The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wartime transportation control of Japanese National Railways (JNR) and make it clear that the management of JNR reached the limit, as the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid became intense.
Since the Sino-Japanese War broke out, JNR had to cope with the sharply increased transportation demand caused by the industrial development as well as the military operation. In addition to the demand increase, JNR was always requested to supervise and support other companies, especially colonial railways as not only a transportation enterprise but also a regulatory agency to transportation companies. However, JNR was not a passive existence but the one to secure human and physical resources aggressively to some degree in case of negotiations with other ministries as one of the government ministries. As far as the railroad operation was possible, the profit seeking was a subsidiary matter. The persistent cooperation of JNR with Japanese Government and Army was shown by maximum transportation capacity even when JNR had insufficient management resources. Especially, after the breakout of WWII, Japanese wartime economic management could be difficult without the land transportation of JNR which substituted for marine transportation. Nonetheless, JNR resisted Japanese Army's intention to seize the railroad management right, which led to the dissatisfaction of the Army until the end of war.
As a result, an efficient railroad operation system was accomplished according to the evolution of wartime economy and military situation. But, it reached the limit because of the lack of JNR's management resources and U.S. Air Force's raid.

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Recent studies contend that Taiwanese small- and medium-sized enterprises not only were able to survive but thrive during Japanese colonial rule. However, the scarcity of primary historical sources has not led to further research in this area. This article analyzes the factors for the business failure of a Japanese enterprise, the Taiwan Canned Pineapple Co. (TCPC), which was the first packer in Taiwan, and through this case study, indirectly highlights the reasons for the resilience of Taiwanese enterprises.
TCPC prospered in the early 1920s. However, when many Taiwanese packers entered the market from the mid-1920s, TCPC faced difficulties, even though it adopted the new business policy of focusing on the quantity rather than the quality of products. The causes of TCPC' s slump can be explained as follows.
First, the measures taken by TCPC, such as processing by machinery and procurement of pineapples from its own plantation, were not appropriate for the condition of the market and the technology of the pineapple industry at that time. In particular, TCPC' s investment in the pineapple plantation, unlike the situation where most Taiwanese factories did not possess their own pineapple plantations, was a crucial factor for its poor business performance. In marked contrast to TCPC, Taiwanese factories also adopted a labor-intensive method of production, which further contributed to its success in the industry.
Second, after the bankruptcy of Suzuki & Co. in 1927, TCPC did not involve trading companies and wholesalers as its shareholders and did not have close connection with them. TCPC, therefore, became disadvantaged not only in sales and marketing but also in financing.
Third, the assistance which the Japanese colonial government (Taiwan Sotokufu) provided to TCPC, such as the disposal of government land and lending of machinery, did not help much in facilitating TCPC' s business.
In conclusion, this case study shows that Japanese small- and medium-sized enterprises could not compete with Taiwanese enterprises in such labor- intensive light industries as the canned pineapple industry.

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This paper examines the asset management practices of local wealth-holders in the prewar era. Based on the cases of the Kamino and Tomita families in Aichi Prefecture, the analysis is advanced from two perspectives: (1) What kind of asset management were local wealth-holders aiming at ? (2) How was it actually practiced ? This paper analyzes the Kaseiyousoku, the family constitution, of these two families and identifies the asset management methods used. The Kaseiyousoku classified the assets of the two families into two categories: assets jointly owned and managed by the two families and assets individually owned and managed by each family. It seems that such mechanism delineated the action of both families afterwards over a long period of time.
This paper examines the remunerations of the heads of both families and the activities of Kamitomishokusan, the asset-preserving company for jointly-owned assets, during the relatively long period starting in 1891 to 1945 and clarifies how they were actually undertaken. As a result, the asset management practices of both families, not identified by existing literature, become clear.
The circumstances faced by both families were taken into consideration as much as possible in the process of analysis. Both families sought and acted to accomplish the asset management system set by family constitution. This paper shows that, as a result, both families were spending their entire efforts only to preserve their assets. This consists one answer to the question posed by previous literature on why the asset-preserving company of both families did not actively invest in stocks.

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