Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks in Deutschland besteht aus zwei verschiedenen Abschnitte. Der erste Abschnitt von 1916 bis 1945 ist die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein grosses Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals, und der zweite von 1945 bis heute ist die Geschichte als ein volkseigener Betrieb der DDR. Dieses Referat spricht hauptsachlich uber den ersten Abschnitt. Die Geschichte des Leuna-Werks als ein kapitalistisches Werk des I G-Konzerns ist in zwei Bestandteile zu teilen, also, erstens die Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung des I G-Monopolkapitals, zweitens die der Grundung und Entwicklung des Leuna-Werks selbst. Die Entstehung des I G-Trusts in 1925 war ein Erfolg des langen Entwicklungsprozesses der acht groBen Chemiegesellschaften, die in 1904 zwei Interessengemeinschaften und dann in 1916 ein groBe Interessengemeinschaft bildeten. In 1925 wurden diese acht Gesellschaften in einem Trust, “I G Farbenindustrie AG”, fusioniert. Das Leuna-Werk selbst wurde in 1916 als ein Werk von “Die Badische Anilin-und Sodafabik” begrundet, dann in 1920 als ihre Tochtergesellschaft, “Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, ” reorganisiert, und nach 1925 als das grosste Werk des I G-Monopolkapitals entwickelt. Aber die Niederlage des deutschen Imperiolismus in dem zweiten Weltkrieg war zugleich die Ende des Leuna-Werks als Werk des Monopolkapitals. Heute ist es “VEB Leuna-Werke Walter Ulbricht” in der DDR.
The system of publicizing business balance sheets was introduced to Japan early in the Meiji period on two separate occasions. When the government transplanted the National Bank system from the United States to Japan, in the years 1873-75, it attempted to institutionalize financial statements as a means of controlling the activities of the new National Banks in Japan. Again, in 1883, in the course of introducing continental commercial law to Japan, the French and German system of financial statements was adopted as the core of the accounting system required by the new law. In the interval the British form of balance sheet prevailed, under the influence of the Meiji government, and terms such as karikata (“debtor”) or fusai-gimu (“liabilities and obligations”), and kashikata (“creditor”) or shisan-kenri (“assets and claims”) were prevalent. When the Continental system was applied, the term actif=Passiva, which properly meant “asset, ” and the term passif=Passiva, which meant “liability”, were translated respectively as kashikata (Cr) and karikata (Dr). These translations were authorized and established by the first commercial law, issued in 1890. Consequently, in spite of the application of the Continental form of balance sheet which listed the assets on the left hand and the liabilities and obligations on the right, the British form which listed the liabilities and capital on the left hand and the assets on the right had to be followed according to the commercial law. The two forms of balance sheet, Continental and British, continued to be valid side by side until the system was unified following the Continental pattern in the middle of the Taisho period, and the commercial law revised in 1922. In the meantime, however, debates on the appropriate form of balance sheet were frequent between the two schools, British and Continental. The controversy was similar to the dispute which arose among British accountants at the beginning of the 20th century concerning Table B of the Company Act of 1862.
This paper deals with a cotton manufacturing company in Manchester, New Hampshire, promoted by a group of entrepreneurs known as the “Boston Associates.” Started as a small establishment in the 1830's, this company had grown in the space of a century to one of the largest-scale and highest quality companies in the industry. But though the mills in Manchester were firmly established, the management of the company in Boston was totally unsuited to meeting the changing situation in the early 20th century. One of the causes of the company's bankruptcy in the 1930's was attributed to mismanagement by the executives. With an emphasis on the functions, respectively, of the company treasurer and of the local mill agent, this paper analyzes the relationship between decision-making and execution, and discusses some of the characteristics of business enterprises controlled by the so-called general entrepreneurs of 19th century America.
Japan's protective policy towards its ship-building industry originated in the enactment of the Ship-Building Promotion Law in 1896. It was intended not to protect particular companies, but to increase the total building capacity of the country by offering premiums for the building of new steel ships larger than 700 tons gross. However, the response to this protective policy and its effects on individual businesses varied markedly depending on the particular circumstances of each ship-yard. This paper attempts to examine the characteristics of the response made by the Ishikawajima Ship-Building Yard to the new law, and the nature of the decisions made by Eiichi Shibusawa, chairman of the company, in the face both of opportunity and crisis. The Ishikawajima company built a large new yard at Uraga in response to the Promotion Law, but it was unable to utilize the yard to its full capacity because of the absence of intimate contacts with major shipping companies, and thus could not take advantage of the premiums offered by the new law. Shibusawa, quick to recognize his mistake, had the foresight to curtail the business, sell the new yard to a competitor, the Uraga Dock Company, established in 1896, and to expand his company's construction of machinery. As a result the company managed to escape total failure, and in a few years had entirely recovered financially. The Uraga Dock Co., meanwhile, was equally unable to take advantage of the huge yard it had bought from Ishikawajima, and its business, too, began to decline gradually. By contrast, both the Mitsubishi and Kawasaki Ship-Building Yard's kept intimate contact with the leading shipping companies, such as Nippon Yusen and Osaka Shosen, and were thus able to secure huge premiums and solidify their positions in the industry.