This paper focuses on Electronic Components makers (of mainly capacitors, resistors, transformers, speakers) from 1945 to 1960. Though most of them were small and medium firms, they established a high volume of production with many new components that large scale firms were unable to make. They also achieved a high growth in their scale of operations from less than 10 workers to more than 300, sometimes 1000 workers within only a 15 year time period. These firms will be referred to as Specialty Components Makers. Here I study how they achieved such progress. In doing so, this period will be divided into two eras of Reconstruction (1945-52) and Growth (1953-60). During the Reconstruction era, many electronic components makers were founded. The founders didn't require expensive capital equipment because electronic components were labor intensive. They sold their products through merchants mainly located in Tokyo and Osaka. The merchants established a wide marketing network and components makers could increase their sales through these networks. To increase production without much investment they formed many cooperative associations. Furthermore, they needed to acquire much electronic technology and founders pursued various cooperative investigation by the support of public research institutes. During the growth era, the radio and television industries began developing quickly. Main customers of component makers switched to radio and television assembling makers. To catch up with increasing demand, components makers had to expand their product line. Much of investment was put into building factories and firm scale expanded. They also needed to produce high quality components. However such a huge investment created a lack of funds for research. So they were still strongly dependent on cooperative investigations. As a result, many components makers became specialized components makers, accumulated high technology within the firm, and achieved high volume production by the end of 1950s.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the cause of the sluggish growth in the labor productivity of the shipbuilding industry of the German Democratic Republic-GDR-during the decade immediately following World War II. Particular attention will be placed on the quality of laborers and its management. From 1945 to 1955 the shipyards of the GDR in the Baltic seaport of Mecklenburgs employed some 35, 000 new laborers. Although some of these individuals had been skilled workers, most of the others had been not. So it was necessary to train these laborers, but the vocational training had many problems. To further complicate matters, a number of the skilled workers there began leaving the industry in search of improved working conditions and better wages. Consequently, the GDR's shipbuilding industry was crippled the shortage of the skilled workers. In terms production management, most of the middle management personnel lacked the ability to manage well. Foreman lacked the authority to avoid having their leadership usurped by the organization of labor interest groups-called “Brigade”. In addition to management's inability to lead, socialist competition was not sufficiently regulated. This caused poor production. Furthermore, there was little rationality in setting up wage rate and norm for piece-work wages. These critical factors combined brought about laxity of production. It is true the post-war condition was a cause of the difficulties of the shipbuilding industry after the war, but the defects in production planning, delayed supplies and the poor quality of materials, and a seller's market of labor and goods were important and determining cause of the negative ramifications in both labor and management.