In this paper, based on investigation of clothing retailers in eighteenth century London, I try to clarify the role of retailers in the consumer revolution and discern the degree of modernity of eighteenth century London retail shops.
In eighteenth century England, there were splendid urban growth and development of shopping area in many towns and retailers of these areas began to display novel goods at their shop windows and tried to sell fashionable things. Especially in London, shopkeepers were strongly sensitive to fashion trends. A key to their business success was in understanding fashion trends and keeping up with the latest fashions. Active business conduct going along with fashion was decisive for shopkeepers in London and they played an important role in diffusion of new fashion trends.
I have investigated trade cards of some London clothing retailers and the business records of a London milliner. They sold diverse clothes and ornaments, but focused their business on preparing and arranging fashionable dresses and hats. The main concern of Mary Holl, whose records I have investigated was to provide sales of lace or other ornaments and the service of stitching these ornaments into clothes as well as washing and mending clothes. They tried to provide customer satisfaction by offering services which adopted the latest fashions and also suited the middle class customer's identity.
It is also clear from records of Mary Holl, and other documents, that the outer and inner appearance of shops were important elements to attract potential customers. Show windows displayed diverse goods and a tasteful shop façade could lure customers into the shops. Inside of many shops there was a special space for the favoured customers to rest while shopping. Shopping became a leisure activity in the late eighteenth century; it was a very important business strategy for shopkeepers to enhance customer satisfaction by preparing comfortable space, especially for female customers.
In the late eighteenth century, at the onset of the consumer society, shopkeepers in London, such as Mary Holl, whose customers were mainly the middling sorts of people played a very important role in increasing the consumption and spreading fashion trends.

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The purpose of this paper is to describe how coordination of plant investment in the petrochemical industry by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not achieve its originally intended function.
In 1967, MITI established a 300,000 ton standard for annual production of ethylene in order achieve economies of scale and strengthen international competitiveness. This standard sets the minimum size for new ethylene manufacturing facilities at annual production of 300,000 tons. In this way, MITI aimed to avoid overcapacity and consolidate investment. Part of the background behind establishing this standard was the ulterior motive of leading firms, who wished to block the entry of relatively weak latecomer firms.
The intentions of MITI and the leading firms were realized comparatively well, based on the 300,000 ton standard, in initial coordination of plant investment. Facility construction was only approved for 5 companies, primarily leading firms. Furthermore, the scale of investment in the overall industry was restrained at a smaller scale than would have been the case had each firm invested freely.
However, demand for petrochemical products subsequently increased more than expected, resulting in a situation different from that which was originally intended. In later coordination of plant investment, MITI concluded that it was necessary to construct more facilities to satisfy future demand, in response to the growth in demand at that time. Accordingly, new facility construction by 4 companies was gradually recognized. Due to growth in demand, MITI's policy of blocking the entry of latecomer firms lost its legitimacy. In the final phase, MITI recognized active construction of new facilities to match the increase in demand.

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This paper focuses on problem about management and collection of the loans by government financial institution. Specifically, this article examines how the Japan Development Bank (JDB, Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkou) managed and collected loans that taken over from the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB, Fukkou Kinyuu Kinko) in the first half of the 1950s.
The RFB, which played an important role in reconstruction of Japanese economy after World War II by supplying industrial funds, was disbanded in January 1952. Its vast uncollected loans were taken over by the JDB. Since then, the JDB managed and collected those loans.
Among those loans, loans to coal mining industry were the biggest one measured by outstanding loans and amount of collection. In addition, collection rate of loans to that industry was lowest at end of March 1956.
In the first half of 1950s, for the JDB, collected money of those loans was important resource on its own activities. Therefore, the JDB selected to mitigate collection from coal mining industry on its own managerial point of view. Around the same time, the Government, whose priority was put on cutting price of coal, made several plans that included across-the-board mitigation of collection from that industry. However, those plans were not brought into effect. If political and unselective mitigation carried out along those plans, collection rate of loans to that industry was far lower.
Previous studies about the JDB put importance on its independence at lending activities that is one aspect of the financial institution. However, the result of this paper shows that its subjectivity at managing and collecting activities that is another aspect also should be emphasized.

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