The purpose of this article is to study the process and features of the so-called 'military transition' of the Japanese automobile firms during the wartime. 'Small vehicle' manufacturing sector and automobile sales sector were then repressed by the military government, for they were thought to be unfitted to military use. Therefore, these sectors were compelled to change their product item, otherwise to be closed and to supply their labor forces to the military sector. In the meanwhile, the vast amount of capital for constructing and enlarging the factories was required by firms in order to transit the product item. The main focus of this article lies in the analysis of financing the capital for restructuring by the firms concerned.
Nihonnainenki established in 1932, was the 3^rd manufacture of small vehicles for civil use. In the initial phase, the management of this firm possessed to the Nihonjidosha. But, in 1936, it was transferred to Terada Zinkichi who was the top management of Terada Zaibatsu. Because he was the active manager for the military production, Nihonnainenki rapidly enlarged the production capacity. Since 1938, on which wartime economy began, up until 1942, production focused to small vehicle for military use. However, since 1943, it shifted to airplane parts under the financial support by the Nihon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan).
Nihonjidosha established in 1909, was the largest automobile sales firm in the inter-war Japan. It was originated as a division of the Okura Zaibatsu, but Okura's influence to this firm became weaker and weaker. Initially, Nihonjidosha was reluctant for transiting the business and enlarging the capacity, although automobile sales sector was repressed. However since late 1943, the firm also started to produce tornado parts for navy, under the financial support by the Senji Kinyu Kinko (Wartime Finance Fund).
In conclusion, the transition of Japanese automobile companies during the wartime from civil to military production could be performed only under the financial aegis of the public banking institutions. And, nothing explains better than the firm's managerial strategy that makes a distinction between Nihonnainenki and Nihojidosha.

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The aim of this paper is to see whether the Prussian (German) railroads in the 19^th century evolved a system of internal labor markets and to investigate the influence of a traditional rule of employment in the Prussian bureaucracy on the employment relationships. It examines the promotion systems of the middle-ranked employees and assesses the existence of internal labor markets in the Prussian railroads from the 1850'^S. This result indicates that the Prussian (private-and state owned-) railroads developed a modern employment system that was suitable for inducing available humane resources. The predominant employment of the retired officers and soldiers with the testimonial for maintenance in the civil service (Civilversorgungsschein) had a negative effect on the functions of these internal labor markets. The result of the introduction of traditional German-Prussian bureaucratic system in the railroads was ambivalent; on the one hand, the bureaucracy was a source of an internal labor market -some preferential treatment of the long-time employed in the employment relationship, but, on the other hand, it burdened the modern economic organizations with the risk and/or uncertainity of the supplied labor forces.

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Muto Sanji (武藤山治) (1867-1934) was one of the greatest Japanese business leaders in the early 20^th century. He succeeded in managing the Kanegafuti Spinning Company (鐘淵紡績株式会社), which developed significantly under his prominent leadership. He was well-known for his paternalism in the company and distinguished for his dignified stance to the shareholders. This paper attempts to find how he could get the shareholders' support for his welfare works which cost much money.
Muto knew that he must give the employees good working environments and conditions to induce them to work hard. He made all the possible improvements for the employees and he himself worked hard with them. On the other hand, he rejected any unreasonable request for dividend-increase and refused almost all the proposals from the shareholders to increase capital because they were often schemed just to get capital gain.
The company grew better-off owing to his good management and came to able to pay a high dividend to the shareholders. Then Muto began to pay a higher dividend than those of other companies in return for the shareholders' cooperation for his policy to avoid unreasonable capital increase, and he could build the complete welfare facilities with their consents.
This paper will give some hints to the Japanese managers struggling to create a new business model today.

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