way that should be and the change of the complicated Japanese sake distribution process are considered by an analysis which combined its sales market, sales strategy, and individual management. As a result, the following points were solved in this paper. First, it is confirmed that in the mid-1920s Tatsuuma-Honke established even in Tokyo the relation of maker predominance which was previously being developed in a local market. Although the company did not necessarily persist in its share reservation in the Tokyo market, without being bound by the monopoly right of the brand which remained among each wholesaler, it was meaningful to enable sales with the “Hakushika” brand which it specified itself. In process of the trademark establishment, the production of self-made sake increased and the raising of the bottom level of the quality was achieved. As a result, in Tatsuuma-Honke, it became possible to use a sales strategy which was further conscious of the brand's bottling sales. However, it was more important for Tatsuuma-Honke to internalize the structure which combined a sales method — undiluted sake dealing in a tun unit— called “Oka-Uri” with the opposite character of bottling, and carries out the hedge of the unsold risk. This also meant the possibility that the purchase of the undiluted sake from a minor-scale brewer would be demoted to the 2nd buffer for a large-scale brewer. This indication adds new knowledge to a simple understanding that the former specialized in Oke-Uri and the latter was based on sales of brand sake, as shown by the conventional history of research. The high profitability in the distribution process as the above-mentioned result relatively stabilized the brewing management of Tatsuuma-Honke in the depression of the 1920s. Such a case was just a pattern of the development which preceded the large-scale management in the prewar-days term of the Nada brewing industry.