The aim of this paper is to examine the trend of Senboku (the southern district of Osaka prefecture) textile weaving industry in the interwar period by analyzing the trend of the management of a textile weaving factory in the district. For the examination, we have investigated the trend of the management of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period. Through this investigation, we can divide the management period of Nayatake textile weaving factory in the interwar period into three parts as follows. 1 The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced cotton textile goods (1922-25) The management of Nayatake in this period depended heavily upon Senboku county. In short Nayatake carried on most of transactions with cotton yarns wholesale stores, textile wholesale stores, and banks in Senboku county. 2 The management period in which products of Nayatake were diversified (1926-30) Nayatake adopted a product diversification strategy in which Nayatake produced cotton blankets and cotton shawls in addition to cotton sheets in order to get out of depression. So the management of Nayatake in this period was very different from the first period. The term-end profit of Nayatake was improved by adopting this strategy. And also as far as yarns and textile wholesale stores and banks were concerned, Nayatake carried on transactions on a much larger scale than the first period by adopting it. To put it concretely, as far as wholesale stores were concerned, Nayatake depended much more upon Osaka city than the first period. 3 The management period in which Nayatake mainly produced woolen textile goods (1931-38) As the management of Nayatake continued to suffer a decrease in profit for seven semiannual settlement terms, Nayatake needed further diversification of its products. So Nayatake started to produce woolen goods by introducing high-performance wool-looms. Introducing them made Nayatake capital intensive, and a term-end profit was improved quickly. In this period Nayatake tended to sell woolen goods to wholesale stores in Osaka city by check and cotton goods to local wholesale stores on credit. Also Nayatake tended to buy woolen yarns directly from woolen spinning companies and cotton yarns from wholesale stores in both Osaka and Senboku county. As far as attached finished processing was concerned, napping processing depended upon Senboku, and another processing upon Osaka city and an advanced woolen weaving area, Bishu. Moreover Nayatake tended to carry on transactions with banks in Osaka city in addition to local banks in Senboku county. Through the analysis mentioned above, the conclusion of this paper should be noted as follows. Senboku county became the most famous woolen textile weaving area in Japan after World War II. However the conversion from cotton textiles to woolen textiles had already occurred during the period from the 1930s to 1930s. Therefore the interwar period was the very turning point for Senboku which would succeed as the most well-known woolen textile weaving area after the War.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, the history of eastern banking was dominated by the depreciation of silver in terms of gold. The continuous decline in the value of silver was a problem for all eastern exchange banks. The Oriental Bank, which was the largest bank in Asia, fell into a business crisis and stopped payment in 1884. Under these circumstances, the Hongkong Bank extended their business, made remunerative profits and became the largest bank in Asia. How could the Hongkong Bank get over the difficulties produced by the exchange fluctuation, and grow up in such bad times? The Hongkong Bank's activities in this era were marked by the Even Keel Policy. One purpose of this article attempts to examine what the Even Keel Policy was through contemporary evidence. Even though the Hongkong Bank adopted the Even Keel Policy, the Bank could not overcome all difficulties. The Bank suffered considerable losses on the exchange business in 1886. The other purpose of this article is to try to investigate why the Bank suffered heavy losses in 1886. The foreign exchange banks had to lay in fund largely at Hankow as preparation for the Chinese tea season. They had remitted a very large amount of their funds to Hankow in Shansi bankers' drafts since 1875. But this mode of remittance was stopped by the Shanghai financial crisis of 1883. Therefore, the Hongkong Bank had to send their fund in the form of “Sycee” to Hankow. In the spring of 1886, the silver panic happened suddenly, when the Hongkong Bank remitted large “Sycee” to Hankow. As a result, the Hongkong Bank could not avoid suffering heavy losses from the silver panic of 1886.