This article focuses on the decision-making process of Prime Minister Heath's administration toward the corporate failure of Rolls-Royce. I chose this process in light of the fact that modern airliner projects were too big to be managed by private corporations. I will examine not only the question, “Why did Rolls-Royce go bankrupt?”, but also “Why did the Heath administration leave Rolls-Royce to go bankrupt?”
In March 1968, Rolls-Royce made a contract for producing RB211 engines for Lockheed's TriStar airliners. At that time, Lockheed and Rolls-Royce expected the TriStar/RB211 to enjoy a monopoly in the medium-range wide-bodied airliner market. However, the expected production quantity for the RB211 had been shrinking. Rolls-Royce, therefore, could not absorb the escalation of the development costs of the RB211 project and, consequently, suffered a severe liquidity crisis. At the time of the first liquidity crisis in October 1970, the Heath administration pulled out of a commitment from the City as money lenders to Rolls-Royce. At the time of the second liquidity crisis in January 1971, the Heath administration decided to leave Rolls-Royce to go into bankruptcy. If the RB211 were to be cancelled, it would certainly cause the chain bankruptcy of Lockheed. As a result, Lockheed, the United States Nixon administration, the British Heath administration, and the United States bank group started negotiations over the continuation of the TriStar/RB211 project. By June 1971, the United States bank group agreed to provide a new $250 million loan to Lockheed subject to a debt guarantee by the United States government. With this new loan, Lockheed had the room to raise the price of the RB211 engines.
Faced with the crisis of this prestigious national corporation. the Heath administration did not bail out Rolls-Royce by limitless government financial commitment but rather ‘bailed in’ concerned business interests — namely, the City, Lockheed, and the United States bank group.

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The purpose of this article is to clarify reorganization process of production system in the metal mold industry in the first half of the high growth era. In the preceding literature has mainly focused on the positive investment in the metal mold manufacture of this period, and overlooked the shift of the production system which played on important role for the development of this industry. Therefore, this paper focused on the metal mold industry of Tokyo, and examined reorganization of production system.
In the metal mold industry at the high-growth period, the shift from comprehensive controI production system to segment control production system has advanced rapidly. The expansion of the mold market caused the shortage of skilled labor. Because it took time to promote skilled labor, it was difficult in comprehensive control production system correspond to the expansion. Therefore, the system of production system that did not need the skilled labor was pursued in the metal mold industry. And, the aggressive capital investment in the latter half of the 1950's had big influence on the shift of the system. The introduction of a special machine and new and powerful equipment enabled the dismantlement of the skilled labor. As a result, the production process was divided, and the skilled labor came to be concentrated on the processes which required the high skilled labor.
Thus, the metal mold manufacturing at the high-growth period had reorganized the system of production flexibly with the problem. In addition the productivity of this system was higher than the comprehensive control production system. Therefore, in this article, it is confirmed the expansion of the mold market led the reorganization of the production system which resulted in the high productivity.

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This paper aims to illustrate recruitment, wages, and the working conditions of ship's officers with a special reference to Mitsui Line, the shipping division of Mitsui & Co. in the 1920s.
There were thirteen mercantile marine schools in Japan in the 1920s. Mitsui Line hired the new graduates of these schools as officers and engineers. Every year for the first half of the 1920s, Mitsui Line employed many new graduates. Consequently, approximately 50% of the officers and engineers comprised young employees with less than five years of service.
Employees' monthly income comprised three parts : base salary, extra salary, and additional salary for sea-service. In the wake of First World War, the Japanese economy experienced inflation and there was a rapid increase in wages. Mitsui Line had to take adequate measures in response to this new situation. The company introduced the component of “extra salary” after controlling the base salary. This extra salary component continued even after the war. The officers' bonus was equivalent to the total monthly income for five or six months. Additionally, the company paid a large sum as retirement allowance to its officers. In the case of employees with 25 years of service, the retirement allowance was equivalent to the base salary for 135 months, which constituted approximately 20∼30 thousand yen.
However, the working conditions of officers and engineers were very arduous. They were required to have onboard experience for about 300 days per year during the interwar period. In the case of officers, the working hours per day were about twelve. Apart from being on watch daily, they had to manage rnany desk tasks such as cargo planning. In those days, cargo planning was a tedious task. The living conditions in ships were severe, especially in the engine rooms. Mitsui Line provided high salaries and retirement allowances in exchange for long-term, rigorous labor. Compared to the white-collar staff of other large Japanese enterprises, it can be said that Mitsui Line's treatment of the employees was not particularly good.

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