The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between changes in shipping markets and trading companies' shipping businesses from the first decade of the 1900s through the 1920s. In shipping markets during the period through the First World War, in which concentrated chartering markets such as the Baltic market played a very important role, Mitsui & Co. employed centralized management of branch offices, expanding its shipping sections, which constituted internal markets. However, as the role of liners grew with expansion of the scheduled shipping network beginning in the second half of the 1920s, the transportation functions of general trading companies began to operate in an autonomous and decentralized fashion at the branch offices that managed each scheduled service. At this time, large shippers such as Mitsui & Co. maintained their competitive strengths by concluding tariff contracts with under-the-table rebates. As a result of such changes in shipping functions, trading companies' domestic shipping sections were forced to choose whether to shift to common carriers or to contract in size through external sourcing of freight space. While under the leadership of its manager Kawamura the shipping division of Mitsui & Co. chose the former option, Mitsubishi Corp. chose the latter.
This paper aims to illustrate the pressure from the capital market brought to even national policy concerns, by analyzing the relationship between Taiwan Development Company (TDC) and its shareholders. In most of previous researches, TDC's shareholders were supposed to be “stable shareholders,” which would not sell their stocks even if the investment destination shows poor business performance, because TDC is a national policy concern. In the procedure of founding TDC in 1936, “stable shareholders” were welcomed and, in fact, two thirds stocks were allocated to foundation members and institutional shareholders such as sugar manufacturing companies or zaibatsu holding companies. However, it is not empirically supported that they did not sell their stocks in the secondary market. In this paper, we investigate selling and buying by all shareholders of TDC, using the list of shareholders from 1937 to 1943, and illustrate the counterplan arranged by managers of TDC, analyzing the company documents. The main findings of this paper are as follows. 1) Individual minority shareholders had continuously sold their stocks since shortly after the foundation of TDC. As a result, the number of shareholders had gradually decreased. 2) Institutional shareholders began to sell the stocks of TDC from around the latter half of 1941. Even sugar manufacturing companies except for Meiji Seito sold their stocks at this time. And when TDC increased capital in 1942, considerable parts of institutional shareholders did not subscribe newly issued stocks. 3) The managers of TDC seriously recognized the pressure from the capital market and attempted to raise profitability and seek new shareholders. 4) It is financial institutions such as mutual loan companies or life insurance companies that purchases stocks of TDC, which were sold by institutional shareholders. They should be considered to have financially supported TDC since around 1941.
In the early 1950s, it was pointed out by the MOF's financial inspectors that almost all small and medium sized banks lacked the modern bureaucratic management structures with scientific business analyses, formally rational procedures and rules. Thus, the banks were instructed by the inspectors on improving their management structures in the modern bureaucratization like Weberian's meanings. According to the inspectors' perceptions, the degrees of the improvements among each group of banks were differed during the 1950s. The regional Banks' improvements in their management structures weren't progressed completely until the end of 1950s. The mutual banks' improvements in their management structures weren't nearly progressed until the same era. To sum up, the direction of the instructions as to the banking managements by the inspectors was the one to change the banking managements from non-bureaucratic and non-effective ways of the managements to a bureaucratic and more effective ways. Through the process shown above, the modernization in the banking management structures was led by the MOF's financial inspectors toward the final stage in the end of the 1950s.